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Summary
This thesis deals with renewable energy adoption in Germany. We exploit a unique
dataset which includes the location, date of installation and size of all photovoltaic
systems, wind power plants and biomass plants for generating electricity installed
in Germany through 2011. Importantly, a strong federal subsidy scheme has fos-
tered the adoption of the three technologies since 2000. Panel data analyses on
different levels of geographical aggregation allow us to identify drivers, barriers and
implications of renewable energy adoption in Germany.
We start our analysis by motivating the topic. Then, we review literature on tech-
nology adoption. Numerous studies confirm that technology diffusion follows an
S-shaped, logistic pattern. A description of the institutional context, aggregate
trends and regional differences in renewable energy adoption in Germany follows.
The purpose of the subsequent section is to illuminate the spatio-temporal diffusion
of photovoltaic installations in Germany quantitatively and to test whether imitation
drives photovoltaics adoption. We choose an aggregate approach and employ an
epidemic diffusion model which includes a spatial dimension. According to our
results, imitative adoption behavior is highly localized and an important factor for
the adoption of photovoltaic systems.
In the following section, we change our focus on spatio-temporal variation of peer
effects, i.e., imitation, in photovoltaics adoption. We add detailed locational data
on potential adopters. This data allows us to construct an individual measure of
peer effects for each potential adopter. Based on a discrete choice model, we confirm
again that peer effects are mostly localized. They generally occur within a radius
of 500 meters. We also find that the peer effect’s impact on the decision to adopt
decreases over time.
The next section makes use of the well-studied logistic shape of technology diffusion.
The common diffusion path allows us to test whether the adoption rate of renewable
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energy plants differs between German NUTS-3 regions (‘Landkreise und Kreisfreie
Sta¨dte’) in which a successful referendum against a single plant was organized and
the remaining regions. We exploit the fact that referenda are mainly organized on
the municipal district (‘Gemeinde’) level against a single plant or building area. Our
analysis reveals that the adoption rate (i.e., the first difference in the diffusion level)
is indeed lower in NUTS-3 regions where a referendum took place. This finding holds
true for wind power and large biomass plants which are both industrial. In contrast,
we do not find the same for photovoltaic installations which are mainly private,
household installations. We interpret this as evidence that potential investors in
wind power and large biomass plants not only avoid the municipal district where a
referendum against the specific technology was organized but stay away from the
whole NUTS-3 region.
Finally, we turn to implications from renewable energy adoption. We estimate the
effect of the diffusion of photovoltaic systems on the fraction of votes obtained by
Germany’s Green Party in federal elections. We take first differences and instru-
ment adoption rates by lagged diffusion levels. We predict the diffusion levels with
a logistic diffusion curve. The existing rationales for non-linearities in diffusion and
the ubiquity of logistic curves ensure that our predicted instrument is orthogonal to
variables that directly affect voting patterns. We find that the diffusion of domes-
tic photovoltaic systems caused a quarter of the increment in green votes between
1998 and 2009. We confirm our findings with survey data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel.
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Summary in German –
Zusammenfassung
Diese Arbeit bescha¨ftigt sich mit der Verbreitung von erneuerbaren Energietech-
nologien in Deutschland. Grundlage der Analysen ist ein einmaliger Datensatz,
der Aufstellungsort, Netzanbindungsdatum sowie Anlagengro¨ße von allen bis 2011
installierten Photovoltaik-, Windkraft- und Biomasseanlagen zur Stromgewinnung
entha¨lt. Die Verbreitung dieser Technologien wird seit dem Jahr 2000 durch das
bundesweit gu¨ltige Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz gefo¨rdert. Anhand von Panel-
datenscha¨tzungen, die auf unterschiedlichen geographischen Aggregationsleveln zur
Anwendung kommen, identifizieren wir sowohl fo¨rdernde als auch verbreitungshem-
mende Faktoren. Zudem decken wir Implikationen der Verbreitung erneuerbarer
Energietechnologien auf.
Zuna¨chst motivieren wir das Thema dieser Arbeit. Danach schaffen wir einen Lite-
raturu¨berblick zum Thema Technologiediffusion. Zahlreiche Studien besta¨tigen,
dass die Verbreitung einem S-fo¨rmigen, logistischen Verlauf folgt. Daraufhin be-
schreiben wir die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen, aggregierte Trends und re-
gionale Unterschiede in der Verbreitung von erneuerbaren Energietechnologien in
Deutschland.
Das Ziel des na¨chsten Abschnitts dieser Arbeit ist, die Verbreitung von Photo-
voltaikanlagen in Deutschland quantitativ u¨ber Raum und Zeit zu analysieren. Wir
u¨berpru¨fen, ob Imitation die Verbreitung von Photovoltaikanlagen fo¨rdert. Wir
aggregieren die Nutzungsdaten und verwenden ein epidemisches Diffusionsmodell
mit einer ra¨umlichen Komponente. Unsere Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass imi-
tierendes Adoptionsverhalten zwar o¨rtlich stark begrenzt ist, aber dennoch einen
wichtigen Faktor fu¨r die Verbreitung von Photovoltaikanlagen darstellt.
In dem darauffolgenden Abschnitt analysieren wir die Vera¨nderung des Einflusses
von Peer-Effekten (beziehungsweise Imitation) bei der Installation von Photovoltaik-
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anlagen u¨ber Raum und Zeit. Den zuvor bereits genutzten Datensatz erweitern
wir durch detaillierte Ortsinformationen zu potenziellen Nutzern der Technologie.
Anhand eines diskreten Entscheidungsmodells besta¨tigen wir erneut, dass der iden-
tifizierte Peer-Effekt o¨rtlich stark begrenzt ist. Zumeist tritt der Effekt innerhalb
eines Radius von 500 Metern auf. Unsere Analyse zeigt auch, dass der Einfluss des
Peer-Effekts, auf die Entscheidung eine Photovoltaikanlage zu installieren, mit der
Zeit abnimmt.
Im na¨chsten Abschnitt machen wir uns den logistischen Verlauf von Diffusionskurven
zunutze. Wir untersuchen, ob sich die Adoptionsrate von erneuerbaren Energietech-
nologien in deutschen NUTS-3-Regionen (Landkreisen und Kreisfreien Sta¨dten),
in denen ein erfolgreicher Bu¨rgerentscheid gegen den Bau einer bestimmten An-
lage stattgefunden hat, von den restlichen NUTS-3-Regionen unterscheidet. Dabei
nutzen wir, dass Bu¨rgerentscheide in erster Linie auf Gemeindeebene gegen eine
einzelne Anlage oder ein bestimmtes Baugebiet durchgefu¨hrt werden. Unsere Analy-
se ergibt, dass die Adoptionsrate, das heißt die erste Differenz des Diffusionslevels,
tatsa¨chlich in NUTS-3-Regionen niedriger ist, in denen ein erfolgreicher Bu¨rger-
entscheid durchgefu¨hrt wurde. Unser Ergebnis gilt fu¨r Windkraftanlagen und große
Biomasseanlagen, folglich nur fu¨r industrielle Anlagen. Fu¨r Photovoltaikanlagen,
die im Wesentlichen private Anlagen sind, gilt der Zusammenhang nicht. Unsere
Ergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass potenzielle Investoren in Windkraft- oder große
Biomasseanlagen nicht nur Gemeinden meiden, in denen ein erfolgreicher Bu¨rger-
entscheid gegen die jeweilige Technologie durchgefu¨hrt wurde. Sie machen sogar
einen Bogen um die gesamte NUTS-3-Region der Gemeinde.
Im letzten Abschnitt untersuchen wir Implikationen der Verbreitung von erneuer-
baren Energietechnologien. Wir scha¨tzen den Zusammenhang zwischen der Verbrei-
tung von Photovoltaikanlagen und dem Stimmenanteil von Bu¨ndnis 90/Die Gru¨nen
bei Bundestagswahlen. Wir bilden die erste Differenz und verwenden das Diffusions-
level der Vorperiode als Instrument fu¨r die aktuelle Adoptionsrate. Das Diffusions-
level pra¨dizieren wir durch eine logistische Diffusionskurve. Die unterschiedlichen
Theorien u¨ber Nichtlinearita¨ten und die Allgegenwa¨rtigkeit der logistischen Kurve
hinsichtlich Technologiediffusion stellen sicher, dass sich unser pra¨diziertes Instru-
ment orthogonal zu Variablen verha¨lt, die Wahlverhalten direkt beeinflussen. Unsere
Analyse zeigt, dass die Verbreitung von privaten Photovoltaikanlagen fu¨r ein Vier-
tel des Stimmenzuwachses der Gru¨nen zwischen 1998 und 2009 verantwortlich ist.
Unsere Ergebnisse stu¨tzen wir durch eine abschließende Analyse von Umfragedaten
des sozioo¨konomischen Panels.
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1. Introduction
The finiteness of fossil fuels and their effect on climate change has encouraged the
search for sustainable energy technologies. In Germany, the nuclear power phase-out
puts additional pressure on creating an energy system based on renewable energy
technologies. When the Social Democratic-Green coalition won the 1998 federal
elections, it raised the nation-wide feed-in tariffs paid for electricity produced from
renewable energy technologies. Since then, many renewable energy plants have been
installed across Germany. The objective of this thesis is to identify drivers, barriers
and implications of their adoption.
Since Griliches (1957) and Mansfield (1961), economists have studied temporal pat-
terns of technology diffusion. We review models of technology diffusion in Chapter 2.
In line with the theory, numerous studies across countries, sectors and periods indi-
cate a common logistic (S-shaped) path of technology diffusion (see Rogers (1983),
Geroski (2000), Comin and Hobijn (2009), or Comin and Mestieri (2013a) for ex-
amples). Besides this similarity, technology diffuses often more slowly than would
be optimal (Rogers, 1983; Geroski, 2000). Dittmar (2011), for instance, gives a
historic example by describing the diffusion of the printing press. The diffusion of
this technology caused a revolution between 1450 and 1500. Book prices fell by
two-thirds, which dramatically changed the way information spread. Still, Dittmar
(2011) finds that in the first 50 years after the invention of the printing press only
11% of European cities adopted the technology. There are numerous other exam-
ples, e.g., see Griliches’s (1957) study of the slow diffusion of hybrid corn, Sommers’s
(1980) description of the slow adoption of nuclear power, or more recent studies on
the slow diffusion of menstrual cups by Oster and Thornton (2012), or agricultural
technology by Conley and Udry (2010). Comin and Hobijn (2010) give many further
examples in their study on 15 technologies in 166 countries.
In this thesis, we study factors which determine the speed of adoption of renewable
energy technologies. Most renewable energy technologies cannot yet compete (or
1
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at least could not compete some years ago) in price with conventionally produced
electricity. Since the 1990s a system of financial subsidies has provided significant
incentives for installing renewable energy technologies in Germany. The subsidy
scheme is the most important factor driving the adoption of renewable energy tech-
nologies in Germany. In Chapter 3, we describe the subsidies along with aggregate
trends in renewable energy diffusion and regional differences in Germany.
Another factor that drives technology adoption is peer effects (Brock and Durlauf,
2010; Conley and Udry, 2010; Oster and Thornton, 2012). Recently, several studies
(Dewald and Truffer, 2011; Dastrup et al., 2012) analyzed the adoption of photo-
voltaic (PV) systems, i.e., solar cell systems for producing electric power. Many
studies found peer effects to be an important driver for PV adoption (Bollinger and
Gillingham, 2012; Islam, 2014; Mu¨ller and Rode, 2013). We define peers as (poten-
tial) adopters nearby. Exact locational data on PV adopters allows us to identify
peer effects more precisely than in previous studies, and across a whole country.
The country we study is Germany, where the PV capacity installed was by far the
highest worldwide in 2013 (IEA-PVPS, 2014).
In their overview of analytical tools for environmental economists studying techno-
logical change Jaffe et al. (2002) suggest the epidemic model of technology diffusion
when – as in our case – no specific data on the respective decision-makers is available.
The model indicates an S-shaped diffusion and builds on the idea that diffusion is
primarily driven by the spread of information. Focusing on the latter aspect makes
sense as the cost and the revenue opportunities of PV can be considered as having
a comparable level across Germany when controlling for certain spatial character-
istics such as solar radiation. We therefore employ the epidemic diffusion model to
analyze peer effects in PV adoption in Chapter 4. Note that the epidemic diffusion
model’s terminology refers to imitation which corresponds to peer effects.
In general, the diffusion of new technologies (in space and time) results from a series
of individual decisions to adopt (i.e., to begin using the new technology). Since
the decision to adopt (in a certain period of time) is a discrete one (Karshenas and
Stoneman, 1992), we follow Mu¨ller and Rode (2013) and employ a discrete choice
model in Chapter 5. Discrete choice analysis is the standard approach to analyzing
individual discrete decision-making (McFadden, 2001). Exact locational data on PV
adopters and potential adopters allows us to be the first to build a specific measure
of the peer effect for each potential decision-maker per time period across a whole
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country. By doing so, we can – besides identifying the peer effect – also find out
how peer effects in PV adoption vary over time and space.
Understanding the impact of peer effects may help to foster diffusion. That is,
installation seeds could be used by (political) decision-makers to raise the diffusion
speed by steering adoption to locations where adoption is most intended (Islam,
2014; Mu¨ller and Rode, 2013).
After dealing with drivers of renewable energy adoption in Germany, we focus on
barriers in this thesis. During recent years we have observed more and more refer-
enda against renewable energy plants (see Datenbank Bu¨rgerbegehren (2014)). In
Chapter 6, we want to find out whether local referenda against a single renewable
energy plant have a measurable impact on the technology’s adoption rate (i.e., the
first difference in the diffusion level) nearby. If a local referendum hinders building
a plant, investors may search for an alternative spot on which to build a plant in
the immediate vicinity of the primary location. Investors may also search for a new
site far away or may fully give up their plans. We make use of the well-studied
logistic shape of technology diffusion and investigate which effect referenda against
renewable energy plants have in Germany.
Finally, we turn to consequences from renewable energy adoption. While PV adop-
tion accelerated strongly in Germany, Germany’s Green Party experienced a signif-
icant increase in its share of votes in federal elections: from 6.7% in 1998 to 10.7%
in 2009. This observation raises a question which has not been studied before. Has
the diffusion of green energy technologies helped the Green Party increase its share
of votes? We answer this question in Chapter 7.
We face the common identification challenges in all our empirical studies. Failing
to control for unobserved heterogeneity may result in biased estimates. We there-
fore have to account for other barriers, drivers and implications from renewable
energy adoption than the ones we study. We take advantage of time fixed effects
that capture time-varying factors that have a symmetric effect on the increase in
renewable energy diffusion across regions: for example, changes in legislation fos-
tering the adoption of the technologies or changes in their installation costs. We
use regional fixed effects to absorb regional-specific trends in the increase in the
diffusion of the studied technology. These could be caused by regional characteris-
tics affecting the usability of the technology: e.g., a region’s average solar radiation
affects the profitability of PV systems, a locations’s average wind speed determines
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the profitability of wind power plants or local agricultural production can be more
or less suitable for biomass plants. Therefore, we control for regional and year fixed
effects when studying peer effects in PV adoption in Chapter 4 and 5. We also do so
when studying whether a successful referendum against one renewable energy plant
is associated with lower adoption rates in the same German region in Chapter 6,
and when investigating the impact that the diffusion of PV systems has on the votes
obtained by the Green Party in Chapter 7. We give further details on our identifica-
tion strategies in the following chapters. But before we start our empirical analyses,
we review models of technology diffusion in Chapter 2 and describe the institutional
context, aggregate trends and regional differences of renewable energy adoption in
Germany in Chapter 3.1
1The notations in the empirical analyses in Chapter 4, 5, 6 and 7 are chapter-specific. The
data sets we use in these chapters always build upon the description in Chapter 3. However,
depending on when we composed the working papers on which all chapters of this thesis are based,
we study different time periods. Although slightly rearranged, this thesis is completely based on
the following working papers: Rode and Weber (2012), Rode and Mu¨ller (2014), Rode (2014), and
Comin and Rode (2013).
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This chapter contains a review of models of technology diffusion, which is relevant
to the empirical analyses at a later stage. Literature relevant to single studies is
included in the specific chapters.
Since Griliches’ (1957) seminal paper on the diffusion of hybrid corn among farm-
ers, the diffusion of technologies has been frequently studied by economics scholars.
Griliches also introduced the idea of an S-shaped pattern of innovation diffusion. In
his early work, Mansfield (1961) supplemented this idea by stating that imitation
may be important for the spread of innovations among firms. These ideas are en-
hanced and frequently employed in marketing science. Studies in marketing usually
build on the model by Bass (1969) and analyze the diffusion on the aggregate level.
Similar models are also common in other disciplines: e.g., Dodds and Watts (2004,
2005) illuminate diffusion models from a biological view.
Roughly speaking, the concept of imitation is based on the idea that the spread of
information (more or less directly) leads to adoption decisions. To some extent, this
is hard to reject, but due to this very general type of model, many extensions are
imaginable (Geroski, 2000). There are numerous models which try to capture the
social process behind the diffusion of new technologies more adequately: instead of
solely asserting that the knowledge of the novelty is acquired, one can make more
sophisticated assumptions on how people behave and why they adopt. Such studies
include – inter alia – Karshenas and Stoneman (1993), Conley and Udry (2010)
and Levin et al. (2012). The general concept is often referred to as social learning
(Young, 2009). Social learning means that non-adopters learn the utility of a novelty
before they consider adopting.
However, this and other more preconditioning concepts require individual-related
data which we cannot access, at least for our Germany-wide aggregate analyses in
Chapter 4. In the following, we review other approaches and their rationales for
adoption.
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2.1. Epidemic diffusion models
The epidemic diffusion model builds on aggregated data and is suggested by Jaffe
et al. (2002) for analyzing technological change in environmental economics. This
model implies that the decision should mainly depend on the information the poten-
tial adopter has.2 Still, the content, which diffuses, can vary: for instance, it may
be information on profitability, the spread of a status effect (Welsch and Ku¨hling,
2009) or of green motives. These aspects support the impact of imitation in our
analyses.
Epidemic diffusion models – also called contagion models – explain the diffusion of
innovations by the spread of information encouraging adoption (Bass, 1969; Geroski,
2000; Peres et al., 2010). This information may on the one hand be codifiable areas
of knowledge, such as information about the existence of the technology itself, or
on the other hand tacit areas of knowledge (Polanyi, 1967), such as beliefs, trust or
personal experience on how to use the innovation.
An epidemic diffusion model can be described by a population N and the number
of users at time t, y(t). The information can be considered as being split into a
‘formal’, codifiable part, which is being transmitted by a central entity, and into
a tacit part, which is borne and sent out by users, who have already adopted the
innovation. Following Geroski (2000), we define
∆y(t) = [α + βy(t)]× [N − y(t)] . (2.1)
∆y(t) denotes the new users between t and t+ 1, i.e., ∆y(t) := y(t+ 1)− y(t). The
information spread by the central information source is described by the coefficient
of external influence α ∈ [0, 1]: in every period, a share α of non-users adopt the
innovation because of the central entity. The information borne by current users
affects the adoption by non-users through the coefficient of internal influence β.
Again, in every period, each existing user contacts a share β of current non-users N−
y(t) which then leads to [βy(t)]× [N − y(t)] new users.3 As the number of adopters
increases, information flows faster, accelerating the adoption rate. According to the
literature, the effect modeled by β refers to imitation related to word of mouth. Still,
2Certainly, there may also be other motives for not adopting: e.g., potential adopters could
mistrust the technology, be financially constrained or expect higher financial attractiveness in
future.
3It is also possible to model the internal process with a contact rate describing which number
of agents of the whole population each user contacts (Bass, 1969).
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we do not assert an exclusively personal communication, but rather suggest that
the real processes behind this relationship may be more or less institutionalized: the
internal source may cover both: just seeing the technology or product in operation
and being convinced through being informed by peers. Solving (2.1) for continuous
time (see Appendix A) yields the S-shaped curve of innovation diffusion over time
plotted in Figure 2.1.
2.2. Probit models of technology diffusion
In addition to epidemic models, other theories also imply S-shaped technology dif-
fusion. Geroski (2000) refers to Probit models. These models rely on exogenous
bell-shaped distributions of adoption costs or profits among potential adopters to
generate heterogeneity in the timing of adoption. An example is the vintage human
capital model of Chari and Hopenhayn (1991).
In general, the diffusion of new technologies (in space and time) results from a
series of individual decisions to adopt (i.e., to begin using the new technology).
Since the decision to adopt (in a certain period of time) is a discrete one (Karshenas
and Stoneman, 1992), technology adoption can be analyzed by probit models. These
models explicitly allow modeling the individual decisions. Discrete choice analysis is
y(t)
t
N
y0
t0
Figure 2.1.: S-shaped technology diffusion y(t) =
N−αN(N−y0)
αN+βy0
×exp [−(α+β)(t−t0)]
1+
β(N−y0)
αN+βy0
×exp [−(α+β)(t−t0)]
.
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the standard approach to analyzing individual discrete decision-making (McFadden,
2001). In particular, Geroski (2000) highlights that when focusing on differences in
adopter characteristics the probit model is appropriate. The probit model is a
specific discrete choice model. We use a discrete choice model to analyze technology
adoption in Chapter 4.
2.3. Further rationales for non-linearities
Besides epidemic and probit models of technology diffusion, the literature has pro-
vided two more rationales for the non-linearity of diffusion curves. The tension
between the legitimization of the technology in the population and competition for
limited resources required to adopt it can generate S-shaped diffusion (Hannan and
Freeman, 1977, 1984). Finally, in information cascades models (Arthur, 1989; Baner-
jee, 1992)) agents initially adopt slowly because they are experimenting with various
technological options. Followers, instead, find it optimal to copy their predecessors
as in a herd, leading to an acceleration of the speed of diffusion. A survey including
all the models mentioned can be found in Geroski (2000).
2.4. Drivers of green technology diffusion
In addition to the standard forces that induce logistic diffusion patterns, a few other
drivers have been pointed out as relevant for the adoption of green technologies.
These include regulation (Snyder et al., 2003), feed-in tariffs (Dewald and Truffer,
2011; Jacobsson et al., 2004), environmental ideology (Kahn, 2007), consumption
patterns of reference persons and habit (Welsch and Ku¨hling, 2009). Further, along
with our analyses in Chapters 4 and 5, Bollinger and Gillingham (2012) and Mu¨ller
and Rode (2013) argue that peer effects deliver logistic dynamics.
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Trends and Regional Differences
In this chapter, we describe the institutional context of renewable energy adoption,
its aggregate trends and regional differences in Germany. We can study regional
differences since we exploit a new unique data set. It comes from U¨NB (2013).
The data set includes the address, installation date and size of all grid-connected
wind power plants, biomass plants, and PV systems for electricity generation across
Germany installed between 1992 and 2011.4 We geocode the address data and can
therefore use exact locational data in our analyses.
3.1. PV systems
Several sources (BSW-Solar, 2011; BMU, 2011; Dewald and Truffer, 2011) confirm
that most PV systems in Germany (> 80%) are rooftop systems. In consequence,
we can take the number of buildings as a proxy for the number of potential PV
users. Since the number of buildings on the NUTS-3 level is directly available
dating back to 1995 from DESTATIS (2013b), we begin our analysis of PV adoption
in 1995. In Figure 3.1 we show the fraction of buildings with new PV system per
year according to their capacity. We observe that only few PV systems are larger
than 100 kWp, which are definitely too large to be private household systems. When
using other thresholds (e.g., 30 kWp) the picture does not change dramatically. Our
first conclusion from Figure 3.1 is that most PV systems in Germany are small,
private household systems.
4Since only 1.5% of the wind power plants, 3.5% of the biomass plants and 0.2% of the PV
systems were shut down through 2011, we neglect decommissioning in our studies.
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Figure 3.1.: Fraction of buildings with a new PV system and the level of the feed-in
tariff for electricity from PV
(
for systems with a capacity of at most
30 kWp
)
in Germany from 1995 through 20011.
Since 1991, the Germany-wide Electricity Feed-in Law (‘Stromeinspeisungsgesetz’)
and its successors have guaranteed that the grid operators have to accept that elec-
tricity produced by renewable energy sources is fed into the grid (e.g., see Altrock
et al. (2006) for details). The law also guaranteed that the producers of electric-
ity from renewables received a remuneration, which was at the same level (around
9 EURCent/kWh) for all renewable energy technologies.
In 1998, the Social Democratic-Green coalition won the federal elections. Two
years later, the government introduced a new feed-in tariff scheme through the
‘Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz’ (EEG), which raised the feed-in tariff for electricity
produced from PV. For example, the feed in tariff for systems with a capacity (size)
of, at most, 30 kWp was raised to 50 EURCent/kWh (from 9 EURCent/kWh).
5 The
5The capacity (or nominal power) of a PV system is specified in kilowatts-peak
[
kWp
]
, i.e.,
the system’s maximum power output under defined conditions. In contrast, produced electricity
is measured in kilowatt-hours [kWh].
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feed-in tariff was vintage-specific and was guaranteed for twenty years (Agnolucci,
2006; Altrock et al., 2011; Maurer et al., 2012). However, starting in 2002, new
installations received a feed-in tariff 5% lower than installations put in place the
previous year. See Figure 3.1. The feed-in tariff is financed by apportioning costs
to all consumers of electricity; thus the costs are born by all consumers.
Additionally, between 1999 and 2003, the government provided low-interest loans
for PV roof installations through the 100,000 roofs program (Jacobsson and Lauber,
2006). By 2003, the fraction of buildings with PV systems was 0.4%, about 10 times
larger than in 1999. The 2004 amendment to the EEG further raised the feed-in
tariff to 57 EURCent/kWh (see Figure 3.1). By 2011, 6% of buildings had PV
systems, which corresponds to more than 1.1 million systems.
In Figure B.1 of Appendix B.1, we show an alternative measure of diffusion: capacity-
adjusted adoption per year. Large plants build a higher share with capacity-adjusted
measures.
3.2. Wind power
Wind power plants – also called eolic plants – are – in contrast to PV systems –
not installed on buildings. In order to normalize their adoption we use forestal and
agricultural land area given by CLC (2009). In Figure 3.2, we illustrate the yearly
number of new wind power plants per forestal and agricultural land area according to
their capacity. We learn from the figure that wind power plants are – in contrast, to
PV systems – mainly large systems (above a capacity of 0.5 MW). As investments
in wind power plants are large, they are all industrial.
Figure 3.2 also highlights that the adoption of wind plants already accelerated in
the 1990s. Whereas the remuneration was not high enough to substantially foster
the adoption of PV systems, it was high enough for wind power plants. In 1999,
almost 6,000 wind power plants existed in Germany. Their total capacity installed
was more than 100 times larger than the capacity installed in PV systems. Also
see Figure B.2 of Appendix B.1 which illustrates the capacity-adjusted adoption per
year. As for PV, large plants build a higher share with capacity-adjusted measures
of eolic adoption.
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Figure 3.2.: Number of new eolic (onshore) systems per forestal and agricultural area
[in sqkm] and the level of the average feed-in tariff for electricity from
eolic (onshore) systems (of 90% reference yield without system service
or repowering bonus) in Germany from 1991 through 2011.
The 2000 EEG also introduced new feed-in tariff schemes for electricity from eolic
plants, though they rose comparatively less than for PV systems (9.1 EURCent/kWh).
(See Figure 3.2.) Unlike PV systems, the feed-in tariff for eolic systems was not fixed
for 20 years. For the first five years they were fixed at a certain amount and then
at some point once the installation was five years old, the feed-in tariff dropped
to a new level. The date of reset of the feed-in tariff depended on the efficiency
of the installation. In less efficient installations, the high feed-in tariff period was
longer. The reset level of the feed-in tariff was 6.19 EURCent/kWh for eolic sys-
tems installed in 2000. Since 2000, eolic systems have diffused more slowly than PV
systems, and by 2011, the total capacity installed in PV systems almost equaled the
capacity installed in eolic plants.
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3.3. Biomass plants
As eolic plants, biomass plants are all industrial because of the large investments they
require. To build a normalized measure of biomass diffusion, we can use agricultural
land area (see left axis in Figure 3.3). As for PV, the number of new biomass plants
(see right axis in Figure 3.3) did not grow rapidly during the 1990s. Through 1999
we find less than 300 biomass plants across Germany. Most biomass plants have a
capacity below 1 MWe. MWe means megawatt electrical to distinguish from MWth,
which refers to thermal power produced.
2000’s EEG also raised the feed-in tariff for biomass plants: for small biomass plants,
e.g., to 10.2 EURCent/kWh. For biomass plants – like PV – the feed-in tariff was
guaranteed for 20 years. Since 2002 (2004), new installations have received a feed-
in level at 1% (1.5%) lower for biomass plants than those put in place the year
before. Further, several bonuses (up to additional 18 EURCent/kWh) exist for
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Figure 3.3.: Adoption of biomass plants in Germany per year.
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biomass plants if they, e.g., use innovative technologies, certain renewable resources
or combine heat and power generation.6
With the EEG in place, the adoption of biomass plants accelerated. In 2004 and
2011, amendments to the EEG changed the level of remuneration for biomass in the
way that smaller plants receive higher tariffs. By the year 2011, we observe more
than 12,500 biomass plants across Germany. This equals 0.06 biomass plants per
agricultural sqkm. In total, these biomass plants account for 20% of the capacity
all wind power plants have in 2011. Figure B.3 in Appendix B.1 shows capacity-
adjusted measures of yearly biomass adoption.
3.4. Regional differences
Beneath these aggregate trends in green energy diffusion there are important regional
differences. Figure 3.4 shows the evolution of the fraction of buildings equipped
with PV systems for the years 1998, 2002, 2005 and 2009 on the NUTS-3 level
in Germany.7 We choose these years since they are relevant in our analysis at a
later stage. In 1998, the diffusion level of PV systems was low in all regions. By
2002, we begin to notice significant regional differences, with higher diffusion rates
in the south – Baden-Wu¨rttemberg and Bavaria – where global solar radiation is
higher. Through 2005 and 2009, the highest diffusion rates can be observed in the
south, in the north of Hesse and in the east and the north-west of North Rhine-
Westphalia. In contrast, relatively few PV systems were installed in the middle of
North Rhine-Westphalia, the east of Lower Saxony, the south of Schleswig-Holstein
and, in general, the eastern part of Germany.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the diffusion of eolic systems. By 1998, there were already
significant regional differences in their diffusion. Some northern regions such as
Dithmarschen, Schleswig-Holstein, (0.30 wind mills per sqkm) and Hamburg (0.29)
had considerable diffusion of eolic systems. In contrast, 48% of the regions – many
of them in Bavaria and Baden-Wu¨rttemberg – had no eolic system installed. In
2009, these differences prevailed. The regions with highest diffusion levels of eolic
systems were Emden, Lower Saxony, (0.88 wind mills per sqkm) and Bremerhaven,
6Since the bonuses and their changes over time vary strongly, we cannot easily compare the
levels of the feed-in tariff for biomass per year and therefore do not plot them.
7Due to the restructuring of districts, we lack data for 2.3% of the NUTS-3 regions for 1998,
2002 and 2005, and for 6.9% for 2009.
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1998 2002
2005 2009
Cumulative fraction of buildings with PV
No data <0.05% 0.05-0.5% 0.5-1% 1-2% 2-5% >5%
0 200 km
Figure 3.4.: Fraction of buildings with PV at NUTS-3 level for 1998, 2001, 2005 and
2009.
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1998 2002
2005 2009
Cumulative number of eolic systems per forestal and agricultural area [in sqkm]
<0.01 0.01-0.02 0.02-0.05 0.05-0.1 0.1-0.2 >0.2
0 200 km
Figure 3.5.: Number of eolic (onshore) systems per forestal and agricultural area [in
sqkm] at NUTS-3 level for 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2009.
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Bremen, (0.71). The share of regions without eolic systems installed dropped to
24%, and these are concentrated in Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg.
In Figure 3.6 we see the number of biomass plants at the NUTS-3 level in 2011.
Most plants are located in the rural areas in the south and the north of Germany.8
We find only few plants (5.6%) in district-free cities, which is relevant at a later
stage.
Cumulative biomass plants in 2011
0 1-5 6-15 16-25 26-45 >45
0 200 km
Figure 3.6.: Counts of biomass plants at NUTS-3 level in 2011.
As for biomass, we can illustrate the non-normalized diffusion of PV systems and
wind power plants at the NUTS-3 level. Appendix B contains the counts of PV sys-
tems (Figure B.4) and wind power plants (Figure B.5) for the year 2011. We observe
similar patterns to the normalized diffusion. In Bavaria and Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
(the south of Germany), we even find 46 NUTS-3 regions with no wind power plants
8For details, see Mangold (2014), who conducts a solid analysis on biomass diffusion in Bavaria.
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at all. As for biomass plants, we see few wind power plants in district-free cities:
only 3.3% of all wind power plants are installed in the 113 district-free cities (out of
429 NUTS-3 regions in total), which is relevant at a later stage.
After describing the institutional context of renewable energy adoption, its trends
and regional differences in Germany, we turn to the first empirical analysis of this
thesis.
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4. Does Localized Imitation Drive
Adoption9
4.1. Motivation
The finiteness of fossil fuels and their effect on climate change has encouraged the
search for sustainable energy technologies. One of these technologies is PV, i.e.,
solar cell systems for producing electric power. Although PV cannot yet compete
in price with conventionally produced electricity, since the year 2000 a system of
financial subsidies has provided significant incentives for installing PV systems in
Germany. In consequence, the PV capacity installed per capita was by far the
highest worldwide in 2009 (REN21, 2010), even though the global solar radiation is
low when compared to other countries in the south.
Figure 4.1, in which each gray dot marks a PV system, shows that the spatial dis-
tribution of PV systems is inhomogeneous in Germany. Our objective is to identify
important drivers of this observed distribution. This question is particularly in-
teresting as the impact of a nation-wide policy is studied in time and space. Our
analysis may contribute to the understanding of policy-induced diffusion and could
therefore be helpful for fostering the diffusion of other distributed energy technolo-
gies or subsidized products in general.10
To be clear, the purpose of this chapter is to investigate whether localized imitation
drives PV adoption. In order to do so, we base our analysis on a data set covering
9This chapter is based on a revised version of Rode and Weber (2012).
10When referring to a technology, we refer to the artifact, thus, in our case, the PV system as
such. In contrast, there are studies which define technology differently, e.g., according to Comin
and Hobijn (2010, p. 2032) a technology “is a group of production methods that is used to produce
an intermediate good or service.” Furthermore, adoption – in this chapter – describes the first
purchase by an individual whereas diffusion refers to the rate at which something spreads in a
group of individuals.
19
4. Does Localized Imitation Drive Adoption
Figure 4.1.: Distribution of PV systems within Germany through 2009; each gray
dot represents a PV system.
the PV installations in Germany through 2009. We analyze the data in an epidemic
diffusion model, which includes a spatial dimension. The model is discrete in time
and space, but its level of geographical aggregation is adjustable in arbitrarily small
steps.
In their overview of analytical tools for environmental economists studying techno-
logical change Jaffe et al. (2002) suggest the epidemic model of technology diffusion
when – as in our case – no specific data on the respective decision makers is avail-
able. The model builds on the idea that diffusion is primarily driven by the spread
of information. Focusing on this aspect makes sense as the cost and the revenue
opportunities of PV can be considered as having a comparable level across Germany
when controlling for certain spatial characteristics as solar radiation.
The analysis of PV adoption is different to the general case of purely market
driven diffusion since use of the innovation is highly subsidized (Jaffe et al., 2002;
Rosendahl, 2004; Davies and Diaz-Rainey, 2011), partly with yearly changes in the
subsidy system. Therefore, we complement the epidemic diffusion model by building
on approaches from marketing science: as we have data on the installation year for
all the PV systems, we can include temporal fixed effects (FE) – in the same way
20
4. Does Localized Imitation Drive Adoption
that Horsky and Simon (1983) extend the model – to cover changes in the subsidy
system. Further, we account for aggregate effects by adding control variables – e.g.,
global solar radiation and household income – as suggested by Boswijk and Franses
(2005), allow a time varying number of potential adopters in line with Mahajan
and Peterson (1985) and follow Peres et al. (2010) when including space into the
epidemic diffusion model. As the epidemic diffusion model requires information on
the number of potential adopters in order to capture saturation and most of the PV
installations in Germany (> 80%) are rooftop installations (BSW-Solar, 2011), we
take the number of buildings as a proxy for the number of potential users.
According to Janssen and Jager (2002), the decision to install solar power can be
characterized by a high relevance of social compatibility: “[c]onsumers frequently
feel satisfied when consuming the same as their neighbors (social needs) and often
engage in social comparison and imitation when deciding what to consume” (Ibid.,
p. 288). Bollinger and Gillingham (2012) and Noll et al. (2013) point in the same
direction. They find peer effects in the adoption of PV in the United States (U.S.).
In their analysis of individual-level data on the adoption of solar thermal equip-
ment, Welsch and Ku¨hling (2009) confirm this view. They find that the behavior
of reference groups is of major importance. In addition, their analysis reveals that
environmental awareness is not an important reason for installing solar thermal
equipment in Germany since the subsidy system is strong. As the subsidy system is
strong for PV systems, environmental awareness may also be of minor importance
for PV. To turn the argument on its head, other reasons might prevail: A natural
reason to imitate adoption would be if PV systems were highly profitable. However,
we show – in Appendix C.1 – that PV systems were sometimes profitable and some-
times not during the time period we study. Still, imitation can be a driving force.
Welsch and Ku¨hling (2009, p. 172) suggest that another motive could be status or
prestige and refer to a “Mercedes-Benz on the rooftop”.
Similarly, numerous simulation studies on innovation diffusion build on the idea that
agents are influenced by or learn from social peers or spatial neighbors (Ellison and
Fudenberg, 1993; Bala and Goyal, 1998; Chatterjee and Xu, 2004). Related ideas
are introduced and partly empirically verified by Ha¨gerstrand (1967), Morrill (1968)
and Morrill (1970). These authors highlight the fact that the spatial separation of
agents limits the degree of contact. This is based on the assumption that information
flows decline with distance. Given that we study the spatial characteristics of PV
adoption and if imitation is indeed an important factor for PV adoption, it may also
be of interest how far imitation reaches.
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In contrast to many studies on technology adoption, we know the exact location and
the year of installation for all 552,259 German (PV) technology adopters through the
end of 2009.11 This unique data allows us to estimate characteristics of the diffusion
process of a distributed renewable energy technology all over Germany and to explic-
itly quantify how far imitative adoption behavior reaches for PV. Furthermore, in
our analysis we do not assume – e.g., in contrast to Mahajan and Peterson (1979) –
a fixed influence of distance, but instead estimate its magnitude empirically.
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we introduce the theoretical
background. Subsequently, Section 4.3 describes the model and the data. A dis-
cussion of the statistical results follows in Section 4.4. Finally, in Section 4.5 we
summarize the chapter and provide an outlook on further research.
4.2. Theoretical background
We use an epidemic diffusion model in this study. Section 2.1 in Chapter 2 con-
tains a general description of the model, which builds on the idea that initial lack of
information on the technology prevents potential adopters from adopting technolo-
gies. As most PV systems are easily visible to passers-by, learning or imitation is
allowed without direct social interaction. Therefore, the assumption of information
flows between spatially close neighbors – on which our modeling approach is based –
should be appropriate.
Many modifications and complementations of the epidemic diffusion model exist,
especially in the marketing literature. The following are of importance for our anal-
ysis: firstly, Horsky and Simon (1983) include the effects of advertising by extending
the coefficient of external influence. In a similar way, shifts in the external influ-
ence – e.g., in the subsidy system – could be covered by allowing α to depend on t.
Secondly, Boswijk and Franses (2005) state that the cumulative number of adopters
may not be represented by a smooth curve. Shifts could, on the one hand, be caused
by individual-specific effects or, on the other hand, come from aggregate effects, e.g.,
11E.g., Comin et al. (2012) analyze technology diffusion on the country level and Keller (2002)
and Verdolini and Galeotti (2011) study technology spillovers between countries. In contrast, our
analysis is conducted on a much lower level of aggregation and we rely, of course, on a different
understanding of technology diffusion. In our sense the adoption of PV means installing a PV
system on a roof and utilizing it to generate electricity. Other studies, such as Conley and Udry
(2010), Bollinger and Gillingham (2012) and Mu¨ller and Rode (2013), also analyze diffusion on a
low level of aggregation but only consider the diffusion across a small sub-unit of a country.
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macroeconomic changes. According to Boswijk and Franses (2005) complementing
the model with additional variables can solve this problem. One possibility would
be to allow α also to be influenced by control variables: C(t). Thirdly, Mahajan and
Peterson (1985) explicitly highlight the fact that the amount of potential adopters
may vary over time, which results in N(t). In consequence, the epidemic diffusion
model may be represented by:
∆y(t) = [α (t, C) + βy(t)]× [N(t)− y(t)] . (4.1)
Finally, Mahajan and Peterson (1985) suggest that it might be important to con-
sider space when studying innovation diffusion. A very intuitive insight of spatial
analysis – by Tobler (1970, p. 236) – is that
“everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related
than distant things.”
In terms of statistical analysis, this means that data at spatially close points may
exhibit a higher correlation than at more distant points.
Concerning the diffusion of innovations, there is some evidence in literature that
adoption of innovations may be localized. This may be especially true for the tacit
part of knowledge since it builds on experience, which cannot be transferred easily
as codification may not be possible (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001). In contrast, codi-
fiable knowledge is thought to be transmittable over distance as it can easily be
written down (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996). Similarly, Jaffe (1989) and Ponds
et al. (2007) suppose that face to face contacts are necessary to share tacit forms
of knowledge. Geographical proximity is thought to encourage close interaction
(Baptista, 1999), which in turn stimulates the exchange of tacit knowledge parts.
Taking into account the concept of spatial autocorrelation, one may however not
only ask for the ‘localization’ of imitative behavior but rather for the spatial range
of influence the word of mouth has and how it attenuates with distance.
The common methods for incorporating spatial relations in econometric analysis
are distance or contiguity matrices (Anselin, 1988). However, we do not want to
predefine a certain functional form of spatial relations: often the inverse distance
or the squared inverse distance are used in this sense. In contrast, we explicitly
estimate the magnitude of spatial influence depending on distance.
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4.3. Building the model
To analyze the evolution of PV systems in space and time, we adapt Equation (4.1)
by incorporating a localized spatial component.12 Obviously, Tobler’s Law could
be valid here in the sense of explaining localized epidemic spread: it is likely that
potential adopters become more easily convinced to adopt the innovation the closer
the users spreading the tacit knowledge on the innovation are.
In discrete time and space we can localize our population of users within a circle
with center point i and radius r0. We also denote this spatial sample as inner circle
at point i (alternatively: ‘inner circle i’). Let yi,t denote the number of users of
the technology within an inner circle at point i and time t. Ni,t is the respective
population size.13 By yi,q,t, we define the users in a distance band with outer radius
rq and inner radius rq−1. q is the integer index of radii starting at 1 for the outer
radius of the first distance band. By doing so, we come up with a localized version of
the epidemic diffusion model (4.2): still, a share α (t, C) of non-users is led to adopt
by the central information source and each user contacts a share β0 of current non-
users Ni,t−yi,t, resulting in [β0yi,t]× [Ni,t − yi,t] agents to adopt. However, the latter
effect (i.e., imitation) also takes place between the population of the distance bands
and the inner circle population. To take into account the locational character of the
model, we allow C to depend not only on time but also on location: C = C(i, t).
The equation takes the following form:
∆yi,t = [α (t, C) + β0yi,t + β1yi,1,t + · · ·+ βQyi,Q,t]× [Ni,t − yi,t]. (4.2)
The relationship is illustrated in Figure 4.2 for the case of four distance bands,
i.e., Q = 4. α (t, C) and βq of model (4.2) can be estimated by using a regression
technique.
12In the functional form of incorporating space into the epidemic diffusion model, we follow
Peres et al.’s (2010) description of a cross-country influence model.
13We assume the social entity into which PV diffuses – thus our inner circle – to be perfectly
connected and homogeneous (Peres et al., 2010).
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Figure 4.2.: Spatial aggregation of events (PV installations) within the inner circle
of radius r0 (darkest gray) and the surrounding distance bands colored
in lightening gray shades for Q = 4.
4.3.1. The data
The most central data in the study is that on PV installations. Section 3.1 in
Chapter 3 contains details on the subsidy system for PV.14 See Appendix C.2 for
details on the geocoding of the data used in this chapter. The geocoding results
in point data on PV installations.15 Therefore, the model variables yi,t, yi,q,t,∆yi,t
can be calculated by counting the number of PV installations within the inner
circles/distance bands.
Epidemic diffusion models cannot explain why the first users adopt (Geroski, 2000).
We refer to the 1, 000 roofs program, which was the first “federal demonstration
... program of small solar cell installations” in Germany (Jacobsson et al., 2004,
p. 16). It was initiated in 1990 and resulted in more than 2,000 grid-connected
roof-mounted PV installations. The 1, 000 roofs program led to installations across
Germany, since a maximum quota of installations was allocated to every German
state (‘Bundesland’) (Hoffmann et al., 1998).
We choose our period of analysis to begin in 1992, since data on our control variables
is available dating back to this year. Furthermore, in 1992 the highest number of
PV systems funded by the 1, 000 roofs program was installed (Hoffmann, 2008).
14Although the fraction of buildings equipped with PV is low when looking at Germany as a
whole, we come close to saturation at some locations of analysis and therefore consider the epidemic
model of technology diffusion, which explicitly allows for saturation, to be appropriate.
15A spatial point pattern analysis is not appropriate as we want to model the temporal sequence
of events.
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In order to be able to control for different environment conditions leading to different
propensities to adopt PV, we also employ data on global solar radiation, population
density, household income and the share of single/double family homes in all homes.
The use of this data should be seen as a possibility to check the robustness of the
epidemic mechanism rather than to extend the epidemic model. These controls are
incorporated in α (t, C), respectively C (i, t), which besides t can also be specific for
inner circle i.
The data on global solar radiation directly affects the income possible with a PV
system at a given place: the higher the level of solar radiation is, the higher is the
amount of electricity produced and the higher the feed-in remuneration paid to the
owner of a PV system will be. The global radiation data, which is provided by the
German Weather Service as 1-km raster data (DWD, 2010), is the yearly average
from 1981 until 2000 and is hence constant over the whole period of study.16 We
therefore expect the global radiation to have a positive impact on the propensity to
install a PV system.
The population density might also play a role: word of mouth might count more in
less densely populated areas. The income level may explain possible financial con-
straints and risk-bearing possibilities. A large share of single/double family homes
of all homes within a certain area might also make the process of adoption easier
since fewer individuals need to agree on the installation.17 The three latter data
are taken from 2010’s INKAR database (INKAR, 2010) and the German Statistical
Office (DESTATIS, 2010a,b). These data are available for the whole study period on
the NUTS-3 level. We use the 2006 classification with 429 NUTS-3 regions making
up Germany as a whole.
Further information on land use is taken from 2006’s CORINE Land Cover (CLC)
data set, which contains vector data on a scale of 1 : 100, 000 (CLC, 2009).18 The
data enables us to distinguish land use using three different categories: (1) urban
areas, (2) field and (3) forest, whereby we neglect forestal areas as very few PV
16DWD (2010) combines measures from satellites and local observation stations to build the
raster data, i.e., the data accounts for the geographic features of the raster units.
17Likewise, Welsch and Ku¨hling (2009) find that agents living in their own house are significantly
more likely to have solar thermal equipment than those living in a rented home or in an owned
apartment, which also refers to the external agency problem mentioned in Jaffe et al. (2002).
18The minimum mapping unit (MMU) for the polygons of 2006’s CORINE Land Cover data
set is 25ha. In consequence, the CLC data may partly absorb the lack of other control variables
on a lower level of geographical aggregation.
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systems were installed there. The land use data allows correction for adoption
propensities differing between urban and rural areas.
During our period of study – between 1992 and 2009 – the level of the feed-in
tariff for electricity produced by PV depended on the year the system was installed.
However, only since the year 2000 the Renewable Energy Sources Act has put the
subsidy system for PV installations to an interesting level. Nevertheless, prior to
this, PV adoption was supported by programs such as the 1, 000 roofs program,
which fostered PV installations between 1990 and 1995 by bearing 70% of the system
and installation costs, and the 100, 000 roofs program, which built on subsidized
interest rates and fostered PV diffusion between 1999 and 2003.19 Furthermore,
PV installations became cheaper in the time period studied as production costs
decreased due to learning effects (Jacobsson et al., 2004; BSW-Solar, 2012). In
order to cover the resulting shifts in the incentive to install a PV system, α (t, C)
takes into account temporal FE in the form of year dummies. In this manner, we
can also allow for saddles in the curve of new PV installations, which, for example,
came about in the years 2002/2003 and 2006 in Germany as shown in Figure 3.1 of
Section 3.1 in Chapter 3.
The NUTS-3 data, the CLC data and the 1-km raster data required special treat-
ment in order to evaluate them for inner circles. See Appendix C.3 for details.
The number of residential buildings BUILDk,t is also available on the NUTS-3 level
for all the years of study. It can be used to calculate the population Ni,t of inner
circle i for each year t by dividing it equally among all points within a NUTS-3
region k, where ki is the region in which point i is situated.
20 When yi,2009 = 0,
we set Ni,t = 1 and ignore this i for the division of buildings within the NUTS-3
region.
The concept of points, inner circles and distance bands can be evaluated in arbitrarily
small steps. The most intuitive way to start is to define the scan points i. Our
19During the years 1996, 1997 and 1998 the only federal incentive to install PV was a com-
paratively low feed-in tariff, which was put in place by the Electricity Feed-in Law on the 7th of
December 1990. However, at that time some local feed-in tariffs started to foster PV adoption,
e.g., in Aachen (Jacobsson et al., 2004).
20This approach may lead to a situation where the number of users is extremely close to sat-
uration or even larger than Ni,t. We require Ni,t ≥ yi,t. In case the Ni,t calculated based on
BUILDk,t is greater than yi,t, we set Ni,t to yi,t + 1 in order not to assert saturation. This pro-
cedure is only necessary for 87 out of 5, 824, 438 observations for a step width of 1 km. For a step
width of 4 km the procedure is needed in 10 out of 333, 064 cases. For the step widths of 10 km
and 20 km it is not needed.
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approach is to define a step width s and to draw latitudinal lines, each having a
shortest distance of step width s to its adjacent line. On these lines, we determine
points with a step width of s again. Then we remove all scan points outside Germany
and those whose circle radii rq covered areas outside Germany. We take the latter
measure to prevent analyzing incomplete areas. Figure 4.3 shows the result for the
case of s = 20 km.
0 50 100 km
Figure 4.3.: Scanning raster with step width of 20 km; each black dot marks a scan-
ning point.
For defining the radii of the inner circles and respective distance bands, we may
choose (in a two-dimensional approximation) r0 ≥ s/
√
2 to ensure that the whole
area of Germany is covered by inner circles. This choice implies data resampling
to some degree as our inner circles are partly overlapping, which leads to counting
some points twice. Therefore, we also resample Ni,t; the correction procedure is
presented in C.4.
The area of the distance bands can be freely chosen, but to ensure comparable sample
sizes, we require the distance bands to have the same area as the inner circle. If
we set r0 = s/
√
2, the latter requirement leads to radii rq = s ×
√
(q + 1)/2.
Consequently, the scanning raster we use for our study has a step width of s = 1 km
with an inner circle radius r0 = 0.707 km, which results in 342, 614 points. Limits in
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computational power prevent us from choosing a lower step width. For comparing
different levels of spatial resolution we also compute data on scanning rasters with
s = 4 km, s = 10 km and s = 20 km, respectively. In all three cases we again set
r0 = s/
√
2.
We process the spatial data in a PostgreSQL database with PostGIS extension with
self-made C# programs and in R (R, 2013). All distance calculations are done on
the WGS 84 coordinate system, except for the algorithm generating the scan points
i for which a sphere model of the earth is used. An overview of the data employed
is presented in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1.: Overview of the data employed.
Variable Description Proxy Source Aggregation level
Model Response
∆yi,t New PV installations dur-
ing t within inner circle i
– TSOs Geocoded point data
Explanatory Variables
yi,t Amount of PV installa-
tions through t within in-
ner circle i
Knowledge and experi-
ence level regarding PV
TSOs Geocoded point data
yi,q,t Amount of PV installa-
tions through t within dis-
tance band q of Q distance
bands at i
Knowledge and expe-
rience level regarding
PV within the distance
bands neighborhood of i
TSOs Geocoded point data
BUILDk,t Number of buildings at k, t Calculate Ni,t DESTATIS (2011) NUTS-3 level
Variables covered by the external influence α (t, C)
GRi Global solar radiation (av-
erage of 1981-2000) at i
Earnings from PV DWD (2010) 1-km raster data
POPi,t Population density at i, t Correct for sparsely
populated areas
DESTATIS (2010a),
DESTATIS (2010b)
NUTS-3 level
INCi,t Household income at i, t Financing and risk-
bearing abilities
INKAR (2010) NUTS-3 level
SIDOi,t Share of single/double
family homes at i, t
Ownership structure of
roofs
INKAR (2010) NUTS-3 level
URBANi,
FIELDi
Land use dummy for ur-
ban/field areas at i
Cover different propen-
sities to adopt in differ-
ent areas
CLC (2009) Scale of 1:100,000,
MMU of 25ha
FEt Year dummies for each
year between 1993 and
2008
Cover changes in feed-in
tariff and cost reduction
in PV production
– –
4.3.2. Setting up the regression model
The regression model is a pooled panel model for the years 1992 to 2009, which
results in 17 observable changes from year to year. We denote the value of the control
variables with index j ∈ {GR, POP, INC, SIDO, URBAN, FIELD} as Cj (i, t). We
define the external influence as α (t, C) = α0 +
∑2008
t=1993 αtFEt+
∑
∀j αjCj (i, t) which
results in
∆yi,t =
[
α (t, C) +
Q∑
q=0
βqyi,q,t
]
× [Ni,t − yi,t] . (4.3)
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α0, αGR, αPOP , αINC, αSIDO, αURBAN, αFIELD, α1993 . . . α2008 and β0 . . . βQ are the co-
efficients to be estimated in a generalized linear model (GLM). We choose a negative
binomial distribution with an identity link function as the functional relationship
is already given through the epidemic model.21 Standard errors are clustered to be
robust against temporal autocorrelation.
4.4. Statistical results and discussion
We study the diffusion of PV on different levels of aggregation. Table C.3, Table C.4,
Table C.5 and Table C.6 of C.6 contain the descriptive statistics of our analysis for
a step width of 1 km, 4 km, 10 km and 20 km.
Our hypothesis is that localized imitation drives PV adoption. If so, when running
regressions with a low step width, we should find significantly positive coefficients
for our inner circle and still significantly positive, but smaller coefficients for the
close distance bands. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients for the year dummies
should be significantly positive for the years when the subsidy system strongly fos-
tered PV adoption. Finally, if localized imitation was important for PV adoption,
estimations under a larger step width should have a lower goodness-of-fit than those
with small s. On the other hand, if the knowledge triggering adoption in epidemic
models disseminated over the whole country without limitations, localized imitation
should not matter and we should find zero influence of the distance bands.
Table 4.2 contains estimates for the different levels of aggregation studied. Spec-
ification MA and specification MB of Table 4.2 include results for s = 1 km. In
comparison with specification MA, MB incorporates a distance band, i.e., we add
a spatial component. Likewise, MC and MD show the results for s = 4 km, spec-
ification ME and MF for s = 10 km as well as specification MG and MH for
s = 20 km. The latter of the two specifications on each level of aggregation again
contains an added spatial component whereas the former does not. Conducting like-
lihood ratio tests to compare the respective specifications with and without spatial
components shows that adding a spatial component to the epidemic diffusion model
significantly improves its goodness-of-fit on all levels of geographical aggregation
21Ordinary least squares cannot be applied since the annex is count data. Furthermore, the
response is heteroscedastic but variance clearly exceeds the mean. In consequence, a Poisson
distribution is not suitable (Hilbe, 2011). See C.5 for details on our estimation procedure.
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studied (Table 4.2). Importantly, only for a step width of 1 km do we find signif-
icant coefficients. Further, one can easily see that the lowest level – a step width
of 1 km – obtains the best results in terms of the goodness-of-fit measure AICn.
22
The values of BICR,n and Dn underpin this finding and support the idea that imi-
tation is highly localized. When comparing the values of the four different levels of
aggregation studied, we find the highest estimated value for β0 on a step width of
s = 1 km. Similarly, β1 is highest for a step width of 1 km and on all step widths β0
is larger than β1, which again indicates that imitation is highly localized.
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Table 4.2.: Estimations for different geographical levels of aggregation.
Specification MA MB MC MD ME MF MG MH
Step width 1 km 1 km 4 km 4 km 10 km 10 km 20 km 20 km
α0 2.16E-05
∗∗∗ 2.02E-05∗∗∗ 1.66E-05 1.07E-05 1.26E-05 9.14E-06 1.08E-05 8.63E-06
(4.50E-08) (6.23E-08) (4.69E-05) (8.20E-05) (6.83E-03) (6.21E-03) (6.83E-03) (6.21E-03)
β0 1.32E-03
∗∗∗ 1.21E-03∗∗∗ 2.74E-04 2.23E-04 5.31E-05 4.29E-05 1.67E-05 1.39E-05
(3.75E-04) (3.64E-04) (2.03E-02) (1.95E-02) (1.86E-01) (1.80E-01) (1.86E-01) (1.80E-01)
β1 2.66E-04
∗∗ 2.15E-05 1.11E-05 2.91E-06
(8.98E-05) (2.25E-03) (2.27E-02) (1.23E-01)
αt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nobs. 5,824,438 5,824,438 333,064 333,064 45,441 45,441 8,738 8,738
LL -1,370,462 -1,366,887 -410,727 -409,245 -106,524 -106,259 -29,732 -29,699
θ−1 1.973 1.957 1.139 1.139 0.902 0.894 0.782 0.776
AIC 2,740,962 2,733,814 821,492 818,548 213,087 212,559 59,501 59,437
AICn 0.471 0.469 2.466 2.458 4.689 4.678 6.809 6.802
BICR,n -15.398 -15.399 -12.073 -12.081 -9.841 -9.848 -8.037 -8.038
D 1,044,447 1,040,609 213,964 211,036 39,962 39,631 8,913 8,897
Dn 0.179 0.179 0.642 0.634 0.879 0.872 1.020 1.018
Comparing with MA MC ME MH
LR (Chi) 7,150.0 1,676.4 530.3 66.1
LR (Pr(> Chisq)) 0∗∗∗ 0∗∗∗ 0∗∗∗ 0∗∗∗
Robust standard errors in parentheses
‡ significant at p < .20; †p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
More detailed results of our analysis with a step width of s = 1 km can be found
in Table 4.3. Specification M1 contains not only one spatial component but also
a second distance band in order to investigate how localized imitative behavior is.
Importantly, β2 of specification M1 is smaller than β1 and β0. Adding even more
distance bands to the epidemic diffusion model – in specification M2 we include
three, in M3 four, in M4 nine and in M5 ten distance bands – and again performing
likelihood ratio tests, reveals that all of the added spatial components significantly
improve the goodness-of-fit of the epidemic diffusion model. However, there is a
tendency that the more distance bands we include the less they can improve the
explanatory power of the model.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the magnitudes of the estimated β-coefficients of specifica-
tion M5. The x-axis shows the inner and outer radius of each distance band and
the y-axis pictures each distance bands’ β-value. Rectangles in black show coeffi-
cients which are significant at p < .05. Gray rectangles show coefficients significant
22See Hilbe (2011) for definitions of the goodness-of-fit statistics. The measures AICn and
BICR,n are relative in the sense that they account for the number of observations.
23As the βqs are relative measures a comparison makes sense across different levels of aggrega-
tion.
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Table 4.3.: Estimations (step: 1 km, r0: 0.7 km).
Specification M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Step width 1 km 1 km 1 km 1 km 1 km
α0 1.94E-05
∗∗∗ 1.88E-05∗∗∗ 1.84E-05∗∗∗ 1.72E-05∗∗∗ 1.70E-05∗∗∗
(8.88E-08) (1.17E-07) (1.42E-07) (2.22E-07) (2.34E-07)
β0 1.20E-03
∗∗∗ 1.19E-03∗∗∗ 1.19E-03∗∗∗ 1.18E-03∗∗∗ 1.18E-03∗∗
(3.64E-04) (3.65E-04) (3.66E-04) (3.68E-04) (3.68E-04)
β1 2.32E-04
∗∗ 2.22E-04∗∗ 2.16E-04∗∗ 2.07E-04∗∗ 2.06E-04∗∗
(8.40E-05) (8.26E-05) (8.18E-05) (8.14E-05) (8.14E-05)
β2 1.04E-04
∗ 8.78E-05∗ 7.98E-05∗ 6.68E-05∗ 6.51E-05∗
(4.54E-05) (4.16E-05) (4.03E-05) (3.91E-05) (3.89E-05)
β3 6.72E-05
∗ 5.54E-05∗ 3.85E-05‡ 3.74E-05‡
(3.55E-05) (3.30E-05) (3.07E-05) (3.07E-05)
β4 5.73E-05
∗ 3.62E-05‡ 3.43E-05‡
(3.22E-05) (2.89E-05) (2.86E-05)
β5 2.27E-05
‡ 2.04E-05
(2.50E-05) (2.46E-05)
β6 2.80E-05
‡ 2.54E-05‡
(2.83E-05) (2.77E-05)
β7 3.20E-05
‡ 2.80E-05‡
(2.78E-05) (2.72E-05)
β8 2.64E-05
‡ 2.21E-05‡
(2.62E-05) (2.51E-05)
β9 4.60E-05
† 3.85E-05‡
(3.32E-05) (3.26E-05)
β10 4.38E-05
†
(3.25E-05)
αt YES YES YES YES YES
Nobs. 5,824,438 5,824,438 5,824,438 5,824,438 5,824,438
LL -1,366,140 -1,365,813 -1,365,577 -1,364,979 -1,364,863
θ−1 1.958 1.960 1.962 1.966 1.967
AIC 2,732,323 2,731,671 2,731,201 2,730,015 2,729,785
AICn 0.469 0.469 0.469 0.469 0.469
BICR,n -15.399 -15.399 -15.399 -15.400 -15.400
D 1,038,811 1,037,789 1,036,982 1,034,838 1,034,482
Dn 0.178 0.178 0.178 0.178 0.178
Comparing with MB M1 M2 M3 M4
LR (Chi) 1492.7 654.1 471.8 1196.4 231.9
LR (Pr(> Chisq)) 0∗∗∗ 0∗∗∗ 0∗∗∗ 0∗∗∗ 0∗∗∗
Robust standard errors in parentheses
‡ significant at p < .20; †p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
to the level of (.05 < p < .20) or insignificant. The figure illustrates an attenuating
effect of distance. This result encourages the use of an imitation model: the fact
that an additional distance band has a positive impact allows the interpretation that
information flows over distance, but this flow peters out with distance. Thus, the
closer a PV system is located to a potential user, the higher the probability that the
potential user also installs such a system. Analyzing the β-values of the distance
bands of specification M5 in detail shows the βqs are in fact at first decreasing with
distance but from the third distance band onwards stay more or less constant, at
least in their order of magnitude: they roughly lie between 2E-05 and 5E-05. Fur-
thermore, the coefficients from the third distance band onwards are only significant
to the level of p < .20, besides β9 from specification M4 and β10 from M5 which are
significant to the level of p < .10 and β5 of specification M5 which is insignificant
(p > .20).
According to these results, localized imitation can only be quantified up to a range
of 1.2 km (for p < .05). However, even PV installations which happen to be located
further away from a certain decision maker may still have a minor effect on the
decision maker’s ability to adopt PV.
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Figure 4.4.: Magnitude of βq over distance for specification M5 (rectangles in gray
come from coefficients with a significance level of p > .05 or more).
Table 4.3 shows that the more distance bands are added the more α0 and β0 decrease
while the goodness-of-fit statistics increase. Consequently, epidemic diffusion models
which do not consider spatial relations may overestimate values of the constant
contact rate α0 as well as of β0, covering imitation. In contrast, the influence of
neighboring spatial units is underestimated, in that it is neglected.
Since we employ an epidemic diffusion model, the interpretation of the estimated
coefficients α0, β0, β1 and the further βqs is straightforward: Specification M5 of
Table 4.3 suggests that, in every period, a share of α0 = 1.70E-05 of non-users
adopt PV because of a central entity. This means on average a share of 1% of the
PV annex can be explained by the central entity. The information borne by current
users within the inner circle affects the adoption by non-users through β0. According
to our results, in every period each existing user contacts a share β0 = 1.18E-03 of
non-users [Ni,t − yi,t] which then in total leads to [β0yi,t] × [Ni,t − yi,t] new users.
I.e., 63% of the PV annex comes from information borne by current users within
the inner circle. Further, each existing user of distance band 1 contacts a share
β1 = 2.06E-04 agents (this corresponds to 9% of the PV annex), whereas each user
of the still highly significant distance band 2 only contacts a share of β2 = 6.51E-05
non-users of the population of the spatial unit of study (3% of PV annex). The
β-coefficients of the distance bands located even further away can be interpreted in
the same way.
In order to confirm our results, we include several control variables in the external
coefficient of the epidemic diffusion model. Due to multicollinearity the controls
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are incorporated separately.24 Table 4.4 shows the results. The αSIDO-coefficient
for the number of single/double family homes as well as the coefficient covering
spatial units mainly shrouded by fields – αFIELD – do not improve our model. In
contrast, global radiation (shown by αGR), population density (αPOP ), household
income (αINC) and urban spatial units (αURBAN) positively increase the annex of PV
installations. Again, likelihood ratio tests for the estimation with control variables
show a significant improvement of our models’ goodness-of-fit for these variables
when compared with the reduced specification, which is MA. However, all control
variables increase the goodness-of-fit in terms of AIC less than by adding spatial
components.
Regarding AIC, the land use information covered by URBANi adds the highest
amount of explanatory power stemming from the control variables.25 In contrast,
information on the household income, which may cover financial constraints and
risk-bearing possibilities, and global radiation, which directly affects the income
possible with a PV system at a given place, only slightly improve the goodness-
of-fit. We therefore argue that these factors are relatively less important for the
diffusion of PV. Further, our results may be interpreted as confirmation that in-
stead of financial aspects other reasons for installing, such as imitation, prevail. In
this respect, the findings regarding the influence of the control variables population
density, household income and single/double family homes should be treated with
caution as they are only available on the NUTS-3 level. Data on a lower level of
geographical aggregation may allow more detailed results.
The robustness of the findings regarding our control variables is checked by including
ten distance bands in the specification M6, M7, M8, M9, M10, M11, and M12.
This step results in only minor changes and in any case does not change the signifi-
cance levels of the distance bands when estimating M5. The significance levels and
values of the control variables are similar to the ones reported in Table 4.4, which
made us decide – for purposes of clarity – not to show the results of this robustness
check.
In general, αt is included and stands for year dummies multiplied by [Ni,t − yi,t]
as temporal FE. According to our interpretation, these variables cover shifts in the
subsidy system for PV and cost reductions in production. The respective coefficients
24A test on the joint significance of the control variables shows that multicollinearity is indeed
a problem when all controls are added (see M12).
25Including all control variables at once (see M12) confirms that URBANi improves the model
most.
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Table 4.4.: Estimations with control variables (step: 1 km, r0: 0.7 km).
Specification M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12
Step width 1 km 1 km 1 km 1 km 1 km 1 km 1 km
α0 0 1.61E-05
∗∗∗ 0 2.02E-05∗∗∗ 4.28E-06∗∗∗ 2.02E-05∗∗∗ 0
(6.07E-06) (3.78E-07) (2.73E-06) (2.33E-06) (1.73E-07) (7.22E-07) (5.93E-06)
β0 1.21E-03
∗∗∗ 1.21E-03∗∗∗ 1.21E-03∗∗∗ 1.21E-03∗∗∗ 1.21E-03∗∗∗ 1.21E-03∗∗∗ 1.21E-03∗∗∗
(3.64E-04) (3.65E-04) (3.64E-04) (3.64E-04) (3.66E-04) (3.64E-04) (3.66E-04)
β1 2.66E-04
∗∗ 2.66E-04∗∗ 2.66E-04∗∗ 2.66E-04∗∗ 2.61E-04∗∗ 2.66E-04∗∗ 2.61E-04∗∗
(8.97E-05) (9.02E-05) (8.98E-05) (8.98E-05) (9.02E-05) (8.98E-05) (9.02E-05)
αGR 2.03E-08
∗∗∗ 0
(5.94E-09) (2.92E-09)
αPOP 6.86E-09
∗∗∗ 0
(8.54E-10) (1.35E-09)
αINC 1.90E-08
∗∗∗ 6.23E-10
(2.51E-09) (1.98E-09)
αSIDO 0 0
(2.81E-08) (4.27E-08)
αURBAN 1.01E-04
∗∗∗ 1.01E-04∗∗∗
(3.73E-06) (4.12E-06)
αFIELD 0 0
(1.15E-06) (4.68E-07)
αt YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Nobs. 5,824,438 5,824,438 5,824,438 5,824,438 5,824,438 5,824,438 5,824,438
LL -1,366,861 -1,366,814 -1,366,780 -1,366,887 -1,365,450 -1,366,887 -1,365,432
θ−1 1.956 1.959 1.957 1.957 1.959 1.957 1.959
AIC 2,733,764 2,733,671 2,733,603 2,733,816 2,730,942 2,733,816 2,730,917
AICn 0.469 0.469 0.469 0.469 0.469 0.469 0.469
BICR,n -15.399 -15.399 -15.399 -15.399 -15.399 -15.399 -15.399
D 1,040,650 1,040,104 1,040,466 1,040,609 1,037,225 1,040,595 1,037,249
Dn 0.179 0.179 0.179 0.179 0.178 0.179 0.178
Comparing with MA MA MA MA MA MA MA M10
LR (Chi) 51.8 144.8 212.6 0.0 2873.4 0.0 2908.7 35.2
LR (Pr(> Chisq)) 0∗∗∗ 0∗∗∗ 0∗∗∗ 1 0∗∗∗ 1 0∗∗∗ 0∗∗∗
Robust standard errors in parentheses
‡ significant at p < .20; †p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
are mainly found to be positive and since the year 1999 have been significantly
higher than for the years before. This result is not surprising, as the 100, 000 roofs
program supported PV installations since the year 1999. A continuous attractiveness
on a similar or even higher level was established by the Renewable Energy Sources
Act since 2000. However, as the year dummies are only significant on the lowest
level of aggregation studied – i.e., on a step width of 1 km – the national subsidy
system seems to be very relevant on the local level. We conclude that shifts in the
subsidy system should be taken into account when studying the propensity to adopt
subsidized technologies with epidemic diffusion models.
In order to test whether imitation is lagged in time, we run regressions under
∆yi,t,lag2 = yi,t+2 − yi,t+1 on the left-hand side, which means that, for example,
the PV installations up to the end of the year 2000 are assumed to explain the
annex in 2002. This modification results in clearly inferior goodness-of-fit statistics,
which are not reported for reasons of clarity. Importantly, the result that imitation
decreases with distance is robust for the change in the lag structure. In consequence,
we can confidently rule out that the ‘reflection problem’ described by Manski (1993)
biases our results. The reflection problem applies to situations where the adoption
decision of an individual depends on others in her reference group and the individ-
uals’s adoption also affects other group members. Given that we analyze adoption
on a yearly basis, it is reasonable to assume that an individual who adopts at t+ 2
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also decided to adopt at t + 2 or at least t + 1 and was therefore affected by the
behavior of reference group members at t.
The robustness of our results is also checked by only studying the time period
between 2000 and 2009, i.e., when the subsidy system fostered the adoption of PV.
Slightly lower significance levels (only α0, β0 and β2 are at least significant to the
level of p < .05), but similar values for the estimated coefficients are found as for
specification M5. Again, to maintain clarity the results are not shown.
Further robustness tests are performed by including αNUTS-1 or αNUTS-3 – spatial FE
on the NUTS-1, respectively NUTS-3 level – into our model. αNUTS-1 and αNUTS-3
could cover idiosyncratic spatial differences as supplementary local incentives: e.g.,
there are additional government grants in Bavaria (‘Programm fu¨r rationelle En-
ergiegewinnung und Verwendung’) or diffusion patterns may vary between the former
East and West Germany. Similar to the year dummies, the NUTS-1 and NUTS-3
dummies are multiplied by [Ni,t − yi,t] as they are part of the external influence.
Including αNUTS-1, thus 15 dummies for the 16 German states, only slightly changes
the magnitude of the estimated coefficients and their significance levels.
Due to limits in computational power, we can only estimate NUTS-3 dummies for
parts of Germany. As an example, we show the results for the analysis of Bavaria
and Hesse in Table 4.5. We included 95 NUTS-3 dummies for the 96 NUTS-3 regions
of Bavaria and 25 dummies for the 26 NUTS-3 regions of Hesse. Table 4.5 compares
the estimates for Bavaria and Hesse including and without αNUTS-3. Although the
NUTS-3 specific dummies significantly improve the goodness-of-fit of our model as
shown by the AIC and a likelihood ratio test comparing specification Ma with
Mb, respectively Mc with Md, αNUTS-3 only slightly changes the results of the
other estimates. In consequence, the estimations including NUTS-3 dummies also
support the hypothesis of localized imitation. Likewise, including αNUTS-3 confirms
that imitation attenuates with distance as the internal coefficients βq are roughly
decreasing with distance. Furthermore, the βqs are insignificant for Bavaria (besides
β0 which is – however – only significant at the level of p < .20) suggesting that
imitation may be localized to a range of only 0.7 km. Importantly, the significance
levels do not change if αNUTS-3 is included in the estimation, indicating that our
results are robust to differences at the NUTS-3 level in general. For Hesse, βq is
decreasing in distance and insignificant from the second distance band onwards,
whether αNUTS-3 is estimated or not. See C.7 for further results on the NUTS-1
level.
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Table 4.5.: Estimations (step: 1 km, r0: 0.7 km) for Bavaria and Hesse.
Bavaria Hesse
Specification Ma Mb Mc Md
Step width 1 km 1 km 1 km 1 km
α0 8.36E-06
∗∗∗ 0 2.69E-04∗∗∗ 2.07E-05∗∗∗
(5.66E-07) (6.12E-20) (3.74E-05) (1.50E-06)
β0 2.06E-02
‡ 2.06E-03‡ 1.31E-03∗ 1.03E-03∗
(2.03E-03) (2.02E-03) (9.75E-04) (5.37E-04)
β1 1.53E-02 1.51E-04 3.48E-04
‡ 7.98E-05‡
(3.13E-04) (3.16E-04) (2.63E-04) (8.07E-05)
β2 3.93E-05 2.99E-05 1.28E-04 0
(1.85E-04) (1.85E-04) (1.42E-04) (2.55E-05)
β3 1.92E-05 1.21E-05 1.15E-04 0
(1.52E-04) (1.55E-04) (1.51E-04) (2.93E-05)
β4 1.49E-05 9.24E-06 6.90E-05 0
(1.44E-04) (1.49E-04) (1.26E-04) (2.71E-05)
β5 2.86E-06 0 7.40E-05 0
(1.00E-04) (6.25E-21) (1.44E-04) (3.37E-05)
β6 0 0 8.27E-05 0
(5.94E-05) (2.18E-18) (1.34E-04) (2.81E-05)
β7 6.88E-06 0 1.11E-04 0
(1.25E-04) (3.30E-19) (1.95E-04) (4.14E-05)
β8 3.70E-06 0 1.54E-04 0
(7.16E-05) (6.78E-20) (2.31E-04) (5.61E-05)
β9 9.92E-06 0 1.57E-04 0
(1.52E-04) (1.87E-18) (1.59E-04) (2.96E-05)
β10 8.30E-06 0 1.50E-04 0
(8.59E-05) (4.55E-19) (1.69E-04) (3.13E-05)
αt YES YES YES YES
αNUTS-3 YES YES
Nobs. 1146259 1,146,259 357,510 357,510
LL -420,882 -420,326 -102,862 -95,942
θ−1 1.439 1.432 1.590 1.268
AIC 841,822 840,900 205,751 191,942
AICn 0.734 0.734 0.576 0.537
BICR,n -13.682 -13.682 -12.556 -12.577
D 308,600 308,011 82,395 74,666
Dn 0.269 0.269 0.230 0.209
Comparing with Ma Mc
LR (Chi) 95 16
LR (Pr(> Chisq)) 0∗∗∗ 0∗∗∗
Robust standard errors in parentheses
‡ significant at p < .20; †p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
Finally, we conduct sensitivity analyses. On the one hand, we run regressions on the
richest and the poorest quartiles of German NUTS-3 regions from the year 2008.
This analysis again confirms that imitation fades with distance. Interestingly, in
the poorer regions imitation could be significantly (p < .20) quantified up to a
radius of 1.7 km, whereas in the richer regions the significant range is only 1 km.
One reason for this finding may be that rich regions are often urban areas where a
high population and building density may limit the spatial range that an individual
observes intensively. On the other hand, we estimate our model for the most and
the least sunny quartiles. Again, the results confirm that imitation attenuates with
distance. In less sunny regions the significant range is 1.4 km (p < .20), in sunny
regions 0.7 km. As fewer PV systems are installed in less sunny regions, the impact
of one system on potential users nearby may have a greater distance range.
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4.5. Summary
We find that including a spatial dimension in an epidemic diffusion model of PV
installations in Germany does significantly increase its explanatory power. In con-
trast, our control variables contribute less information than a spatial component.
Further, the best results are achieved on the lowest level of geographical aggrega-
tion. Consequently, epidemic models which do not consider spatial relations may
have overestimated values of the constant contact rate α0 as well as of imitation.
Our analysis reveals a decreasing influence of distance on localized imitation and
suggests that from 1.2 km onwards there is actually a roughly constant and only to
p < .20 significant positive influence on imitation.
Stated more explicitly, our study of PV data indicates that imitative behavior is
highly localized, i.e., spatial proximity facilitates imitative behavior. Observing a
PV system in operation and talking about it with a person of trust, may increase
the likelihood of installing PV.
In his overview of diffusion models, Geroski (2000, p. 621) highlights that, according
to the epidemic model, technology diffusion “happens too slowly, mainly because
information does not diffuse fast enough amongst potential users.” By including a
spatial component in an epidemic diffusion model and employing it on a low level
of geographical aggregation, we conclude that it is not only a case of “too slowly”,
but also of “not far enough” in geographical terms. This finding may be interpreted
in the way that a financial incentive is not the only important factor in fostering
adoption, but that the diffusion process may be initiated on the local level in order
to boost adoption. This argument is one in favor of locally distributed eye- and
attention-catching projects, which could be placed as seeds in key regions. These
simply signal that the technology or product works. In the same line of reasoning,
schemes on the local level that support spreading of information, such as referral
reward programs and impact campaigns, could be promising. For instance, Mu¨ller
and Rode (2013) refer to Cardwell (2012) who shows that, in the U.S., enthusiastic
PV users inform their neighbors about PV. Similar sales strategies are known from
Tupperware. To conclude, if fostering technology diffusion is on the agenda, creating
incentives for enthusiastic technology users to share their experience with neighbors –
i.e., facilitating the spread of information – may be rewarding.
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Our analysis leaves room for improvements: a lower level of geographical aggre-
gation for the relevant population and the proxies of economic wealth, population
density and the share of single/double family homes should be beneficial. A general
drawback of diffusion models on the aggregate level, as with the epidemic model,
is their inability to describe different degrees of resistance to adoption caused by
heterogeneous user needs and individual preferences. These shortcomings should be
a topic for further research on the diffusion of PV and technologies in general.
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In the last chapter, we use an (aggregate) epidemic model of technology diffusion to
show that localized imitation drives PV adoption. Now, we focus on the adoption
decision of individuals.
5.1. Motivation
The diffusion of new technologies (in space and time) results from a series of indi-
vidual decisions to adopt (i.e., to begin using the new technology). Understanding
factors influencing the choice to adopt is essential both for economists studying the
determinants of diffusion and for the creators and producers of such technologies.
Since Griliches (1957) and Mansfield (1961) economists have focused on temporal
patterns of technology diffusion, i.e., why diffusion is slow. Ha¨gerstrand (1965, 1967)
was the first to concentrate on the spatial aspects of diffusion. Following these
early contributions, diffusion might be interpreted as the (cumulative) outcome of
individual decisions to adopt. However, it might be rewarding to explicitly study
the individual decisions. Since the decision to adopt (in a certain period of time) is a
discrete one (Karshenas and Stoneman, 1992), we follow Mu¨ller and Rode (2013) and
employ a discrete choice model. Discrete choice analysis is the standard approach
to analyzing individual discrete decision-making (McFadden, 2001). In particular,
Geroski (2000) highlights that when focusing on differences in adopter characteristics
a specific discrete choice model, namely the probit model, is appropriate.
26This chapter is based on a revised version of Rode and Mu¨ller (2014).
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PV systems are a sustainable energy technology. In contrast to previous studies
on PV adoption, we analyze all potential adopters’ individual decisions to adopt
PV systems across a whole country, i.e., we study the adoption of PV systems
in Germany using individual level panel data. Due to a strong subsidy system,
Germany was the country with the highest PV capacity installed per capita in the
world through 2012 (IEA-PVPS, 2013). Figure 5.1 illustrates the spatio-temporal
dimension of our data. The lighter a given region is colored, the more new PV
systems are installed in the corresponding year (while controlling for the number
of potential adopters in that region). The figure shows that, e.g., in the east of
Bavaria comparatively many PV systems were installed in all years. Besides high
global radiation in Bavaria, a localized peer effect may be a reason for the observed
clustering.
Peer effects are one factor that drives individual technology adoption (Brock and
Durlauf, 2010; Conley and Udry, 2010; Oster and Thornton, 2012). Recently, several
studies analyzed the adoption of PV systems (Dewald and Truffer, 2011; Dastrup
et al., 2012; Comin and Rode, 2013) and found peer effects to be an important driver
(Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012; Rode and Weber, 2012; Islam, 2014; Mu¨ller and
Rode, 2013). We define peers as (potential) adopters nearby. Exact locational data
on PV adopters and potential adopters allows us to be the first who build a specific
measure of the peer effect for each adopter per time period across a whole country.
By doing so, we can find out how peer effects in PV system adoption vary over time
and space.
According to Rogers (1983, 166-167), early adopters are more influential on peers
than later adopters, i.e., we hypothesize that the influence of peer effects may de-
crease over time.27 Why should it be of interest to know whether the influence of
peer effects decreases over time? New technologies often diffuse more slowly than
would be optimal (Rogers, 1983; Geroski, 2000; Oster and Thornton, 2012). Un-
derstanding the impact of peer effects may help to foster the diffusion. That is,
installation seeds could be used by (political) decision-makers to raise the diffusion
speed by steering adoption to locations where adoption is most intended (Rode and
Weber, 2012; Islam, 2014; Mu¨ller and Rode, 2013). Further, we are interested in the
characteristics of early adopters. Rogers (1983) describes early adopters as being of
high socio-economic status. We hypothesize that early adopters may be associated
27At the end of our period of study, in 2010, still less than 5% of the potential users had adopted
PV systems. Therefore, we define early adopters as those who adopt in the very first periods of
diffusion. Following Mu¨ller and Rode (2013), later adopters are those who adopt in early but not
in the very first periods of diffusion.
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Figure 5.1.: Natural logarithm of yearly annex of PV installations divided by number
of potential adopters across Germany. The lighter a region is colored in
the figure, the more PV systems are installed in the corresponding year
while controlling for the number of addresses.
with measures indicating high income and low population density, i.e., a high share
of single- and double-family homes.
Our analysis reveals that peer effects in PV system adoption are largely localized.
The peer effect’s impact on the decision to adopt decreases over time. This trend
is disrupted by changes in the subsidies for PV systems. When comparing early
and later adopters, we find that later adopters tend to have lower buying power.
They also live in less densely populated areas with lower global radiation. We find
different scales of the effects in urban and non-urban areas, and in the east and
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west of Germany. Finally, we also show that the number of peers needed to foster
adoption at locations with low global radiation increases over time. A case study
with building-specific data on global radiation confirms our findings.
In parts, we follow Mu¨ller and Rode (2013) when we introduce our discrete choice
model with panel data in Section 5.2. We give a description of our empirical study
in Section 5.3. The results are shown in Section 5.4, which also contains a case
study confirming some of our assumptions. Section 5.5 summarizes the chapter and
provides an outlook on further research.
5.2. Discrete choice analysis for binary panel data
This section gives a short description of basics in discrete choice analysis. For further
reading, we refer to Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985), Train (2003), and Koppelman
and Bhat (2006).
Consider a decision-maker n (an individual or a household) who faces the decision
to adopt or not to adopt the new technology in period t. That is, n chooses in t
between two alternatives: first, i.e., i = 1, to adopt or second, i.e., i = 2, not to
adopt. In each period t choice-maker n perceives utility Unti of choosing alternative i.
Here, we assume a rational choice behavior, i.e., choice-maker n chooses in period t
alternative i that maximizes his utility (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Concerning
the adoption of new technology, we consider the choice problem
Unt1 > Unt2. (5.1)
Choice-maker n adopts the new technology (i = 1) if (5.1) holds. Unfortunately, it is
impossible to correctly observe all variables that make up utility Unti. Therefore, in
discrete choice analysis the latent construct utility is decomposed into a deterministic
(or systematic) part Vnti and a stochastic part εnti:
Unti = Vnti + εnti. (5.2)
Usually Vnti is linear in parameters:
Vnti =
∑
h∈H
βithxntih. (5.3)
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The H independent variables xntih describe alternative i and characteristics of
choice-maker n in period t. The exogenous variables xntih are weighted by coefficients
βith. Obviously, utility of (5.2) is random and hence only probability statements on
our behavioral model of (5.1) can be made:
Pnt1 = Prob (Unt1 > Unt2) (5.4)
= Prob (εnt2 − εnt1 < Vnt1 − Vnt2) .
Equation (5.4) denotes the (choice) probability of choice-maker n adopting the new
technology in period t, i.e., n chooses to install a PV system in t. In order to opera-
tionalize the choice model of (5.4), we have to make assumptions about the random
components of utility nti in (5.2). We usually assume that each error εnti is the
sum of many random variables. According to the central limit theorem, the sum
of many independent and identically distributed random variables approximately
follows a normal distribution, i.e., εnti ∼ N (0, σ). Since the difference of two nor-
mally distributed random variables follows a normal distribution as well, we may
operationalize the choice probabilities of (5.4) as
Pnt1 = Φ
(
Vnt1 − Vnt2
σ
)
. (5.5)
Φ is the standardized cumulative normal distribution and σ is the standard devia-
tion that is usually set to one for identification purposes. The choice model of (5.5)
is referred to as the binary probability unit model – in short: binary probit model.
Although (5.5) is based on simple theoretical assumptions about the stochastic part
of utility, it lacks a closed-form probability formula. If we assume that each error
εnti is the maximum of many independent and identically distributed random vari-
ables, then, according to the Gumbel theorem, it has been shown that εnti follows
an extreme value distribution (McFadden, 2001). Since the difference of two ex-
treme value distributed random variables follows the logistic distribution, we may
operationalize (5.4) as
Pnt1 =
eµVnt1
eµVnt1 + eµVnt2
, (5.6)
which is the well-known binary logit model (McFadden, 1974). µ is a scale parameter
> 0 that is not identified and has to be set to an arbitrary value (e.g., one) for model
identification purposes. In subsequent paragraphs we use BPM for (5.5) and BLM
for (5.6).
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The unknown coefficients βih of (5.3) can be provided through maximum likelihood
estimation:
max
β∈RH
N∑
n=1
T∑
t=1
(ont1 ln (Pnt1) + (1− ont1) ln (1− Pnt1)) . (5.7)
ont,PV equals one if we observe that choice-maker n has installed a PV system in
period t (zero otherwise). Therefore, ont,PV is the dependent variable and hence we
are not able to measure Unti directly. Furthermore, we are only able to identify utility
differences due to (5.1). Note, N is the set of all considered individuals. As already
stated, utility Unti is a latent variable: the observable choices are manifestations
of the underlying utilities described by exogenous variables. Nowadays, there are
tailored software packages for estimation purposes (see for example StataCorp (2009)
and Bierlaire (2003)). The modeling framework is given in Figure 5.2.
Exogenous variables Xnti
Utility Unti
Observed choices onti
Equation (5.2)
Equation (5.7)
Figure 5.2.: Modeling framework: rectangles represent observed data and the ellipse
denotes a latent variable. The solid line represents a structural equation
while the dashed line stands for a measurement equation.
Note that BPM (5.5) and BLM (5.6) might exhibit a severe shortcoming depending
on the specific choice situation and data to be analyzed: the assumption of indepen-
dence of the error terms in (5.2). In our case the independence of the error terms
over choice alternatives seems to be uncritical because the choice situation is binary
and the two alternatives are antipodal. Although the assumption of independence
(over periods and choice-makers) might be violated in our case, it is well known
from empirical studies that the inferences based on the estimates of (binary) logit
and probit models are fairly robust (Hensher and Greene, 2003).
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5.3. Empirical study
In this section we discuss the operationalization of peer effects in PV system adop-
tion. We also present details of the data used for model estimation and we specify
the utility functions of (5.3).
5.3.1. Data
This study builds on a unique data set including the location (address) and date
of installation of the PV systems set up in Germany through 2010. Since 80% of
the PV systems in Germany are installed on roofs (BMU (2011) and Dewald and
Truffer (2011)), we consider buildings as the predominantly potential places for PV
systems. Therefore, we are only interested in PV systems on buildings. Since we
obtain adresses, we assume that each address may be equipped with a building
that is owned by someone. Eventually, this (artificial) person – the owner or owner
group – makes the decision to install in a certain period or not. However, due to
data-related issues we do not observe the choice directly. We only observe whether
there is a PV system at a given address in a given period or not (see Figure 5.3).
Of course, whether the building at the address is owned by a private household or a
house cooperation (or a firm) makes a difference. Unfortunately, we do not obtain
information on ownership. Still, to the best of our knowledge no other study on
PV system adoption, particularly those using aggregate approaches, accounts for
ownership (see Bollinger and Gillingham (2012), Mu¨ller and Rode (2013) and our
analysis in Chapter 5).
Our geocoded data set covers all 882,062 grid-connected PV systems which were
installed in Germany through the end of the year 2010 (U¨NB, 2012). We drop
solar systems that are obviously solar parks and end up with 879,020 installations.
We neglect that a PV system may be uninstalled since – according to our data
set – this is only the case for 0.35% of the systems under study. Table D.1 in
Appendix D.4 shows the accuracy of the geocoding process. Further, the data
set contains 21,808,025 addresses (Infas, 2009a). Each PV system is allocated to
its nearest address. 269,752 addresses end up with more than one allocated PV
system. This is due to inaccuracy in geocoding, missing address information in
the PV system data set and the possibility that more than one building exists
at one address and more than one PV system could be installed on one building.
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We randomly allocate the PV systems from these observations to another address
located in the same spatial unit (statistical district). The 77,847 statistical districts
are taken from Infas (2009b).28 As a consequence, our data set comprises 877,114
PV systems each allocated to a mutually exclusive address.
Figure 5.3.: PV installations in detail in space and time. Hollow circles picture
potential adopters, i.e., addresses. Filled circles are PV installations.
Animation works with Adobe Reader version ≥7.
In order to run the estimations in a reasonable amount of time, we randomly choose
a 9% sample with 1,982,098 address observations.29 78,952 of these are equipped
with a PV system. Table D.2 in Appendix D.4 shows the frequencies of each choice
alternative per period.
5.3.2. Utility functions and operationalization
The choice problem under consideration is for each n to choose to install a PV
system in a given period t or to not install (see Section 5.2). In order to test for
peer effects we consider the influence of the choice of m ∈ N in period t− 1 on the
choice of n ∈ N in period t, i.e., the dependencies between choice-makers n and m.
28The average area of a statistical district is about 4.6 sqkm and the average number of addresses
in such a statistical district is 280.
29We verify our results for further samples in Section 5.4.1.
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We define the peer effect on choice-maker n in period t as
IBASEnt =
∑
m∈N,
m6=n|
dnm≤D
om,t−1,1f (dnm) , (5.8)
the installed base (Farrell and Saloner, 1986; Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012). With
dnm > 0 as the Euclidean distance in meters between the location of n and the
location of m. D is a cut-off parameter to be set by the analyst. We may assume
that there is no remarkable influence of PV installations farther away from location n
than D. Exemplarily, we set f (dnm) = 1/ ln (dnm), and D = 500 meters.
30 Of
course, choice-maker n might also be influenced by peers who have adopted in earlier
periods, i.e., t−2, t−3 etc. We consider the corresponding measure in Appendix D.1.
Since the subsidy system for PV systems changes during the period of study, only
peers who adopted in the preceding period (t− 1) may pass on reliable information
regarding, e.g., the reliability, initial costs, and the net present value of PV systems.
Note, om,0,1 = 1 if m has adopted a PV system in any period preceding period t = 1.
The spatio-temporal lag variable, (5.8), enables us to test whether preexisting PV
systems stimulate further installations nearby.
As we are interested in the adoption of a subsidized environmentally-friendly tech-
nology, we incorporate this characteristic into our analysis (Jaffe et al., 2002; Davies
and Diaz-Rainey, 2011; Rode and Weber, 2012). We describe the subsidy system
for PV in detail in Section 3.1 of Chapter 3. Besides changes in the subsidy sys-
tem, decreased cost of PV system adoption also caused shifts in the profitability of
PV systems. Because the year of installation is known, we can allow for different
gains in utility from different installation periods. In order to account for these
time-period-specific effects, we consider period dummies.
Before the year 2000 the subsidy level for PV systems was low and only very few
systems were installed. Therefore, we define year 2000 to be our first period. Year
2001 is the second period, and finally year 2010 is the eleventh period.
Of course, the utility a decision-maker gains by installing in a certain period or not
may also be influenced by factors other than peer effects (IBASEnt) and temporally
fixed effects covering shifts in the profitability of PV systems. Unfortunately, we
do not have information about the characteristics of the decision-maker itself but
30In Section 5.4.1, we relax the specification and show results for further specifications f (dnm)
and D.
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we have information on characteristics of the decision-maker’s location. We assume
that it is very likely that the characteristics of both are comparable and therefore
include locational characteristics. In order to account for the problem of modifiable
areal units (Openshaw, 1984), these variables (population density, buying power,
and global radiation) are of very high spatial resolution. We consider the following
variables:
• GRn denotes the average yearly global radiation in MWh/m2 according to n’s
location in 1-km raster cells provided by DWD (2010).31 A higher level of
global radiation indicates a higher potential to produce electricity and there-
fore a higher remuneration potential to the owner of a PV system at a given
location. Hence, we assume the higher GRn, the higher the utility from in-
stalling a PV system. Early adopters may have other motives for installing
than to generate income (Rogers, 1983). In contrast, later adopters may install
to generate income. Thus, global radiation’s contribution to the utility from
adoption may rise over time.
• BUYPOWn is the buying power index of the statistical district according to
decision-maker n’s location. An index value of 1 corresponds to the median
buying power of German households in 2009 (Infas, 2009b). Data is available
for 77,847 statistical districts in Germany. Since PV installations are expensive
(see Appendix C.1), we might assume that wealthier decision-makers are more
likely to install. According to Rogers (1983), early adopters may have a higher
socio-economic status than followers, which leads us to the hypothesis that
measures indicating high income are associated with early adopters.
• GREENn specifies the share of green votes from the casted votes in 2009’s
federal (“Bundestag”) election according to n’s location in NUTS-3 districts,
i.e., 429 districts across Germany (DESTATIS, 2012). On the one hand, a
high share of green votes may be associated with a distinct “green attitude”.
Therefore, high values of GREENn may yield a high propensity of installing
a PV system. On the other hand, Welsch and Ku¨hling (2009, p. 172) argue
that solar thermal equipment may also be installed due to a status effect and
therefore be seen as a “Mercedes-Benz on the rooftop”. A similar reasoning
may make sense for PV systems. Furthermore, the positive net present value
31DWD (2010) combines measures from satellites and local observation stations to build the
raster data, i.e., the data accounts for the geographic features of the raster units. Across Germany,
the data includes values for 359.586 raster cells, which means on average 61 addresses per raster
cell for our data set.
49
5. Spatio-Temporal Variation in Peer Effects
of PV systems – shown in Appendix C.1 in some parts of Germany since 2004 –
should result in PV installations no matter how high or low the green attitude
of a decision-maker is. If so, we should not observe that the probability to
install a PV system increases with the share of green votes. We are therefore
unsure what impact to expect from GREENn on the propensity to install a
PV system.
• POPDENn denotes the population density times 100 of the statistical district
where n is located in 2009 (Infas, 2009b). Data is available for 77,847 statistical
districts in Germany. A low measure of POPDENn may refer to places with a
high share of single- and double-family homes. For decision-makers located at
these places the decision to install a PV system may be easier as fewer parties
have to agree upon the installation on a certain building. As a consequence,
we expect a negative impact of POPDENn on the propensity to install a PV
system. In line with Rogers (1983), early adopters may have a higher socio-
economic status than later adopters. Therefore, we test whether early adopters
are located in districts with a low population density, referring to locations
with a high share of single- and double-family homes.
• EASTn is a dummy variable that equals one, if n is located in the acceded
territories of the former German Democratic Republic.
• NUTS-1 (“La¨nder”) dummies cover time-invariant spatial effects. The dum-
mies capture region specific subsidies to install a PV system: e.g., the “Pro-
gramm fu¨r rationelle Energiegewinnung und Verwendung” – a government
grant – in the NUTS-1 region “Bavaria”.
• PERt is a dummy variable that equals one for period t, zero otherwise.
• URBANn identifies whether n is located in an urban area. According to n’s
location, we use detailed information on urban areas from 2006’s CORINE
Land Cover (CLC) data set (CLC, 2009). This data set comprises vector
data on a scale of 1:100,000. The minimum mapping unit for the polygons is
25 hectare.
Table D.3 in Appendix D.4 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables. Since
we use data from different sources and different spatial scales, Figure 5.4 summarizes
the data according to the corresponding spatial resolution.
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Figure 5.4.: Data and spatial resolution.
Now we specify the deterministic part of utility of observation n to adopt (i.e., i = 1)
in period t according to (5.3) as
Vnt,1 =β0 (5.9)
+β1IBASEn1 + · · ·+ β11IBASEn11 + β12IBASEntEASTn + β13IBASEntURBANn
+β14BUYPOWnPER1 + · · · β24BUYPOWnPER11 + β25BUYPOWnEASTn + β26BUYPOWnURBANn
+β27GRnPER1 + · · ·+ β37GRnPER11 + β38GRnEASTn + β39GRnURBANn
+β40GREENn + β41GREENnEASTn + β42GREENnURBANn
+β43POPDENnPER1 + · · ·+ β53POPDENnPER11 + β54POPDENnEASTn + β55POPDENnURBANn
+β56URBANn +
H∑
h=57
βhWnth,
with βh to be estimated by maximum likelihood of Equation (5.7) and IBASEnt
given as (5.8). Spatial and period fixed effects are denoted by dummy variables Wnth.
According to Section 5.2, only the utility differences are of interest (see Equa-
tion 5.4). Therefore, we might normalize the deterministic part of utility of ob-
servation n not to adopt (i.e., i = 2) in period t as
Vnt,2 = 0. (5.10)
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5.4. Results
5.4.1. Germany
Table 5.1 shows the coefficient estimate for the constant-only model, specifica-
tion M1. If not stated otherwise, we use the BPM model of (5.5). Specification M2
includes a time constant measure of the installed base and the respective control for
the east of Germany as well as period dummies and NUTS-1 dummies. A likelihood
ratio (LR) test – comparing M1 with M2 – indicates that M2 indeed describes the
decision to install a PV system significantly better. Specification M3 of Table 5.1
considers a period-specific measure of the installed base. Again a likelihood ratio
test indicates that including the period-specific installed base significantly increases
the explanatory power. M4 illustrates the results with a time-constant coefficient for
the installed base and BUYPOWn, GRn, GREENn, POPDENn, and the respective
control for the east of Germany. These controls improve the model fit significantly
but do not largely affect our measure of the installed base. M5 considers the con-
trols and a period-specific measure of the installed base. As shown by L(βˆ) and a
likelihood ratio test, M5 explains the adoption decision process better than M4.
Our preferred specification is M6 (see Table D.4 of Appendix D.4 and Equation (5.9)).
In comparison to M5, M6 includes interaction terms of URBANn, with BUYPOWn,
GRn, GREENn, and POPDENn. Furthermore, we estimate period-specific coeffi-
cients for BUYPOWn, GRn, POPDENn. A likelihood ratio test shows that M6 is
significantly superior to M5. We also show the robustness of our estimates by using
a BLM regression: M6Logit confirms the findings of M6.
We observe that the installed base has a significantly positive influence on the de-
cision to install a PV system. That is, the more proximate PV systems in the
preceding period, the higher the propensity of a potential user to obtain a PV sys-
tem in the current period. Potential users might be influenced by the decisions of
their peers. As a consequence, imitation of spatially close precursors might indeed
be an explaining factor in PV system adoption; i.e., our results confirm a localized
peer effect in the adoption of PV systems. For example, according to M6 in Ta-
ble D.4, the utility to install a PV system in western, non-urban areas in the year
2000 increases by 0.3 units per PV system installed in previous periods relative to
the distance to the previous installations. Imagine a given address and the situation
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Table 5.1.: Coefficient estimates of utility functions for sample of Germany.
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
ASCsolar -2.685
∗∗∗ -3.524∗∗∗ -3.532∗∗∗ -4.689∗∗∗ -4.682∗∗∗
(-2304.40) (-288.70) (-285.35) (-105.96) (-105.62)
IBASEnt 0.121∗∗∗ 0.0854∗∗∗
(44.48) (30.18)
IBASEn1 0.327∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗
(8.77) (12.34)
IBASEn2 0.194∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗
(4.64) (7.79)
IBASEn3 0.213∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗
(12.09) (12.92)
IBASEn4 0.398∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗
(14.07) (12.82)
IBASEn5 0.348∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗
(17.36) (14.51)
IBASEn6 0.236∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗
(19.11) (14.44)
IBASEn7 0.146∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(15.82) (11.76)
IBASEn8 0.149∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
(12.71) (11.08)
IBASEn9 0.142∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(16.30) (12.88)
IBASEn10 0.0982∗∗∗ 0.0626∗∗∗
(16.60) (10.46)
IBASEn11 0.103∗∗∗ 0.0616∗∗∗
(27.41) (16.02)
IBASEnt*EASTn 0.173∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗
(11.14) (10.88) (13.14) (12.75)
BUYPOWn -0.628∗∗∗ -0.628∗∗∗
(-52.11) (-52.08)
BUYPOWn*EASTn 0.404∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗
(6.54) (6.52)
GRn 2.102∗∗∗ 2.085∗∗∗
(46.75) (46.34)
GRn*EASTn -1.507∗∗∗ -1.478∗∗∗
(-5.90) (-5.78)
GREENn -2.160∗∗∗ -2.193∗∗∗
(-26.55) (-26.95)
GREENn*EASTn 0.523 0.541
(1.24) (1.28)
POPDENn -0.590∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗
(-53.88) (-54.00)
POPDENn*EASTn 0.412∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗
(12.23) (12.29)
NUTS-1 dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 21,803,078 21,803,078 21,803,078 21,803,078 21,803,078
DFM 0 27 37 35 45
Final log-likelihood L -522,595 -477,974 -477,800 -469,093 -468,876
LR: χ2 (DF) 89,242 (27) 349 (10) 17,763 (8) 433 (10)
LR: p-value 0 5.6e-69 0 8.7e-87
LR test against M1->M2 M2->M3 M2->M4 M4->M5
VIF below 10 for non-interaction terms
Robust t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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that through 1999 only one PV system was installed 100 meters away. Then, the
increase in utility is 0.3/ ln (100) = 0.07.
Interestingly, we find evidence for spatial non-stationarity: the coefficient for the
interaction between IBASEnt and EASTn is significantly positive, i.e., the peer effect
may be more important in the east of Germany. For example, for M6, adding
IBASEn1*EASTn’s coefficient to the one of IBASEn1 yields the effect of the installed
base on the utility to install a PV system in the east in 2000. Since fewer PV
installations exist in the east (see Figure 5.1), uncertainty regarding the reliability
of a PV system may be higher and therefore information from peers might be more
important compared to the west of Germany. Similarly, the interaction between
IBASEnt and URBANn is significantly positive, i.e., the peer effect may be more
important in urban than in non-urban areas.
We see that the coefficients of the installed base decrease over time. However, simply
comparing the magnitude of the estimated coefficients yields limited information.
Instead, we study their general impact by considering the average marginal effect.
Table D.5 of Appendix D.4 shows the respective results for M4, M6 and M6Logit.
Obviously, the average marginal effect for the installed base tends to decrease over
time (see M6 and M6Logit): i.e., the impact per distance-weighted peer on the utility
to install declines (see Figure 5.5). In general, there is the trend that the average
marginal effect of prior users on the decision to adopt diminishes. However, we
observe three positive shifts. (I), an increase in the year 2003 when the 100,000
roofs program ceased. The shift may be also due to the government’s discussion on
the amendment of the EEG between 2002 and 2003. In December 2003 the level of
the feed-in tariff for PV electricity was indeed modified for 2004.32 (II), from 2006
to 2007 we find a small increase in the average marginal effect again. This increase
may be linked to 2006’s slight change in the EEG: an obligation to publish data on
location and capacity of all subsidized systems was implemented. (III), in 2010 we
also observe a slight increase in the average marginal effect. This increase may be
linked to the amendment of the EEG in 2009. In contrast to the yearly changes of
the level of the feed-in tariff between 2000 and 2009, the level changed three times
in 2010. Having in mind the general trend of a diminishing average marginal effect
for IBASE over time, it seems that this trend is interrupted when relevant changes
in the subsidy system are implemented.
32The amendment of the EEG was implemented in 2004 but the relevant changes in the feed-in
tariff for PV electricity were already put in place in December 2003.
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Figure 5.5.: Diminishing average marginal effect for IBASE with time (for
M6, non-urban locations in the west). The patterns for urban
areas and the east of Germany are very similar.
We are now interested in adopter characteristics. We find that global radiation
(GRn) has a significantly positive effect on PV adoption. This finding is appropriate
as a high level of solar radiation indicates a higher potential to produce electricity
and confirms a large income potential from a PV system. The average marginal effect
of global radiation is also positive. Since 2002 we observe a slightly decreasing trend:
in contrast to our expectation, for later adopters global radiation seems to be less
relevant than for early adopters. This finding may be evidence for PV adoption due
to a status effect. The comparatively low marginal effect of global radiation in 2000
may be associated with the fact that the feed-in tariff was not put in place before
April 2000: it may have taken some time until the new subsidy system unfolded its
incentive effect. In the east of Germany, global radiation’s contribution to the utility
of installing a PV system is smaller than in the west. We find a similar pattern for
urban areas.
Political decision-makers might influence the diffusion process by systematically es-
tablishing seeds, e.g., local or regional incentives (Rode and Weber, 2012; Mu¨ller and
Rode, 2013). From a planning perspective it is interesting to know to what extend
seeding might balance disadvantages of regions in terms of global radiation. There-
55
5. Spatio-Temporal Variation in Peer Effects
fore, we evaluate seeds for promoting diffusion in regions with low global radiation,
i.e., we consider the trade-off between peer-effects (IBASEnt) and global radiation
(GRn) in terms of utility. This trade-off is measured as the ratio of the derivative
of utility with respect to global radiation and the derivative of utility with respect
to the installed base
TOGR*PERt/IBASEt =
∂Vn1t
∂GRnPERt
∂Vn1t
∂IBASEnt
=
β27,...,39
β1,...,13
.
The units for measuring global radiation are MWh/sqm and the units for mea-
suring the peer-effect (installed base) are number of distance-weighted peers, i.e.,
peers/ln(m). Therefore, the unit for this measure of utility trade-off is “distance-
weighted peers per MWh/sqm”, i.e., (peers/ln(m))/(MWh/sqm). Consider exem-
plarily the corresponding estimates of M6 in Table D.4 for the second period (2001)
TOGR*PER2/IBASE2 = βˆ28/βˆ2 = 2.25/0.24 ≈ 9
peers
ln(m)
MWh
sqm
.
This means, in terms of utility, 9 distance-weighted peers are equivalent to one
MWh/sqm global radiation. Consider exemplarily two locations: location A with
a global radiation of 1.05 MWh/sqm and location B with 1 MWh/sqm, all others
constant. In order to compensate the disadvantage of 0.05 MWh/sqm (1 stan-
dard deviation) of location B by additional peers, one would need to promote addi-
tional PV installations such that the measure of installed base IBASEB3 increases by
(1.05− 1) · 9 = 0.45. For example, this can be achieved by nine additional installa-
tions that are located 100 m away from location B (in period 3). As shown in Figure
5.6 this trade-off increases over time. This means that in more recent periods more
additional peers are needed to equal one MWh/sqm of global radiation compared to
earlier periods. In the east, less peers are needed to equal one MWh/sqm of global
radiation. We observe similar shifts in the trade-off between peer-effects and global
radiation as in the marginal effect for the peer-effect. Thus, potential adopters’
uncertainty caused by shifts in the subsidy system could be balanced through addi-
tional seeds.
We go on by discussing further characteristics of PV adopters. For a decision-
maker n with an average buying power (i.e., BUYPOWn = 1), the utility contri-
bution of buying power from installing PV is -0.27 units in 2002 (period 3, M6 in
Table D.4). Table D.5 illustrates that the average marginal effect for buying power
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Figure 5.6.: Trade-off between IBASEnt and GRn*PERt per year for urban
and non-urban areas in the east and west of Germany (M5).
decreases over time. As the costs for installing a PV system decreased substan-
tially in our period of study this finding is reasonable. Roughly speaking, early
adopters are associated with higher buying power compared to later adopters. This
finding is consistent with Rogers’ (1983) idea that early adopters are of higher socio-
economic status compared to later adopters. Again, there is evidence for spatial non-
stationarity: the coefficient for the interaction between BUYPOWn and EASTn is
significantly positive. For the period 2000-2007, we find positive (or close to zero)
coefficients for choice-makers located in the eastern part of Germany. While in the
west the utility declines with increasing buying power, we observe the opposite trend
for the east during 2000-2007 (excluding 2004). As there are fewer PV installations
in the east of Germany, we find early adopter characteristics (i.e., a high buying
power) for a longer period of time. Between buying power’s impact on the utility to
adopt in urban and non-urban areas is no significant difference.
We include the share of green votes in 2009’s federal election (GREENn) as an
indicator for environmental attitude. Its influence on the decision to install a PV
system is negative. This finding may be seen in line with Welsch and Ku¨hling’s
(2009) results that – in Germany – environmental awareness is not an important
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reason for installing solar thermal equipment, a technology closely related to PV.
Regarding the green attitude’s impact on the decision to adopt, there is no significant
difference between urban and non-urban areas. In the east of Germany the results
are similar, although less strong.
The impact of the population density (POPDENn) is negative and also decreases
over time. This indicates that decision-makers located in less densely populated
areas are more likely to install a PV system. We expect that the propensity of
decision-makers located in areas with low population density to own a house is high.
Once more, there is evidence for spatial non-stationarity: the coefficient for the
interaction between POPDENn and EASTn is significantly positive, i.e., on average,
PV adopters in the east live in regions with higher population density than those in
the west. In urban areas, the impact of population density on the utility to adopt
is also less negative.
Comparing the results of M4 shown in Table 5.1 to M6 (Table D.4) indicates that
the coefficient estimates are robust. Still, we check the validity of our results by
drawing two other 9% samples from our data set. M6II and M6III in Table D.6 of
Appendix D.4 confirm the validity of M6’s estimates (Table D.4). We also combine
the samples of M6 and M6II , respectively M6 and M6III . Then, we estimate our
baseline specification and add a dummy variable (set to one for all observations
from the second [respectively, third] sample), and interactions with the dummy
variable and the explanatory variables of the baseline specification. A joined F-test
confirms that the dummy and the interactions with the dummy are not significantly
different from zero. As a consequence, our estimates seem to be valid for the whole
population. For purposes of clarity we do not show the results here.
In Table D.7 of Appendix D.4, we show that neither a smaller cut-off parameter D
of 200 meters (M7) nor a higher cut-off parameter of 1000 meters (M8) changes our
findings. The peer effect is highly localized: considering installations further away
than 500 meters – i.e., D > 500 m – does not significantly increase the explanatory
power of the model (see Horowitz test between M6 and M8 in Table D.7 of Ap-
pendix D.4).33 In other words, studies concentrating on peer effects at a higher level
of geographical aggregation may fail to represent the peer effect appropriately.
Instead of measuring the installed base by installations from the previous period
only, we incorporate all previous installations into specification M9, Table D.8 in
Appendix D.4. See Appendix D.1 for a definition of the relevant measure of the
33E.g., Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) describe the Horowitz non-nested hypothesis test.
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installed base: C IBASEnt. Comparing M9 to M6 using a Horowitz test confirms
that the adopters of the previous period represent the installed base best.
We also check whether distance-decay functions other than f = 1/ ln(dnm) are
more appropriate in explaining the decision to adopt a PV system. Table D.9
(Appendix D.4) presents the results. Specification M10 builds on f = 1/dnm and
M11 on f = 1/d2nm. A Horowitz test confirms that M6 (with f = 1/ ln(dnm)) is
significantly superior.34
5.4.2. Individual-specific effects and local shocks
So far, we have controlled for period fixed effects capturing time-varying factors
that have a symmetric effect on the increase in the adoption decision across all
regions: for example, changes in legislation fostering PV adoption or changes in
their installation costs. We have also included NUTS-1 (‘La¨nder’) fixed effects.
These absorb NUTS-1-specific trends in the adoption decision and could be caused
by ‘La¨nder’ characteristics affecting the usability of the technology: e.g., additional
time-invariant incentives to install PV. In order to cover local characteristics we have
included control variables, e.g. for buying power or population density. However,
these are still aggregate controls.
To identify peer effects even more confidently, we should include a time-invariant
individual specific fixed effect. We can do so by taking advantage of the conditional
(or fixed effects) logit estimator.35 Note that we cannot then include time-invariant
controls. M12 in Table 5.2 reveals the exponentiated coefficients. We can interpret
them as odds ratios.36 The relevant descriptive statistics are shown in Table D.10
of Appendix D.4. When estimating a conditional logit model, groups with all zero
outcomes are dropped, i.e., the number of observations is lower compared to the
34An estimation with controls for elevation and firm density also confirms our results. Elevation
data comes from Jarvis et al. (2008) and data on firm density from Infas (2009b). Both controls
are included at very high spatial resolution. For purposes of clarity we do not show these results.
35Conditional fixed effects means that the fixed effects are conditioned out of the model estima-
tion through a revised log-likelihood function. In the unconditional case, the standard log-likelihood
function is used and indicator variables (covering the fixed effects) included in the estimation. Un-
fortunately, a conditional probit estimator does not exist.
36Since Rural and East are time-invariant, they are absorbed by the individual fixed effects.
We therefore do not estimate them separately in specification M12. Note that it does not make a
difference that – instead of Urban – we include the antipodal dummy for rural areas (Rural) here.
In M12, we also estimate the single period dummies without interaction. We do not show them as
they are not relevant to our interpretation.
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other estimation approaches although the conditional logit estimator allows us to
include the full sample for Germany. Specification M12 in Table 5.2 reveals that for a
unit increase in our IBASE measure we expect an increase of (5.8-1)*100%=486% in
the odds of installing a PV system (under PV adopters) in period 1. Interpreting the
other period-specific exponentiated coefficients is straightforward: e.g., multiplying
IBASEn’s exponentiated coefficient with the one of IBASEn ∗ PER2 reveals that
we expect an increase of ((5.8*0.4)-1)*100%=132% in the odds of installing a PV
system (under PV adopters) in period 2. Importantly, the analysis with individual-
specific (address) fixed effects confirms our previous results: peer effects drive PV
adoption but diminish over time. We do not observe a significant difference between
peer effects in urban and rural areas. But as observed in our previous estimations,
the effect is stronger in the east of Germany. Again, this is evidence for spatial
non-stationarity in peer effects.
To identify even more confidently peer effects, we should also put our findings to the
test with time-variant effects on the local level. We do so by conducting estimations
with district times period fixed effects (i.e., a district fixed effect for every period of
study). In these estimations, we control for yearly adoption shocks on the district
level (i.e., 77,847 districts across Germany). Such a shock could, for example, be
a local advertisement campaign by a PV seller, a new local subsidy fostering PV
installations or a housing development in which new local regulations force residents
to install PV. M13 in Table 5.2 illustrates the exponentiated coefficients, which we
can again interpret as odds ratios. We show the relevant descriptive statistics in
Table D.11 of Appendix D.4. The results with district times period fixed effects
also confirm our previous results of diminishing peer effects over time and spatial
non-stationarity in peer effects.
Note that we choose a cut-off distance of 200 m for the specifications shown in
Table 5.2. For these we obtain the best goodness-of-fit measures, which supports
the localization of peer-effects even more than the cut-off distance of 500 m, which
delivered the best results before.
Our findings for estimations with individual-specific effects and local shocks remain
unaffected by lagging our peer effect measure by two periods.37 We can therefore
confidently rule out that the ‘reflection problem’ described by Manski (1993) biases
our results. The reflection problem applies to situations where the adoption decision
of an individual i depends on others in i’s reference group and i’s adoption also affects
37For reasons of clarity, we do not show these results.
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other group members. Bearing in mind that we study PV adoption on a yearly basis,
it is reasonable to assume that an individual who adopts at t also decided to adopt
at t or t−1. If so, i was affected by the behavior of reference group members at t−2.
In consequence, the time lag rules out the possibility that the individual could have
affected the adoption decision of reference group members, which in turn influenced
the individual’s adoption.
Table 5.2.: Odds ratio of peer effects for Germany.
M12 M13
f
(
dnm
)
1/ ln
(
dnm
)
1/ ln
(
dnm
)
Cut-off 200 m 200 m
IBASEn 5.862
∗∗∗ 1.897∗∗∗
(19.62) (4.40)
IBASEn ∗ PER2 0.407∗∗∗ 0.975
(-8.55) (-0.13)
IBASEn ∗ PER3 0.299∗∗∗ 0.811
(-12.71) (-1.36)
IBASEn ∗ PER4 0.472∗∗∗ 0.726∗
(-7.71) (-2.01)
IBASEn ∗ PER5 0.328∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗
(-11.83) (-2.60)
IBASEn ∗ PER6 0.255∗∗∗ 0.650∗∗
(-14.85) (-2.90)
IBASEn ∗ PER7 0.204∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗
(-17.34) (-2.90)
IBASEn ∗ PER8 0.202∗∗∗ 0.624∗∗
(-17.43) (-3.19)
IBASEn ∗ PER9 0.198∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗
(-17.80) (-3.39)
IBASEn ∗ PER10 0.157∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗
(-20.47) (-4.15)
IBASEn ∗ PER11 0.153∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗
(-20.81) (-4.06)
IBASEn ∗ Ruraln 1.017 0.842∗∗∗
(1.54) (-13.28)
IBASEn ∗ Eastn 1.203∗∗∗ 1.423∗∗∗
(5.68) (7.86)
IBASEn ∗ Ruraln ∗ Eastn 0.942 1.375∗∗∗
(-1.25) (4.38)
Eastn 0.958
(-0.14)
Ruraln 1.368
∗∗∗
(81.34)
Ruraln ∗ Eastn 0.805∗∗∗
(-16.27)
Observations 9,545,184 109,848,217
DFM 24 17
Final log-likelihood L -1,764,494 -4,269,741
District*Period fixed effects No Yes
Address fixed effects Yes No
Exponentiated coefficients; Robust t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
5.4.3. Case study
In order to verify the robustness of our results with partially different data, we
consider a case study including panel data for the cities of Darmstadt, Karlsruhe,
Marburg, and Wiesbaden. We study these cities because building-specific global
radiation data (GR BUILDINGn) is accessible. The case study helps us to check
some of our assumptions. We test if we can indeed disregard building-specific data
on global radiation for our analyses of Germany. Thus we test whether we might
neglect roof orientation and shadowing. We also study differences between address
and building data. Table 5.3 shows the corresponding data.
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Table 5.3.: Characteristics for case study cities.
Characteristic Darmstadt Karlsruhe Marburg Wiesbaden Sum
Residents in 2010 144,402 294,761 80,656 275,976 795,795
Number of buildings 100,004 83,819 40,872 113,548 338,243
Number of PV systems through 2010 374 1,058 450 463 2,345
Spatial units 109 302 56 177 644
Data on residents in 2010 is taken from DESTATIS (2013a).
Vermessungsamt Darmstadt (2008), KEK (2010), Stadt Marburg (2011) and Stadt
Wiesbaden (2009) provide spatial data of the cities including information on build-
ings and detailed data on global radiation. Certainly, the level of detail is different
for the specific cities. For example in 2010, Karlsruhe had more than twice as many
residents than Darmstadt. Nevertheless, in our data set the number of buildings is
larger in Darmstadt compared to Karlsruhe. Since we obtain similar results from the
following study for each city individually, we neglect the different level of detail.38
Table D.12 and Table D.13 in Appendix D.4 present the frequencies of the categories
for the case study and the descriptive statistics. Due to the low number of PV sys-
tems installed in the four cities through 2010, we can only estimate time-invariant
coefficients for buying power, global radiation, installed base and population den-
sity. We only have data on GREENn at the NUTS-3 level, which does not provide
sufficient spatial variation for the case study. Table 5.4 shows the estimates and
the average marginal effects. The respective results from BLM are not presented
but confirm the shown results from BPM. Both are comparable to the ones found
for the whole country. Employing building-specific data on global radiation (GR
BUILDINGn), which includes roof orientation and shadowing, does not change our
coefficient estimates in terms of algebraic sign and level of significance. Still, a
Horowitz test shows that MB, which relies on more accurate data, is significantly
superior to MA.
Since also the average marginal effects for MA (Table 5.4) and for M4 (Table D.5)
are comparable, we expect that the case study provides insights for our analysis of
Germany. Comparing MA to MB (Table D.5) reveals that the average marginal ef-
38Taking the four cities together we end up with 338,243 observations (i.e., buildings and there-
fore potential places for PV installations). As not all PV systems fall inside a building-polygon
we allocate 743 out of 2,345 to their nearest building. Due to inaccuracy in geocoding and the
possibility that more than one PV system could be installed on one building, 128 buildings have
several PV systems installed. As we assume one PV system per building in the case study, we
allocate them to a random building in the same spatial unit. Table 5.3 shows that we have all in
all 644 spatial units for the four cities under study.
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Table 5.4.: Coefficient estimates of utility functions for case study.
MA MB
Coeff. Avg. marginal eff. Coeff. Avg. marginal eff.
ASCsolar -5.892
∗∗∗ -3.409∗∗∗
(-22.72) (-62.44)
IBASEnt 0.229∗∗∗ 0.000482∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.000523∗∗∗
(11.08) (10.84) (12.00) (11.72)
BUYPOWn -0.598∗∗∗ -0.00126∗∗∗ -0.331∗∗∗ -0.000689∗∗∗
(-12.06) (-11.77) (-8.01) (-7.93)
GRn 2.912∗∗∗ 0.00614∗∗∗
(11.32) (11.10)
GR BUILDINGn 0.393∗∗∗ 0.000819∗∗∗
(24.28) (22.27)
POPDENn -0.170∗∗∗ -0.000358∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ -0.000302∗∗∗
(-10.96) (-10.76) (-9.71) (-9.57)
Period dummies Yes Yes
Observations 3,720,662 3,720,662
DFM 14 14
Final log-likelihood L -18,531 -18,196
Horowitz test statistic (sig. level) -1.87 (.0307)
Horowitz test against MA
Robust t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
fects for buying power, installed base and population density are not largely affected
by more detailed data on global radiation: their algebraic signs stay constant and
their absolute values remain at a comparable level. However, the average marginal
effect for global radiation decreases if more accurate data is used. This result may
be due to the fact that inappropriate roofs are, actually, disregarded for PV instal-
lations. Most importantly, the case study confirms the validity of our findings for
buying power, installed base, and population density.
In Appendix D.2 we describe a placebo test which uses case study data and confirms
our findings. Finally, we use individual level data from the Socio-Economic Panel
to verify our results (SOEP, 2013). For details see Appendix D.3.
5.5. Summary
We set out to study the individual adoption decision to install a PV system in
Germany. We incorporate the year and location of installation for the PV systems
set up in Germany through 2010 and locational data of addresses (at which we
assume all PV systems to be installed).
In line with Bollinger and Gillingham (2012), Mu¨ller and Rode (2013) and our
results in Chapter 5, our discrete choice analysis reveals that the propensity to install
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a PV system increases with the number of previously installed systems in spatial
proximity; i.e., we confirm a highly localized peer effect. In contrast to the mentioned
studies, we measure peer-effects by the installed base using a continuous distance
decay function for each (potential) adopter individually across a whole country.
Our analysis reveals that the impact of each previously installed PV system on the
propensity of a new installation decreases continuously with the distance between
the two locations. We find evidence for peer effects within a range of 0-0.5 km.
However, within this range the peer effects’ impact deflates slowly. Measuring the
peer effect by the inverse natural logarithmic distance explains PV system adoption
best. Furthermore, a previous year’s PV system adopters are – in comparison to all
previous adopters – most important for current adopters. Our analysis also shows
that the peer effect’s impact on the decision to adopt decreases over time. This is
not surprising since it is reasonable to expect that the number of prior users reduces
uncertainty about the reliable operation of a technology. However, in periods when
the subsidy system is revised the peer effect gains importance again since uncertainty
about the remuneration potential from a PV system may increase.
When comparing early and later adopters, we find that later adopters tend to have
lower buying power. Later adopters also live in less densely populated areas with
lower global radiation. We find different scales of the effects in urban and non-
urban areas in the east and west of Germany. Finally, we observe that the number
of peers that equals the utility contribution of one unit of global radiation increases
over time. A case study with building-specific data on global radiation confirms our
findings.
The policy implications of our study are straightforward. Our results reveal that it
would be efficient to influence the adoption of PV systems using seed installations in
the very early periods of diffusion since the importance of peer effects decreases over
time. Furthermore, seed installations have the highest impact in the early periods
in terms of balancing low levels of global radiation. Seeding is most promising at
urban locations with low population density and high global radiation. Finally,
policy makers should be careful when implementing changes in the subsidy system
for PV. However, potential adopters’ uncertainty caused by such changes could be
balanced through additional seeding.39
39Certainly, we study PV adoption after political decision-makers decided to foster PV. We do
not evaluate which energy technology or which mix of energy technologies is the best choice for a
certain country.
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We study PV system adoption in Germany. Certainly, a similar analysis in other
countries with different residential structures or climate zones would be of interest.
Studying PV adoption at locations where subsidies do not drive their diffusion would
be valuable. Further disentangling of the peer effect may also be rewarding. For
example, employing data on regional differences in Internet search engine usage may
help to find out if the identified effect is driven by communication from face to face
or, instead, seeing a PV system in operation is sufficient. Forecasting PV adoption
at the local level could also be of interest.
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6. Not in My Backyard! Local
Resistance to the Adoption of
Renewable Energy Technologies40
6.1. Motivation
After studying peer effects in PV adoption, we change our focus to resistance against
renewable energy adoption. In recent years, we have observed more and more refer-
enda against renewable energy plants (see Datenbank Bu¨rgerbegehren (2014)). We
want to investigate whether local referenda against a single renewable energy plant
have a measurable impact on the technology’s adoption rate (i.e., the first differ-
ence in the diffusion level) nearby. If a local referendum hinders building a plant,
investors may search for an alternative site on which to build a plant in the imme-
diate vicinity of the primary location. They may also search for a new site far away
or may fully give up their plans. The purpose of this chapter is to find out which
effect referenda against renewable energy plants have in Germany.
Studies on the diffusion of new technologies in a wide range of countries, sectors and
periods confirm a diffusion path following logistic (S-shaped) curves (see Griliches
(1957) and Mansfield (1961), or Comin and Mestieri (2013a) for further examples).
This diffusion path is characterized by low initial adoption rates that eventually ac-
celerate to reach a technology’s long-run penetration rate. The non-linear nature of
logistic curves implies that current adoption rates can be forecast by lagged diffusion
levels. Epidemic models (Bass, 1969; Rogers, 1983), probit models (Griliches, 1957),
legitimization theories (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1984), and information cascades
models (Arthur, 1989; Banerjee, 1992), all explain the same non-linearity in diffu-
sion. See Chapter 2 for a deeper discussion on the different theories. The common
40This chapter is based on Rode (2014).
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S-shaped pattern of technology diffusion allows us to test whether the adoption rate
of renewable energy plants differs between German NUTS-3 regions (‘Landkreise
und Kreisfreie Sta¨dte’) in which a successful referendum against a single plant was
organized and the remaining regions.
In this chapter, we exploit our data set regarding the adoption of wind power plants,
biomass plants, and PV systems across Germany installed between 1992 and 2011.
We add information on local referenda against the three technologies under study
and test whether local referenda are associated with lower adoption rates. Our analy-
sis exploits the fact that the referenda are held on the municipal district (‘Gemeinde’)
level against a single plant or building area.
Failing to control for unobserved heterogeneity may result in biased estimates. We
therefore have to account for other barriers (and drivers) to renewable energy adop-
tion. Time fixed effects capture time-varying factors that have a symmetric effect
on the increase in renewable energy diffusion across regions: for example, changes in
legislation fostering the adoption of the technologies or changes in their installation
costs. NUTS-3 fixed effects absorb NUTS-3-specific trends in the increase in the
diffusion of the studied technology. These could be caused by regional character-
istics affecting the usability of the technology: e.g., the average wind speed affects
the profitability of wind power plants or local agricultural production can be more
or less suitable for biomass plants. Therefore, we control for NUTS-3 and year fixed
effects.
To strengthen the robustness of our analysis, we should have potentially omitted
variables in mind. Omitted variables are drivers of adoption patterns that are corre-
lated with referenda against renewable energy plants. Besides national time-varying
factors and regional time-constant influences that both symmetrically shape renew-
able energy adoption, we could think of regional time-varying symmetric effects. We
absorb these by conducting an analysis with NUTS-2-times-year-fixed effects (i.e.,
a NUTS-2 fixed effect for every year of study). These control for yearly adoption
shocks on one level of aggregation higher than the NUTS-3 level.41
We find that adoption is indeed lower in regions where a referendum was conducted.
The result is valid for wind power and large biomass plants. In NUTS-3 regions
where a referendum against a wind park was organized, we find between 70% and
41During our period of study, on average every NUTS-2 region consists of 11 NUTS-3 regions
and every NUTS-3 region of 27 municipal districts.
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85% fewer new large wind power plants (after the referendum) than in NUTS-3
regions without a referendum. For large biomass plants, our analysis reveals that
99% fewer new plants are located in NUTS-3 regions where a succesful referendum
was organized compared to the remaining regions. Our results are robust to using
capacity-weighted measures of technology adoption. An analysis with NUTS-2-
times-year-fixed effects also confirms our findings. We conclude that local resistance
against one plant does not only work as a barrier against adoption in the municipal
district where the plant was to be located. Instead, it has a signaling effect and
hinders the adoption in the municipals district’s NUTS-3 region. We interpret this
as evidence that potential investors in wind power and large biomass plants not only
avoid the municipal district where a referendum took place but stay away from the
municipal district’s neighbors.
To better understand the effect of referenda on renewable energy adoption, we con-
duct a placebo test. We study whether the same effect exists for PV systems, which
shape the landscape less than wind power plants and do not come with the same
pollution as biomass plants. As expected, we do not find that a referendum against
a single PV system hinders PV adoption on the NUTS-3 level. We conclude that
referenda only strongly slow down adoption for technologies such as wind power or
large biomass plants, which may have – in comparison to PV – a larger effect on the
well-being of the local population.
Finally, we analyze data on referenda against renewable energy plants which were
announced but not conducted. In these cases, the decision against building the re-
newable energy plant was taken before the referendum could be organized. For these
announced but not organized referenda we cannot confirm the effect found before.
This result indicates that only organized referenda prevent potential investors from
building renewable energy plants near the primary location.
Our study relates to literature on technology adoption. Many studies find that new
technologies often diffuse more slowly than would be optimal (Rogers, 1983; Geroski,
2000; Oster and Thornton, 2012). High adoption costs (Griliches, 1957; Mansfield,
1961) often work as a barrier in the early phase of technology diffusion. Further, a
lack of information about the technology’s existence – as implied by the epidemic
model of technology diffusion (Bass, 1969; Rogers, 1983) – can be responsible for
slow diffusion. Similarly, theories on social learning (Young, 2009; Conley and Udry,
2010) imply that a lack of trust in the technology and missing knowledge on how to
operate the technology can be a diffusion barrier.
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Our analysis is also linked to specific studies on barriers to technology adoption.
Comin and Mestieri (2013b) give an overview on active blocking. For example,
technologies which improve transportation or communication can reduce the power
of certain actors as described by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). I.e., political or
economic incumbents may construct barriers to protect their economic or political
rents (Comin and Mestieri, 2013b). Comin and Hobijn (2009) identify lobbies in this
context: lobbying efforts of incumbent technology producers which delay technology
adoption. This finding is in line with our result in the sense that lobbying (in
our context, resistance by the local public through a referendum) can slow down
technology adoption.42
This chapter is also related to studies on protest movements in Germany. Among
others, Marg et al. (2013) describe protest actors against infrastructure, electricity
grid or large renewable energy plants and their motives. They find that protests
are dominated by well-educated men, often with engineering expertise. In addi-
tion, Neukirch (2014) classifies the aims of protest actors and highlights their partly
contradicting range of interests.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 describes im-
plications of green energy adoption in Germany on our estimation strategy and
presents details on referenda against renewable energy plants. Section 6.3 includes
the empirical analysis, and discusses their interpretation. Section 6.4 concludes.
6.2. Institutional context and referenda
In this chapter, we exploit our data set regarding the adoption of wind power plants,
biomass plants, and PV systems across Germany installed between 1992 and 2011.
The changes in the feed-in tariff scheme and the shifts in the new installations shown
in Figure 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 of Chapter 3, are important for our econometric analysis.
They highlight that we have to account for effects capturing time-varying factors
which have a symmetric effect on the increase in renewable energy diffusion across
regions, i.e., year fixed effects.
42Another stream of literature names country-specific, institutional factors as barriers to tech-
nology adoption (e.g., see Parente and Prescott (1994), Parente (1995) or Cunha-e Sa´ and Reis
(2007)). This is less relevant to our study since a country-wide incentive scheme fosters the tech-
nologies we analyze. Further, there are many studies identifying factors that foster green technology
adoption: see Section 2.4 in Chapter 2 for details.
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The regional differences in the diffusion level of the three technologies shown in the
maps (Figure 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 in Section 3.4 of Chapter 3) are also important for our
econometric analysis. They illustrate that we have to account for effects capturing
time-constant factors that have a symmetric effect on the trend in renewable energy
adoption in every region, i.e., NUTS-3 fixed effects. Since we find few wind power
plants in district-free cities: only 3.3% of all wind power plants are installed in the
113 district-free cities (out of 429 NUTS-3 regions in total), we neglect district-free
cities in our econometric analysis on wind power plants. The same applies to our
analysis on biomass plants: we only find few plants (5.6%) in district-free cities and
therefore disregard these when studying the adoption of biomass plants.
In this chapter, we want to investigate whether the adoption of renewable energy
plants differs between NUTS-3 regions in which a successful referendum against
a single plant was organized and the remaining regions. The way referenda are
organized is defined in the federal states (‘La¨nder’) government codes. E.g., in
Bavaria – according to Gemeindeordnung Bayern (1998) – the municipal council
can initiate a referendum, or – depending on a municipal district’s size – a certain
number of citizens have to sign a referendum (e.g., 8% of eligle voters if the municipal
district has between 20,001 and 30,000 inhabitants). If this amount of support
is reached, the supporters can submit the referendum to the municipal council,
including a justification for the referendum and the question to be asked in the
referendum. The question must be capable of being answered with yes or no. The
municipal council has to decide if the referendum is admissible within one month.
If so, the municipal council has to schedule a Sunday (which lies within the coming
three months) on which the referendum is organized. The referendum is accepted
if a minimum turnout is reached (e.g., 20% for municipal districts below 50,000
inhabitants) and the majority of the votes is in favor of the referendum. Similar
rules apply in all German ‘La¨nder’.
The successful referenda shown in Table 6.1 against renewable energy plants are –
according to Datenbank Bu¨rgerbegehren (2014) – relevant for our analysis. See
Figure 6.1 for a map of the successful referenda.
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Table 6.1.: Successful referenda against renewable energy plants.
Technology Year Community NUTS-3 region ‘Land’
Wind power plants 1998 Rugendorf LK Kulmbach Bavaria
2010 Bu¨chen Kreis Herzogtum Lauenburg Schleswig-Holstein
2010 Nu¨bbel Kreis Rendsburg-Eckernfo¨rde Schleswig-Holstein
2010 Ru¨gge Kreis Schleswig-Flensburg Schleswig-Holstein
Biomass plants 2005 Langerringen LK Augsburg Bavaria
2009 Großhabersdorf LK Fu¨rth Bavaria
2010 Großhabersdorf LK Fu¨rth Bavaria
2010 Freilassing LK Berchtsgadener Land Bavaria
PV systems 2008 Mu¨nster (Lech) LK Donau-Ries Bavaria
2010 Gablingen LK Augsburg Bavaria
2010 Eslarn LK Neustadt an der Waldnaab Bavaria
LK stands for ‘Landkreis’: rural districts
Referendum against
a wind park a biomass plant a PV system
0 200 km
Figure 6.1.: NUTS-3 region with a referendum against a renewable plant.
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6.3. Econometric evidence
We consider the following technology-specific econometric model for the adoption
rate for NUTS-3 region n in year t (∆Fnt):
∆Fnt = αn + αt + βFnt−1 + γXnt + ρREFnt−1 + nt. (6.1)
αn is a region-specific trend, αt is an aggregate time dummy, Fnt−1 is the technology-
specific (normalized) stock of renewable plants installed in the region at year t− 1,
Xnt is a vector of other potential drivers (or barriers) of technology adoption, and nt
is an error term.43 REFnt−1 is a dummy variable which is set to one if a successful
referendum against the technology under study was organized at n in t−1 or before.
We lag REF by one year. If not, a renewable energy plant could be installed before
a referendum was organized.44
6.3.1. Referenda against wind power plants
Table 6.2 column (1) reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of Equa-
tion (6.1) including NUTS-3 and year fixed effects.45 The significantly negative
coefficient of the referendum dummy indicates that the number of new wind power
plants is significantly lower in regions where a successful referendum against wind
power was organized in t − 1. The null that REFWind,t−1 is irrelevant and that
REFWind,t−1 and FWind,t−1 are irrelevant predictors for ∆FWind,t−1 are rejected at
any level of significance by a F test. Note that we control – as implied by diffusion
theory – for the stock of renewable plants (Fnt−1) in this and all coming regressions.
The significantly negative coefficient for the level of wind power diffusion in t − 1
indicates that adoption rates are lower in regions with high diffusion levels.
The descriptive statistics shown in Table E.1 of Appendix E.1 illustrate that our
endogenous variable is truncated: only non-negative values, but many zeros exist.
43As implied by Figure 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 in Chapter 3 we normalize the number of wind power
plants by the agricultural and forestal area in sqkm, the number of biomass plants by the agricul-
tural area in sqkm, and the number of all PV systems by the amount of buildings and the number
of large PV systems (above 100 kWp) by the agricultural area in sqkm.
44Information on the date of installation of the renewable energy plants is only valid on a yearly
basis.
45Reported standard-errors are, here and in the coming results, robust to heteroscedasticity and
clustered for each NUTS-3 region.
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Table 6.2.: Estimation of successful referendum on adoption of wind power plants.
(1) (2) (3)
∆FWind,t ∆FWind,t ∆#Wind,t
Estimator OLS FE Cond. Poisson FE Uncond. Neg. Bin. FE
REFWind,t−1 -0.00185∗∗∗ -0.576∗ -0.723∗∗
(-6.46) (-2.12) (-2.65)
FWind,t−1 -0.0274∗∗ -7.639∗∗∗
(-2.99) (-4.42)
#Wind,t−1 -0.00321∗∗∗
(-3.59)
θ−1 1.356
NUTS-3 and Year FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0801
Adj. R2 0.0770
LL -46.13 -9155.2
F 12.95
χ2 362.3
FREF=0 / χ
2
REF=0 (p-value) 41.76 (3.93e-10) 4.509 (0.0337) 7.000 (0.00815)
N (DFM) 6004 (19) 5396 (20) 6004 (128)
Robust t statistics in parenth., built with HAC SE, estim. constant omitted in column (3)
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
According to Hilbe (2011), a generalized linear model (GLM) with a Poisson dis-
tribution and its canonical log link may be appropriate in this case. A conditional
fixed effects estimator exists for a GLM with a Poisson distribution (and log link).46
We report the results in Table 6.2 column (2).47 Again, the significantly negative
coefficient of the referendum dummy indicates that the number of wind power plants
is lower in regions where a referendum against wind power was organized in t − 1.
A χ2 test suggests the validity of the specification.
A GLM with a Poisson distribution may be appropriate but cannot deal with overdis-
persion. Overdispersion means that the variance of the response exceeds the mean.
In this case, Hilbe (2011) recommends a GLM with a negative binomial distribu-
tion.48 Hilbe (2011) further advises employing unconditional fixed effects. Table 6.2
shows the results in column (3). Note that Equation (6.1) is modified for the esti-
mates in column (3): instead of the normalized ∆Ft and Ft−1, we have to include
the simple counts ∆#t and #t−1. The dispersion parameter (θ−1) is significant to
46Such a model is often used for count data but not affected through scaling and therefore a
useful option here. Conditional fixed effects means that the fixed effects are conditioned out of the
model estimation through a revised log-likelihood function. In the unconditional case, the standard
log-likelihood function is used and indicator variables (covering the fixed effects) included in the
estimation.
47When estimating a conditional fixed effects model for a GLM with a Poisson distribution
(and log link), groups with all zero outcomes are dropped. I.e., the number of observations is lower
compared to the other estimation approaches.
48We parameterize the estimation as NB-2 with a log link. This is standard in Stata 11, which
we use (StataCorp, 2009). NB-2 means that the model has a variance V = µ+ θ−1µ2 , where µ is
the mean and θ−1 is the dispersion parameter, also known as alpha.
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the 0.1% level, which indicates that overdispersion is present and, therefore, the
specification in column (3) most appropriate. Once again, the significantly nega-
tive coefficient of the referendum dummy illustrates that the number of wind power
plants is significantly lower in regions where a referendum against wind power was
organized in t − 1. Exponentiating the estimated coefficient allows interpreting it
as an incidence rate ratio (IRR): in NUTS-3 regions where a referendum against a
wind park was organized, we find 50% fewer new wind power plants (after the ref-
erendum) compared to NUTS-3 regions with no referendum at all or no successful
referendum.
Do our findings change if we only take into account wind power plants of high
capacity, i.e., larger systems? Table 6.3 reveals the estimates for wind power plants
of capacity higher than 0.5 MW. Figure 3.2 in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 illustrates
that most wind power plants are of this size. Wind power plants with a capacity
higher than 0.5 MW have larger rotors and therefore shape the landscape more
heavily than small plants.
Table 6.3.: Estimation of successful referendum on adoption of large wind power
plants.
(1) (2) (3)
∆FWind>0.5 MW,t ∆FWind>0.5 MW,t ∆#Wind>0.5 MW,t
Estimator OLS FE Cond. Poisson FE Uncond. Neg. Bin. FE
REFWind,t−1 -0.00253∗∗∗ -1.252∗∗ -1.890∗∗∗
(-8.68) (-2.70) (-7.44)
FWind>0.5 MW,t−1 -0.00171 -9.362∗∗∗
(-0.20) (-3.52)
#Wind>0.5 MW,t−1 -0.00271∗
(-2.30)
θ−1 1.525
NUTS-3 and Year FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0997
Adj. R2 0.0967
LL -37.45 -7868.7
F 12.50
χ2 571.7
FREF=0 / χ
2
REF=0 (p-value) 75.37 (2.14e-16) 7.266 (0.00703) 55.41 (9.77e-14)
N (DFM) 6004 (19) 4940 (20) 6004 (78)
Robust t statistics in parenth., built with HAC SE, estim. constant omitted in column (3)
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Again we show the estimates for the simple OLS fixed effects regression, the condi-
tional fixed effects estimator for the GLM with Poisson distribution, and the uncon-
ditional fixed effects estimator for the GLM with a negative binomial distribution
(Table 6.3). The three estimation approaches point in the same direction. They con-
firm that the number of new wind power plants is significantly lower in regions where
a referendum against wind power was organized in t− 1. The effect is stronger for
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larger wind plants. The exponentiated point estimate shown in column (3) reveals
that (after a successful referendum) 85% less new wind power plants are located in
NUTS-3 region with a successful referendum compared to the rest of the NUTS-3
regions.
6.3.2. Referenda against biomass plants
Let us turn to the adoption of biomass plants. Can we confirm the same effect as
for wind power plants? Table E.2 of Appendix E.1 reports the descriptive statistics.
In Table 6.4, we see the point estimates for new biomass plants while, of course,
always including NUTS-3 and year fixed effects. We cannot confirm any effect when
including all biomass plants. No matter which estimation approach we choose, the
point estimate for the referendum dummy at t− 1 does not significantly vary from
zero. F and χ2 tests confirm this result.
Table 6.4.: Estimation of successful referendum on adoption of biomass plants.
(1) (2) (3)
∆FBiomass,t ∆FBiomass,t ∆#Biomass,t
Estimator OLS FE Cond. Poisson FE Uncond. Neg. Bin. FE
REFBiomass,t−1 -0.000853 -0.253 -0.227
(-0.24) (-0.73) (-0.69)
FBiomass,t−1 0.110∗∗ -10.17
(3.06) (-1.45)
#Biomass,t−1 -0.00557∗
(-2.32)
θ−1 0.237
NUTS-3 and Year FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.311
Adj. R2 0.308
LL -40.75 -6942.9
F 113.2
χ2 2283.5
FREF=0 / χ
2
REF=0 (p-value) 0.0565 (0.812) 0.537 (0.464) 0.470 (0.493)
N (DFM) 6004 (19) 5928 (20) 6004 (24)
Robust t statistics in parenth., built with HAC SE, estim. constant omitted in column (3)
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The picture changes if we study the effect of referenda on the adoption of biomass
plants with high capacity. Figure 3.3 in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3 illustrates the
adoption of large biomass systems (above 1 MWe). In comparison to small systems,
they have higher pollution. Although there are relatively few large biomass plants,
we observe more than 500 plants installed across Germany through 2011, 86 of
these located in Bavaria, where referenda against biomass plants were organized.
Further, more than half of the large biomass plants in Bavaria were installed later
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than 2005, which is the year when the first referendum against a biomass plant
was organized in the municipal district Langerringen (NUTS-3 region Landkreis
Augsburg, Bavaria).
Table 6.5 shows our estimates for large biomass plants. We again control for NUTS-3
and year fixed effects. No matter which estimation strategy we use, we find that the
number of new large biomass plants is significantly lower in regions where a refer-
endum against a biomass plant was organized in t− 1. As the dispersion parameter
does not significantly differ from zero, the estimates in column (2), i.e., the ones from
the conditional fixed effects estimator for the GLM with Poisson distribution, seem
to be most appropriate. Exponentiating the point estimate reveals that 99% fewer
new plants are located in NUTS-3 regions where a successful referendum against
biomass plants was organized compared to the remaining regions.
Table 6.5.: Estimation of successful referendum on adoption of large biomass plants.
(1) (2) (3)
∆FBiomass>1 MWe,t ∆FBiomass>1 MWe,t ∆#Biomass>1 MWe,t
Estimator OLS FE Cond. Poisson FE Uncond. Neg. Bin. FE
REFBiomass,t−1 -0.000205∗∗∗ -13.26∗∗∗ -18.91∗∗∗
(-3.99) (-12.78) (-18.91)
FBiomass>1 MWe,t−1 -0.0853∗∗∗ -853.0∗∗∗
(-7.22) (-3.91)
#Biomass>1 MWe,t−1 -0.922∗∗∗
(-5.15)
θ−1 0
NUTS-3 and Year FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0388
Adj. R2 0.0356
LL -1.382 -946.7
F 15.79
χ2 383.8
FREF=0 / χ
2
REF=0 (p-value) 15.93 (0.0000820) 163.2 (2.22e-37) 357.6 (9.34e-80)
N (DFM) 6004 (19) 3382 (20) 6004 (315)
Robust t statistics in parenth., built with HAC SE, estim. constant omitted in column (3)
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
6.3.3. Shocks on the NUTS-2 level
The negative association between referenda and the adoption rates could also result
from omitting relevant variables from the vector of controls, Xnt. So far, we control
for federal time-varying factors, regional time-constant influences and the lagged
adoption level. Any regional time-varying effect could be an omitted variable which
biases our estimates. However, we can absorb regional time-varying symmetric ef-
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fects by conducting an analysis with NUTS-2-times-year-fixed effects. These control
for yearly adoption shocks on one level of aggregation higher than the NUTS-3 level.
Such a shock may, for example, be the result of a ‘La¨nder’ government, which tries to
locate renewable energy plants in a certain NUTS-2 region through additional sub-
sidies, a regional change in agricultural production which makes a NUTS-2 region
more attractive for biomass plants, or even relevant changes in per capita income or
the population density.
In the following analysis, we only study renewable energy plants of the size for
which we find the strongest effect of referenda in the previous exercise. Table 6.6
reports the estimates for wind power plants with capacity higher than 0.5 MW. As
before, the stock of adoption serves as a control.49 The three different estimation
approaches again point in the same direction: the number of new wind power plants
(above 0.5 MW) is significantly lower in regions where a referendum against wind
power was organized in t − 1. F and χ2 tests confirm this result. Since θ−1 is
significant at any level of significance, we find the results given in column (3) most
appropriate. They reveal that 70% fewer new wind power plants (above 0.5 MW)
are located in NUTS-3 regions where a referendum against wind power plants was
organized compared to the remaining regions.
Table 6.6.: Estimation of successful referendum on adoption of large wind power
plants (controlling for yearly NUTS-2 shocks).
(1) (2) (3)
∆FWind>0.5 MW,t ∆FWind>0.5 MW,t ∆#Wind>0.5 MW,t
Estimator OLS FE Cond. Poisson FE Uncond. Neg. Bin. FE
REFWind,t−1 -0.00119+ -0.844∗∗ -1.204∗
(-1.75) (-2.99) (-2.30)
FWind>0.5 MW,t−1 0.0641∗∗∗ 10.94∗∗∗
(10.99) (10.69)
#Wind>0.5 MW,t−1 0.0141∗∗∗
(9.31)
θ−1 1.870
NUTS-2xYear FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0977
Adj. R2 0.0974
LL -30.98 -8127.4
F 60.57
χ2 161.6
FREF=0 / χ
2
REF=0 (p-value) 3.061 (0.0806) 8.935 (0.00280) 5.273 (0.0217)
N (DFM) 6004 (1) 4728 (2) 6004 (277)
Robust t statistics in parenth., built with HAC SE, estim. constant omitted in column (3)
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
49Reported standard-errors for the regressions with NUTS-2-times-year-fixed are still robust to
heteroscedasticity but clustered on the NUTS-2-times-year level.
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Turning back to the adoption of large biomass plants, Table 6.7 confirms our previous
findings for referenda against biomass plants. Again F and χ2 tests approve this
result. Our preferred estimation is shown in column (3) since θ−1 is significant to
the 5% level. According to this estimation, again 99% fewer new large biomass
plants are located in NUTS-3 regions where a referendum against biomass plants
was organized (compared to the remaining regions).
Table 6.7.: Estimation of successful referendum on adoption of large biomass plants
(controlling for yearly NUTS-2 shocks).
(1) (2) (3)
∆FBiomass>1 MWe,t ∆FBiomass>1 MWe,t ∆#Biomass>1 MWe,t
Estimator OLS FE Cond. Poisson FE Uncond. Neg. Bin. FE
REFBiomass,t−1 -0.000237∗∗ -12.82∗∗∗ -18.89∗∗∗
(-2.86) (-26.36) (-18.48)
FBiomass>1 MWe,t−1 0.00521 27.15
(0.94) (1.01)
#Biomass>1 MWe,t−1 0.249∗∗∗
(7.97)
θ−1 0.155
NUTS-2xYear FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.000299
Adj. R2 -0.0000343
LL -1.514 -1023.6
F 4.286
χ2 697.1
FREF=0 / χ
2
REF=0 (p-value) 8.170 (0.00439) 695.0 (3.68e-153) 341.5 (3.08e-76)
N (DFM) 6004 (1) 2229 (2) 6004 (2)
Robust t statistics in parenth., built with HAC SE, estim. constant omitted in column (3)
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
In estimations not shown, we confirm our findings. Our results hold true if we only
study the parts of Germany in which most plants are located. For wind power
we only study the north (Schleswig-Holstein, Lower-Saxony, and Mecklenburg-West
Pomerania) and for large biomass plants we only study the south (Baden-Wu¨rttem-
berg and Bavaria). Our results also remain unaffected from including cities and
from neglecting the lagged diffusion level (which is correlated with current adoption
rates) in our estimations.
We also put the robustness of our findings to the test with alternative measures of
adoption. Instead of simply counting the renewable energy plants, we calculate the
capacity-adjusted adoption rates
∆FWi.Cap> 0.5 MW,nt =
∆Total wind capacity installed > 0.5 MWnt
Sqkm of agricultural/forestal arean
(6.2)
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and
∆FBio.Cap> 1 MWe,nt =
∆Total biomass capacity installed > 1 MWe,nt
Sqkm of agricultural arean
, (6.3)
as well as the respective levels with time lag. Figure B.2 and Figure B.3 in Ap-
pendix B.1 illustrate the adoption of wind power plants using capacity-adjusted
adoption rates. Large plants build a higher share with capacity-adjusted measures.
As capacity-adjusted adoption measures are not count data, we only rely on OLS
fixed effects regression and the conditional fixed effects estimator for the GLM with
Poisson distribution. Tables E.4 and E.5 illustrate the results with NUTS-3 and
year fixed effects in column (1) and (2), and NUTS-2-times-year-fixed effects in col-
umn (3) and (4). The capacity-adjusted analyses confirm our previous findings.
6.3.4. Neighborhood effects of referenda on the NUTS-3 level
So far, we have shown that referenda against wind power and large biomass plants
on the municipal district level work as a barrier to the adoption of both technologies
on the NUTS-3 level. We may expect that this effect also spills over to neighboring
NUTS-3 regions. We therefore include a spatially-lagged version of our referendum
dummy in our estimations: W REFt−1. W is a row-normalized contiguity matrix
of the NUTS-3 regions. Note that we also control for the spatially lagged diffusion
level in the previous period: W Ft−1 and accordingly W #t−1. The following analysis
again includes NUTS-3 and year fixed effects.
Referenda against wind power plants
Table 6.8 reports the neighborhood effect of referenda (against wind power plants)
on new wind power plants (above 0.5 MW). Note that the estimate for the non-
spatially lagged referendum dummy is very similar to the one in Table 6.3 and
therefore confirms our previous results. The spatially-lagged referendum dummy
shows a significantly negative impact in column (1) and (2), i.e., for the simple
OLS fixed effects regression and the conditional fixed effects estimator for the GLM
with Poisson distribution. The dispersion parameter of the regression shown in
column (3) is positive to any level of significance. We therefore regard the estimates
in column (3) as most reliable. The unconditional fixed effects estimator for the
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GLM with a negative binomial distribution does not reveal a significant impact of
the spatially lagged referendum dummy. Therefore, we cannot confirm that the
negative effect from a referendum spills over to neighboring NUTS-3 regions for
wind power plants.
Table 6.8.: Estimation of successful referendum nearby on adoption of large wind
power plants.
(1) (2) (3)
∆FWind>0.5 MW,t ∆FWind>0.5 MW,t ∆#Wind>0.5 MW,t
Estimator OLS FE Cond. Poisson FE Uncond. Neg. Bin. FE
REFWind,t−1 -0.00251∗∗∗ -1.184∗ -1.877∗∗∗
(-8.94) (-2.38) (-6.66)
W REFWind,t−1 -0.00935∗ -4.605∗∗ -4.326
(-2.51) (-3.17) (-1.11)
FWind>0.5 MW,t−1 -0.00184 -9.282∗∗∗
(-0.22) (-3.49)
W FWind>0.5 MW,t−1 0.00429 3.481
(0.97) (1.18)
#Wind>0.5 MW,t−1 -0.00250∗
(-2.13)
W #Wind>0.5 MW,t−1 0.00634+
(1.94)
θ−1 1.511
NUTS-3 and Year FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.100
Adj. R2 0.0970
LL -37.42 -7861.6
F 11.77
χ2 581.2
FW REF=0 / χ
2
W REF=0 (p-value) 6.296 (0.0126) 10.06 (0.00152) 1.230 (0.267)
N (DFM) 6004 (21) 4940 (22) 6004 (78)
Robust t statistics in parenth., built with HAC SE, estim. constant omitted in column (3)
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Referenda against biomass plants
Is there a spill-over effect for large biomass plants? Independent of the estimation
strategy we choose, the estimates in Table 6.9 report that less large biomass plants
are found in NUTS-3 regions which share a border with a NUTS-3 region where a
referendum against biomass plants was organized (in a previous period).50 F and
χ2 tests confirm this result.
We find evidence that a referendum against large biomass plants in a NUTS-3 region
is associated with lower adoption in neighboring NUTS-3 regions. We conclude that
50Due to convergence problems, we can only estimate the GLM with a negative binomial dis-
tribution (Table 6.9 column (3)) for the panel between 1994 and 2011.
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Table 6.9.: Estimation of successful referendum nearby on adoption of large biomass
plants.
(1) (2) (3)
∆FBiomass>1 MWe,t ∆FBiomass>1 MWe,t ∆#Biomass>1 MWe,t
Estimator OLS FE Cond. Poisson FE Uncond. Neg. Bin. FE
REFBiomass,t−1 -0.000200∗∗∗ -15.35∗∗∗ -19.31∗∗∗
(-3.94) (-14.72) (-19.29)
W REFBiomass,t−1 -0.000369∗∗ -92.69∗∗∗ -104.4∗∗∗
(-2.64) (-13.45) (-15.73)
FBiomass>1 MWe,t−1 -0.0857∗∗∗ -856.6∗∗∗
(-7.27) (-3.95)
W FBiomass>1 MWe,t−1 -0.00239 -24.67
(-0.97) (-0.72)
#Biomass>1 MWe,t−1 -0.921∗∗∗
(-5.23)
W #Biomass>1 MWe,t−1 0.201
(0.77)
θ−1 1.57e-49
NUTS-3 and Year FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0391
Adj. R2 0.0356
LL -1.379 -928.4
F 14.42
χ2 631.4
FW REF=0 / χ
2
W REF=0 (p-value) 6.963 (0.00874) 180.8 (3.18e-41) 247.6 (8.72e-56)
N (DFM) 6004 (21) 3382 (22) 5372 (315)
Robust t statistics in parenth., built with HAC SE, estim. constant omitted in column (3)
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
local resistance against one plant may not only work as a barrier against adoption
in the municipal district where the plant should be located; instead it may hinder
the adoption in the municipal district’s NUTS-3 region (and for the case of large
biomass plants also in neighboring NUTS-3 regions). We interpret this as evidence
that potential investors in wind power and large biomass plants not only avoid the
municipal district where a referendum took place but stay away from the municipal
district’s NUTS-3 region.51
6.3.5. A placebo test – Referenda against PV systems
To better understand the effect of referenda on renewable energy adoption, we con-
duct a placebo test. We study whether the same effect exists for PV systems, which
51An alternative explanation would be that in NUTS-3 regions where referenda were organized
small instead of large plants are built. In estimations not shown, we find evidence against this
idea. We estimate the effect of referenda against biomass plants on the adoption of small biomass
plants. For all estimation approaches, there is a negative (but only sometimes significant) point
estimate for the referendum dummy.
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shape the landscape less than wind power plants and do not come with pollution as
biomass plants.
PV systems are mainly small, private household systems (see Figure 3.1, BMU
(2011) and Dewald and Truffer (2011)). A referendum will only be organized against
a large system recognized by the public. If we analyze the adoption of all PV systems,
there is no reason to expect that a referendum against a large industrial PV plant
should be associated with low adoption (of all systems).
Table E.3 of Appendix E.1 reports the descriptive statistics. As expected, Table 6.10
indicates that a referendum against a single PV system does not hinder PV adoption
on the NUTS-3 level. Instead, we see that the referendum dummy is significantly
positive for PV systems. Referenda against PV were organized in Bavaria where
most (small household) PV systems exist. Therefore, it makes sense to see that
we find 16% more (small household) PV systems in regions where a referendum
against a (large) PV plant was organized than in the remaining regions (column (3)
in Table 6.10).
Table 6.10.: Estimation of successful referendum on adoption of PV systems.
(1) (2) (3)
∆FPV,t ∆FPV,t ∆#PV,t
Estimator OLS FE Cond. Poisson FE Uncond. Neg. Bin. FE
REFPV,t−1 0.00629∗ 0.207∗∗ 0.149+
(2.39) (2.79) (1.73)
FPV,t−1 0.260∗∗∗ -3.203∗∗∗
(46.48) (-8.00)
#PV,t−1 -0.0000150
(-0.99)
θ−1 0.297
NUTS-3 and Year FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.865
Adj. R2 0.865
LL -57.73 -29646.8
F 978.2
χ2 8377.7
FREF=0 / χ
2
REF=0 (p-value) 5.702 (0.0174) 7.765 (0.00533) 3.008 (0.0828)
N (DFM) 6435 (15) 6420 (16) 6435 (17)
Robust t statistics in parenth., built with HAC SE, estim. constant omitted in column (3)
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
But, is there evidence for a negative effect of referenda on large, industrial PV
systems (above 100 kWp capacity)? Table 6.11 contains the results. We see that for
large PV systems, there is no significant effect from referenda at all. F and χ2 tests
approve this finding.
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Table 6.11.: Estimation of successful referendum on adoption of large PV systems.
(1) (2) (3)
∆FPV>100 kWp,t ∆FPV>100 kWp,t ∆#PV>100 kWp,t
Estimator OLS FE Cond. Poisson FE Uncond. Neg. Bin. FE
REFPV,t−1 0.000305 -0.113 0.222
(0.05) (-0.67) (1.18)
FPV>100 kWp,t−1 0.400
∗∗∗ -1.556∗∗
(9.42) (-3.06)
#PV>100 kWp,t−1 -0.00400
∗∗∗
(-3.40)
θ−1 0.0905
NUTS-3 and Year FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.571
Adj. R2 0.570
LL -113.9 -6644.0
F 152.2
χ2 41443.9
FREF=0 / χ
2
REF=0 (p-value) 0.00218 (0.963) 0.449 (0.503) 1.386 (0.239)
N (DFM) 6435 (15) 6420 (16) 6435 (17)
Robust t statistics in parenth., built with HAC SE, estim. constant omitted in column (3)
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Does the picture change if we control for shocks on the NUTS-2 level? Table 6.12
illustrates that – across the three estimation approaches – there is still no significant
effect of referenda against PV systems on the adoption of large PV systems when
controlling for NUTS-2-times-year-fixed effects.52 In Table E.6 of Appendix E.3,
we show that neither a spill-over effect from referenda against PV systems exists in
neighboring NUTS-3 regions. Referenda seem to slow down adoption strongly for
technologies as wind power or large biomass plants, which may have – in comparison
to PV – a larger effect on the well-being of the local population. Initiators of
referenda for instance argue that biomass plants come with odour emissions and
traffic from the supply of wood chips or other combustibles (Bernstein and Knoll,
2011).
6.3.6. Announced but not conducted referenda
In order to improve our understanding of the effect of referenda on renewable en-
ergy adoption, we analyze data on referenda against renewable energy plants which
were announced but not conducted. In these cases, the decision against building
the renewable energy plant was taken before the referendum could be organized.
Figure 6.2 illustrates where referenda against wind power plants or biomass plants
were announced but not conducted.
52Due to convergence problems, we can only estimate the GLM with a negative binomial dis-
tribution (Table 6.12 column (3)) for the panel between 2003 and 2011.
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Table 6.12.: Estimation of successful referendum on adoption of large PV systems
(controlling for yearly NUTS-2 shocks).
(1) (2) (3)
∆FPV>100 kWp,t ∆FPV>100 kWp,t ∆#PV>100 kWp,t
Estimator OLS FE Cond. Poisson FE Uncond. Neg. Bin. FE
REFPV,t−1 0.00680 0.0893 0.159
(0.71) (0.90) (0.51)
FPV>100 kWp,t−1 0.425
∗∗∗ 3.595∗∗∗
(11.34) (11.02)
#PV>100 kWp,t−1 0.0293
∗∗∗
(12.59)
θ−1 0.433
NUTS-2xYear FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.414
Adj. R2 0.414
LL -162.4 -7081.3
F 68.16
χ2 166.4
FREF=0 / χ
2
REF=0 (p-value) 0.503 (0.478) 0.806 (0.369) 0.256 (0.613)
N (DFM) 6435 (1) 4036 (2) 3432 (296)
Robust t statistics in parenth., built with HAC SE, estim. constant omitted in column (3)
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 6.13 and 6.14 report the estimates. No matter which estimation strategy we
use, we cannot confirm the effect found before: neither for wind power plants nor
for large biomass plants. This result indicates that only organized referenda prevent
potential investors from renewable energy plants nearby the primary location.
Table 6.13.: Estimation of announced but not organized referendum on adoption of
large wind power plants.
(1) (2) (3)
∆FWind>0.5 MW,t ∆FWind>0.5 MW,t ∆#Wind>0.5 MW,t
Estimator OLS FE Cond. Poisson FE Uncond. Neg. Bin. FE
REFWind,n.o.,t−1 0.000991 0.0406 0.276
(0.79) (0.12) (0.62)
FWind>0.5 MW,t−1 -0.00164 -9.368∗∗∗
(-0.20) (-3.51)
#Wind>0.5 MW,t−1 -0.00272∗
(-2.27)
θ−1 1.527
NUTS-3 and Year FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0998
Adj. R2 0.0968
LL -37.41 -7857.5
F 11.62
χ2 540.7
FREF=0 / χ
2
REF=0 (p-value) 0.625 (0.430) 0.0136 (0.907) 0.386 (0.534)
N (DFM) 5988 (19) 4924 (20) 5988 (76)
Robust t statistics in parenth., built with HAC SE, estim. constant omitted in column (3)
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Referendum announced but not organized against
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Figure 6.2.: NUTS-3 regions where a referendum was announced but not organized
against a renewable plant.
6.4. Summary
We set out to study whether a successful referendum against one renewable energy
plant is associated with lower adoption rates in the same German NUTS-3 region
at a later stage. Importantly, the technologies of study are fostered by a strong
federal subsidy scheme, which has already been in place since 2000. The fact that
the subsidy system existed for over a decade signals public support. In other words,
the public supports the adoption of the technologies in general but there is resistance
to the adoption at the local level through referenda. While controlling for regional
and time fixed effects, we find that the adoption of wind power plants and of large
biomass plants is indeed lower in regions where a successful referendum against a
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Table 6.14.: Estimation of announced but not organized referendum on adoption of
large biomass plants.
(1) (2) (3)
∆FBiomass>1 MWe,t ∆FBiomass>1 MWe,t ∆#Biomass>1 MWe,t
Estimator OLS FE Cond. Poisson FE Uncond. Neg. Bin. FE
REFBiomass,n.o.,t−1 0.000192 0.759 0.494
(1.34) (0.95) (0.81)
FBiomass>1 MWe,t−1 -0.0858∗∗∗ -857.3∗∗∗
(-7.34) (-3.86)
#Biomass>1 MWe,t−1 -0.923∗∗∗
(-5.15)
θ−1 2.84e-14
NUTS-3 and Year FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0392
Adj. R2 0.0360
LL -1.381 -946.5
F 15.03
χ2 247.2
FREF=0 / χ
2
REF=0 (p-value) 1.785 (0.182) 0.910 (0.340) 0.658 (0.417)
N (DFM) 5995 (19) 3375 (20) 5995 (315)
Robust t statistics in parenth., built with HAC SE, estim. constant omitted in column (3)
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
renewable plant of the same technology was organized. We do not observe the same
for PV systems.
Our findings are good news to those who protest against renewable energy plants in
their backyard. Referenda have their intended effect on renewable energy technology
adoption in Germany. Local resistance against one plant does not only work as a
barrier against adoption in the municipal district where the plant was to be located.
It also has a signaling effect and hinders the adoption in the municipal district’s
NUTS-3 region. We interpret this as evidence that potential investors in wind power
or large biomass plants not only avoid the municipal district where a referendum
took place but stay away from the municipal district’s NUTS-3 region. Our findings
imply that a federal incentive system has limited effects without local support.
This analysis also contributes to the discussion on the effect of democratic political
institutions on technology diffusion. According to the literature, there is a positive
link (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Comin and Hobijn, 2004). If, however, the local pub-
lic participates in the decision whether a wind park or more general infrastructure
projects such as large power lines or railway tracks should be built, their adoption
may be slowed down. Still, potential investors in wind power or large biomass plants
can convince the local public of the benefits of their plans which may prohibit resis-
tance. For instance, in the municipal district Sauerlach (NUTS-3 region Landkreis
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Mu¨nchen, Bavaria), the local public was involved early on when a biomass plant was
built. In Sauerlach no organized resistance occurred (Bernstein and Knoll, 2011).
During recent years we have observed more and more referenda against renewable
energy plants (see Datenbank Bu¨rgerbegehren (2014)). It would be interesting to
study whether our findings hold true when we can employ updated data sets on
renewable energy adoption in Germany. To investigate why local resistance did not
occur in the cases in which wind parks and large biomass plants were actually built
would also be promising.
Our findings raise many new questions. Firstly, does the adoption barrier from a
referendum only persist for a certain time period? Secondly, do we see similar barri-
ers to the adoption of renewable energy systems in other countries? Thirdly, do we
observe similar effects for other technologies and what do they have in common?
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Voters53
In the last chapter, we discussed the effect of referenda on renewable energy adoption
in Germany. Now, we turn to implications from their adoption.
7.1. Motivation
Can the diffusion of technologies affect voting patterns? Do political parties reap
political benefits from the diffusion of certain technologies? Technology is usually
not aligned with a specific ideology or political party. Indeed, to the extent that
technology raises living standards, all parties tend to favor technology diffusion.
However, in some cases, voters may associate a political party with a specific tech-
nology. This may be the case because the technology is important for the fulfillment
of the party’s aspirations or because the party has actively supported policies that
affect the diffusion of the technology. One example where both of these nexes are
present is environmentally-friendly technologies. Green parties advocate the diffu-
sion of green energy technologies and pursue policies that foster the diffusion of
green energies. In Germany, for example, when the Social Democratic-Green coali-
tion won the 1998 federal elections, it raised the feed-in tariffs paid for electricity
produced from wind and solar power.54
Coinciding with the diffusion of PV systems, Germany’s Green Party experienced
a significant increase in its share of votes, from 6.7% in 1998 to 10.7% in the 2009
elections. This observation raises a question that the literature has not contemplated
53This chapter is based on a revised version of Comin and Rode (2013).
54Indeed, these measures may have accelerated the diffusion of PV systems (Dewald and Truffer
(2011), Jacobsson et al. (2004) and Jacobsson and Bergek (2004)).
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yet. Has the diffusion of green energy technologies helped the Green Party increase
its share of votes?55
Identifying the effects of diffusion on green votes presents well-known identification
challenges. An increase in the political power of the Green Party may enable the
approval of subsidies to green energy that accelerate its diffusion. Such reverse
causality logic may result in biased estimates of the effect of PV systems diffusion on
green votes. Similarly, failing to control for unobserved heterogeneity may result in
biased estimates if omitted drivers of Green Party votes are correlated with diffusion
patterns.
We avoid these potential biases by exploiting variation in adoption rates (i.e., the
increment in diffusion) exogenous to the political process. To find a valid instrument
for adoption rates, we build on the key finding of over 50 years of economic and
marketing research on diffusion curves. Namely, that new technologies in a wide
range of sectors, countries and periods diffuse approximately following logistic curves
(e.g., Griliches (1957) and Mansfield (1961)).56 Logistic curves are characterized by
low initial adoption rates that eventually accelerate to reach a technology’s long-run
penetration rate. One implication of the non-linear nature of logistic curves is that
current adoption rates can be forecasted by lagged diffusion levels. In Chapter 2,
we outline the four distinct rationales for the non-linearity of diffusion curves.
It is important to note that (i) all the sources of non-linear dynamics proposed in
the literature are orthogonal to voting patterns and more generally to politics; and
(ii) non-linear dynamics have been documented in the diffusion of a large number
of technologies, most of which are orthogonal to the political process. These two
observations allow us to confidently claim that variation in adoption rates that comes
from the non-linearity of technology diffusion is orthogonal to voting patterns. Under
this premise, we can use lagged diffusion levels to instrument for current adoption
rates of PV systems.
Further, we make direct use of the fact that technology diffusion across sectors, coun-
tries and periods approximately follows logistic curves. A non-linear least squares
(NLS) estimation allows us to predict diffusion levels and conduct our analysis with
a predicted instrument (as, e.g., Czernich et al. (2011) do).
55In Section 7.4.7, we provide two possible rationales for why adopting PV systems may affect
voting patterns. One is based on Bayesian updating and the other based on cognitive dissonance
(Akerlof and Dickens, 1982).
56See Comin and Mestieri (2013a) for some examples.
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We implement this identification strategy by constructing a panel at the NUTS-3
level that covers both the diffusion of PV systems and the fraction of total votes that
went to the Green Party in all the federal elections between 1998 and 2009. Our
baseline regression includes year dummies and region-specific trends in green voting.
We find a significant effect of PV adoption on the increase in the share of votes for
the Green Party. In particular, the increase in the diffusion rate of PV systems
between 1998 and 2009 led to an increase in the fraction of green votes of 0.9%,
which represents about 25% of the actual increase in the voting rate experienced by
the Green Party between 1998 and 2009.
To better understand the mechanism by which green-technology adoption affects
voting patterns, we investigate several hypotheses. First, we explore whether vot-
ers compensate the Green Party for a windfall gained by adopting PV systems at
a higher feed-in tariff. We deem this hypothesis as unlikely to drive our findings
because (i) our estimates are robust to controlling for proxies of the profitability
of adopting PV systems and (ii) we show that installing a PV system did not sig-
nificantly contribute to household income. A second hypothesis is that observing
the diffusion of green technologies is sufficient to affect voters propensity to vote for
the Green Party. We evaluate this hypothesis by exploring whether the diffusion of
industrial green technologies (PV and eolic, i.e., wind) has a similar effect on green
voting to what we have observed for household PV systems. In contrast to our
findings for household PV systems, we find no effect of the adoption of industrial
PV systems and eolic systems on green voting.
We interpret these results as evidence that seeing more green energy installations
in the neighborhood is not sufficient to induce voting for the Green Party. Instead,
individuals that use green technologies are more likely to become Green Party vot-
ers.
We put our findings to the test at the individual level. Survey data from the German
Socio-Economic Panel confirms our results. We find that the odds that a home
owner, who has previously installed a PV system, becomes greener is 1.7 times higher
than for a home owner who has not installed PV. We define becoming greener as
stating a change in support from another party to green or stating a change from
a weaker to a stronger level of Green Party support. We do not find evidence for
reverse causality.
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This analysis is related to various literatures that have explored the drivers of vot-
ing behavior. Deacon and Shapiro (1975) and Fischel (1979) use survey data from
voters in referenda on environmental issues to study which factors affect the proba-
bility of voting in support of the environment. They find that occupation, political
affiliation, education, income and location are important drivers of green voting.57
A number of studies have explored the role of monetary incentives in voting both
from the perspective of voters and of politicians. The existing evidence suggests that
monetary rewards are relatively ineffective in driving votes both when trying to af-
fect the position taken by elected representatives (Ansolabehere et al., 2003) and
the votes of the electorate (Cornelius (2004), Wang and Kurzman (2007), Schaffer
and Schedler (2007)).
Falck et al. (2014) reveal that the availability of Internet technology impacts voter
turnout negatively in Germany. The specific driver of voting patterns we explore is
the diffusion of PV systems. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to
explore positive effects of technology diffusion on specific party votes.58
As mentioned above, our identification strategy exploits the logistic diffusion pattern
observed for many technologies. In addition to the standard forces that induce
logistic diffusion patterns, a few other drivers have been pointed out as relevant for
the adoption of green technologies. See Section 2.4 in Chapter 2 for details.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 presents the aggregate
trends and regional differences in green voting. Section 7.3 develops a model of tech-
nology adoption to explore the drivers of diffusion and motivate the instrumentation
strategy. Section 7.4 presents the empirical findings, and discusses their robustness
and interpretation. Section 7.5 concludes.
57A related literature (e.g., Tjernstro¨m and Tietenberg (2008), Torgler and Garc´ıa-Valin˜as
(2007), Whitehead (1991), Nord et al. (1998) Zelezny et al. (2000)) has used survey data to explore
drivers (mostly socio-economic and demographic) of attitudes towards green issues.
58Our analysis is also related to the literature on policy feedback (Schattschneider, 1935; Pierson,
1993; Soss and Schram, 2007). These authors argue that new policies can create their own support
through a range of mechanisms. However, the effects we identify are orthogonal to potential policy
feedbacks since (i) we control for policy changes and (ii) we exploit exogenous variation in adoption
rates which, by definition, is not driven by new policies.
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7.2. Aggregate trends and regional differences in
green voting
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, we describe the institutional context of green energy
diffusion, its aggregate trends and regional differences. Coinciding with the diffusion
of green energies, the Green Party experienced a significant increase in votes. (See
Figure 7.1.)59 In the 1998 elections, the Green Party received 6.7% of valid votes.
This share increased to 8.6% in 2002, declined to 8.1% in 2005 and reached 10.7%
in 2009.
Year
F
ra
ct
io
n
of
gr
ee
n
vo
te
s
0%
4%
8%
12
%
1998 2002 2005 2009
6.7%
8.6%
8.1%
10.7%
Figure 7.1.: Fraction of green votes in federal elections in Germany from 1998
through 2009.
Beneath these aggregate trends in votes there are important regional differences.
The cross-sections of the share of green votes are plotted in Figure 7.2.60 In 1998,
the Green Party obtained large voting shares in Freiburg, Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, in
Heidelberg, Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, in Tu¨bingen, Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, and in Darm-
stadt, Hesse. On the contrary, the Green Party did poorly in the eastern part of
Germany. In the next decade, we observe an increase in green votes in most regions.
The highest increases in the share of green votes between 1998 and 2009 took place
in Lu¨neburg, Lower-Saxony, in Flensburg, Schleswig-Holstein, and in Wu¨rzburg,
Bavaria.
59Voting data comes from DESTATIS (2012). We consider second votes (‘Zweitstimmen’ ).
60Due to the restructuring of districts, we lack data for some 3% of the NUTS-3 regions for
1998 and 2002, 0.7% for 2005 and 7.5% for 2009.
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Figure 7.2.: Fraction of green votes at NUTS-3 level for 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2009.
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7.3. A simple model of diffusion
To illustrate the drivers of the adoption decisions, we develop a simple model. After
characterizing the individual adoption decision, we study the diffusion dynamics of
PV systems at the regional level. Though our model belongs to the so-called probit
models, it shares with other diffusion models the prediction that diffusion follows an
S-shaped pattern. In our empirical analysis, we take no particular stand on which
of the theories proposed in the literature drives the non-linear diffusion dynamics.
In each location (NUTS-3 region), there is a continuum of potential adopters, j, that
differ in the potential electricity production, elj, (due to differences in solar radiation,
alignment potential. . . ) and in the sunk cost of setting up the PV system, cjt. The
sunk cost of installation declines over time deterministically as follows:
cjt = cj0e
−αt.
Without loss of generality, we index the potential adopters, j, in each region n so
that the ratio cj0/ej is increasing. Furthermore, we assume that, in each region,
log(cj0/ej) is distributed according to the following logistic cumulative density func-
tion:
Fn(x) =
1
1 + e−bnx
where bn is a region-specific parameter that determines how concentrated the density
function is.
The instant t in which a PV system is installed defines its vintage. For simplicity,
we assume that adopters of vintage-τ PV systems obtain a constant feed-in tariff of
Pτ forever.
61 Pt evolves stochastically according to the following Poisson process:
dPt =
φPt, with probability λdt,0, with probability 1− λdt. (7.1)
This formulation captures the possibility that the feed-in tariff increases discretely,
as occurred in Germany in 2000.
Given a constant discount rate of r, the expected value of a PV system of vintage τ
is defined by:
61In reality, it is for a 20 year period.
94
7. From Green Users to Green Voters
rVτdt = Pτejdt (7.2)
which yields
Vτ =
Pτej
r
. (7.3)
Conditional on not having installed a PV system at time t, when the feed-in tariff
is Pt, the option value of installing a PV system, Wt, is defined by
W (t, Pt) = max
{
Et
W (t+ dt, Pt+dt)
1 + rdt
, Vt − cjt
}
, (7.4)
where Et is the expectation operator. The following proposition characterizes both
the optimal adoption rule and the diffusion of PV systems.
Proposition 1 (i) A potential producer j has adopted a PV system at time t if her
ratio
cj0/ej 6
(1− λ(φ− 1)/r)Pt
e−αt(r + α)
,
where Pt is the prevailing feed-in tariff at time t. (ii) The fraction of potential
adopters that have installed a PV system at t when the prevailing feed-in tariff is Pt
is given by
Fn (log [(1− λ(φ− 1)/r)Pt]− log(r + α) + αt) (7.5)
= [1 + exp (−bn (log [(1− λ(φ− 1)/r)Pt]− log(r + α) + αt))]−1 .
Proof: See Appendix F.1.
Taking a first order Taylor expansion of (7.5), it follows that the fraction of newly
installed PV systems, fn, is approximately equal to
dFnt ≡ fnt (log [(1− λ(φ− 1)/r)Pt]− log(r + α) + αt)
' Fnt ∗ (1− Fnt) ∗ bn ∗
[
dPt
Pt
+ α ∗ dt
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
revision in return
. (7.6)
Equation (7.6) characterizes the determinants of the adoption rate. Adoption rates
are increasing in the revisions of the return to adopting PV systems. In particular,
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the return to adopting PV systems increase with the growth rate of the feed-in tariff
(dPt/Pt) , and with the rate of decline of installation costs, α. Adoption rates also
increase with the concentration of the ratio cj0/ej (bn), and, in the initial stages of
adoption (i.e., when (1 − Fnt) ' 1), it is also increasing in the diffusion level, Fnt.
Note that, the diffusion level is a driver of adoption rates that varies both over time
and across regions. Therefore, we can exploit exogenous variation in diffusion levels
to instrument for adoption rates in the presence of both time and region-specific
fixed effects.
7.4. Econometric evidence
We consider the following reduced form for the fraction of votes received by the
Green Party in region n in the federal elections that take place in year t (Vnt) :
Vnt = αn + gn ∗ t+ αt + βFnt + ρXnt + nt. (7.7)
αn is a region (NUTS-3) level effect, gn is a region-specific trend, αt is an aggregate
time dummy, Fnt is the stock of PV systems installed normalized by the number of
potential adopters in the region, Xnt is a vector of other potential drivers of green
votes, and nt is an error term. Taking differences between consecutive election years
(t and t− k), (7.7) can be expressed as:
4Vnt = gn + γt + β4Fnt + ρ4Xnt + unt (7.8)
where 4Vnt ≡ Vnt−Vnt−k is the increment in the share of green votes, γt ≡ αt−αt−k
is a time dummy, unt ≡ nt − nt−k is an error term and 4Fnt ≡ Fnt − Fnt−k is the
adoption rate defined as the increase in the ratio of the stock of PV systems adopted
over the number of potential adopters.
As elections took place in fall and technology adoption could occur in the same year
but after the election, we have to adjust our lag structure. Table 7.1 illustrates
the situation. In case 2, the change in green votes could have occurred before PV
adoption. In case 1, this is not possible. We therefore lag PV adoption by one year:
∆FPV,t−1.
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Table 7.1.: Contrasting lag structure.
Case 1 Case 2
t− 2 t− 1 t t− 2 t− 1 t
∆vt 0 1 0 1
∆FPV,t 0 1 0 0 0 1
Table 7.2 reports the ordinary least squares estimates of Equation (7.8) including
the lag structure.62 We consider four specifications which differ according to whether
time and NUTS-3 fixed effects are included. Time fixed effects capture time-varying
factors that have a symmetric effect in voting patterns across regions. For example,
nation-wide changes in green sentiment or political changes in the Green Party and
how these are perceived by voters. Regional fixed effects capture region-specific
trends in attitudes towards the Green Party, education and values, which may lead
to regional trends in green votes. Because the specification that includes both time
and NUTS-3 fixed effects controls for these trends, we consider it to provide a cleaner
identification than the other three alternatives. In addition, all specifications control
for the logarithm of per capita income in the region.
Table 7.2.: OLS estimation of increase in PV diffusion on increase in share of
green votes.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆vt ∆vt ∆vt ∆vt
∆FPV,t−1 0.402∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗
(13.60) (13.48) (4.75) (5.84)
ln(GDPcap,t) 0.00674∗∗∗ 0.00853 0.00597∗∗∗ -0.0000851
(6.61) (1.13) (6.84) (-0.01)
α -0.0591∗∗∗ -0.0384∗∗∗
(-5.79) (-4.30)
NUTS-3 fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes
R2 0.147 0.215 0.582 0.642
Adj. R2 0.146 -0.182 0.581 0.459
F 131.5 177.5 427.1 311.4
N 1160 1160 1160 1160
t statistics in parentheses, built with Newey-West SE
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Turning back to Table 7.2, we find that increments in the share of green votes are
positively associated with adoption rates in all four specifications. These associations
are statistically and economically significant. Based on the estimates in our preferred
specification (column 4), an increase in the adoption rate by one standard deviation
is associated with an increase in the fraction of green votes by .24 standard deviations
(see Table F.1 in Appendix F.2 for the relevant descriptive statistics). Similarly, the
62Reported standard errors (SE) are always robust to both arbitrary heteroskedasticity and
arbitrary autocorrelation. They have a bandwidth of 2.
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diffusion of PV systems between 1998 and 2009 is associated with an increase in the
fraction of green votes of 0.9%, which is approximately 25% of the actual increase
in the voting rate experienced by the Green Party between 1998 and 2009.
At this point, we do not interpret the estimates in Table 7.2 as a causal effect of PV
adoption on green votes. The correlation between adoption rates and the increment
in the fraction of green votes could also result from omitting relevant variables from
the vector of controls, 4Xnt. To confidently argue that the estimates reflect the
causal effect of PV adoption on green voting, we need some exogenous source of
variation in the adoption of PV systems. That is, variation in PV adoption that is
driven by factors that do not affect directly voting patterns or that are not correlated
with factors other than adoption that may drive voting patterns.
Finding valid instruments is, in general, a difficult task. However, in our context,
the non-linear diffusion patterns of new technologies provide us with a natural in-
strumental variable. As shown in Section 7.3, a property of logistic diffusion curves
is that current adoption rates are a function of the lagged diffusion level. Indeed, in
the early stages of diffusion, current adoption is (approximately) a linear function
of the lagged diffusion level. But, what is the nature of this relationship? Is it
orthogonal to voting patterns?
The literature has proposed several hypotheses on the source of the non-linearities
of diffusion patterns. These theories include epidemic models (Bass, 1969; Rogers,
1983) where information diffuses slowly, probit models where the exogenous dis-
tribution of adoption costs and profits in the population is bell-shaped (Griliches,
1957), legitimization theories where the population accepts slowly the validity of the
technology (Hannan and Freeman, 1989) and information cascades models where
agents initially experiment with multiple forms of the technology until a dominant
form emerges (Arthur (1989) and Banerjee (1992)). Importantly, in none of these
theories is the non-linear nature of diffusion dynamics related to politics or voting
dynamics.
Furthermore, S-shape diffusion patterns have been documented for a wide range
of technologies, periods and countries with very diverse political and contextual
factors. The ubiquity of S-shaped diffusion patterns strongly supports the premise
that variation in the adoption of PV systems driven by the non-linearities of diffusion
are exogenous to changes in voting patterns. In particular, we find it difficult to
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make the argument that factors that drive changes in green votes between t − k
and t are correlated in any way with the stock of adoption until one year before the
previous election year (t− k − 1); especially, after controlling for time and regional
fixed effects that capture cross-regional differences in attitudes towards the Green
Party, and in their trends, as well as any pattern of aggregate time-variation in green
vote drivers.
Table 7.3 reports the estimates of the first stage regression where we use the PV
diffusion level in the previous election year (t−k) to forecast the adoption rate over
the electoral cycle (i.e., from t − k to t). The findings are quite similar for all four
specifications, including our preferred one with both region and time fixed effects.
Lagged diffusion levels are a very strong predictor of current adoption rates. The
t-statistics of this coefficient are close to 20 or above. The null that the instrument
is irrelevant is rejected at any level of significance. Furthermore, the high R2 (over
0.8 in all four specification) shows that the logistic curve provides a very good
approximation for the diffusion process of PV systems at the NUTS-3 level.
Table 7.3.: First stage estimation of increase in PV diffusion on increase in share of
green votes.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆FPV,t−1 ∆FPV,t−1 ∆FPV,t−1 ∆FPV,t−1
FPV,t−k−1 1.827∗∗∗ 1.519∗∗∗ 1.679∗∗∗ 1.318∗∗∗
(28.78) (20.60) (23.03) (15.94)
ln(GDPcap,t) -0.00139∗∗ 0.0276∗∗∗ -0.00170∗∗∗ 0.00199
(-3.26) (8.85) (-4.13) (0.58)
α 0.0163∗∗∗ 0.0227∗∗∗
(3.81) (5.42)
NUTS-3 fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes
R2 0.802 0.806 0.822 0.840
Adj. R2 0.802 0.708 0.821 0.759
F 419.7 708.7 444.2 535.2
FInstrument=0 828.3 424.4 530.2 254.2
p-valueInstrument=0 8.07e-138 1.83e-75 7.43e-97 1.17e-49
N 1160 1160 1160 1160
t statistics in parentheses, built with Newey-West SE
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 7.4 shows the estimates from the second stage regression. In all specifications
we find a positive and significant effect of instrumented adoption rates on the incre-
ment in Green Party votes. The point estimates vary from 0.16 to 0.5 depending
on the specification. In our preferred specification with region and time fixed effects
the point estimate is 0.26 which implies that one standard deviation increase in the
adoption rate of PV systems over one electoral period induces an increase in the
share of votes for the Green Party by 0.31 percentage points. Cumulating that over
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the three elections that took place after 1998 until 2009 implies that the diffusion
of PV systems accounts for a cumulative increase in the fraction of green votes of
0.9 percentage points. This increment represents approximately a quarter of the
actual increase in votes experienced by the Green Party over this period.
Table 7.4.: Two-stage least squares estimation of increase in PV diffusion on increase
in share of green votes.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆vt ∆vt ∆vt ∆vt
∆FˆPV,t−1 0.375∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗
(12.88) (10.15) (4.99) (5.06)
ln(GDPcap,t) 0.00684∗∗∗ 0.0212∗∗ 0.00595∗∗∗ 0.0000469
(6.71) (2.73) (6.85) (0.01)
α -0.0599∗∗∗ -0.0389∗∗∗
(-5.87) (-4.37)
NUTS-3 fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes
R2 0.147 0.209 0.581 0.641
Adj. R2 0.145 -0.191 0.580 0.459
F 120.9 139.7 420.5 297.2
N 1160 1160 1160 1160
t statistics in parentheses, built with Newey-West SE
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Although we believe it to be unlikely, one may question whether factors that drive
changes in green voting between t−k and t are correlated with the stock of adoption
one year before the previous election year. To further strengthen our instrumentation
strategy, we can directly make use of the fact that technology diffusion follows a lo-
gistic pattern. A NLS estimation allows us to estimate the non-linear diffusion curve.
We specify Equation (7.9) in such a way that only region n’s average amount of solar
radiation (sunn), its share of single and double family houses (share si-do housesnt)
and an east dummy (eastn) affect the diffusion level in region n and year t:
FPV,nt =
a+ asun ∗ sunn104 + ashare si-do houses ∗ share si-do housesnt103 + aeast ∗ eastn
1 + e−b(t−c)
+ ζnt. (7.9)
ζnt is an error term. The numerator determines the level of saturation, b the diffusion
speed and c the diffusion process’ inflexion point (Czernich et al., 2011). Table 7.5
reports the estimates for the NLS estimation. All coefficients are highly significant.
The high R2 confirms the very good fit of the specification. As we would expect,
global radiation and the share of single and double family houses shape the satu-
ration level positively and the east dummy negatively. A positive diffusion speed b
makes sense as well as an inflexion point between the year 2001 and 2004 (having in
mind the relevant descriptive statistics in Table F.2 of Appendix F.2 and the time
lag).
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Table 7.5.: First stage NLS estimation of logistic PV diffusion.
(1)
FPV,t−k−1
a -0.126∗∗∗
(-4.11)
asun 1.198∗∗∗
(4.21)
ashare si-do houses 0.178
∗∗∗
(3.30)
aeast -0.00623∗∗∗
(-4.24)
b 2.244∗∗∗
(4.57)
c 4.585∗∗∗
(17.09)
NUTS-3 fixed effects No
Time fixed effects No
R2 0.751
Adj. R2 0.749
N 1157
t statistics in parentheses, robust SE
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Now, we can use the predicted values of FˆPV,t−k−1 to instrument the adoption rate
(∆FPV,t−1). Table 7.6 reports the results. Across the specifications, the findings
are quite similar. Column (4) contains our preferred specification with NUTS-3 and
time fixed effects. The predicted lagged adoption levels are a very strong instrument
for the current adoption rate. In all specifications, the goodness-of-fit measure R2 is
still very high and a F test rejects the null that the instrument is irrelevant at any
level of significance. Note that we control for the logarithm of per capita income
and the time-variant predictor, which we use in the NLS estimation, share si-do
housesnt. In columns (2) and (4) of Table 7.6, the time-invariant predictors of the
NLS estimation are covered by the NUTS-3 fixed effects.
Let us turn to the third stage in Table 7.7. Across specifications we find a strong
positive effect from the instrumented adoption rate on the increase in Green Party
votes. The point estimates vary from 0.17 to 0.64 depending on the specification. In
our preferred specification with region and time fixed effects – shown in column (4) –
the point estimate is 0.17, which implies that one standard deviation increase in the
adoption rate of PV systems over one electoral period induces an increase in the
share of votes for the Green Party by 0.2 percentage points. Cumulating this over
the three elections that took place after 1998 until 2009 implies that the diffusion
of PV systems accounts for a cumulative increase in the fraction of green votes of
0.6 percentage points. This increment represents approximately 15% of the actual
increase in votes experienced by the Green Party over this period.
Next, we conduct a series of robustness checks to gain further assurance that the
estimated effect of PV adoption on green voting reflects a causal relationship.
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Table 7.6.: Second stage estimation of increase in PV diffusion on increase in share
of green votes.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆FPV,t−1 ∆FPV,t−1 ∆FPV,t−1 ∆FPV,t−1
FˆPV,t−k−1 1.977∗∗∗ 1.816∗∗∗ 1.817∗∗∗ 1.644∗∗∗
(23.61) (22.74) (16.09) (14.22)
ln(GDPcap,t) 0.000296 0.0194∗∗∗ 0.000626 0.0133∗∗
(0.34) (5.19) (0.71) (2.84)
share si-do houst 0.000110∗∗∗ -0.000363 0.000128∗∗∗ -0.000801
(4.59) (-0.94) (5.33) (-1.68)
α -0.0103 -0.0129
(-1.01) (-1.27)
NUTS-3 fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes
R2 0.671 0.760 0.678 0.769
Adj. R2 0.671 0.638 0.677 0.650
F 196.9 355.9 181.3 271.7
FInstrument=0 557.7 516.9 258.9 202.2
p-valueInstrument=0 6.90e-101 6.78e-88 1.09e-52 6.69e-41
N 1157 1157 1157 1157
t statistics in parentheses, built with Newey-West SE
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 7.7.: Third stage estimation of increase in PV diffusion on increase in share
of green votes.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆vt ∆vt ∆vt ∆vt
∆FˆPV,t−1 0.552∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.171∗
(14.73) (10.72) (3.54) (2.13)
ln(GDPcap,t) 0.00303∗ 0.00958 0.00523∗∗∗ -0.000168
(2.51) (0.99) (5.41) (-0.02)
share si-do houst -0.000173∗∗∗ -0.000241 -0.0000372 -0.000422
(-4.46) (-0.29) (-1.08) (-0.40)
α -0.00859 -0.0289∗∗
(-0.61) (-2.62)
NUTS-3 fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes
R2 0.145 0.215 0.580 0.640
Adj. R2 0.143 -0.183 0.579 0.456
F 98.14 95.96 347.4 257.7
N 1157 1157 1157 1157
t statistics in parentheses, built with Newey-West SE
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
7.4.1. The profitability of PV systems
The first check consists of exploring the role played by the profitability of PV adop-
tion in our results. We do this in two different ways. Firstly, we control for the
profitability of PV systems in the region and year. Secondly, we calculate the ratio
of net profits from PV systems to household income to assess the possible significance
of the income from PV system installations in households’ decisions.
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Controlling for profitability
Controlling for the profitability of adopting a PV system allows us to study the
importance of omitted variables (OV) for our estimates of the effect of PV adoption
on voting patterns. OV are drivers of voting patterns that are correlated with
adoption rates. The most natural source of co-movement between OV and adoption
rates is a potential correlation between the OV and the profitability of PV adoption.
Hence, by controlling for profitability we test the relevance of this channel.
As implied by Section 7.3, we proxy changes in profitability by the growth rate of
the feed-in tariff interacted by the average solar radiation of the NUTS-3 region.
Note that this measure captures the asymmetric effect that the feed-in tariff has on
the return to PV systems. Therefore, it has variation even after including time and
regional fixed effects.
The first stage NLS estimation which we use to predict the lagged adoption level
is the same we used before (see Table 7.5). Table 7.8 presents the second stage
estimates after controlling for profitability. Consistent with the literature (Dewald
and Truffer (2011), Jacobsson et al. (2004) and Jacobsson and Bergek (2004)), we
find that changes in profitability have a positive effect on adoption rates if we in-
clude time fixed effects (column (3)). However, once NUTS-3 fixed effects are also
considered (column (4)), changes in profitability do not affect adoption rates. This
observation suggests that the potential for omitted variables to drive the relation-
ship between PV adoption and voting patterns is very limited.63 Also note that the
strength of the predicted instrument is not affected by controlling for profitability.
In particular, the coefficient of the lagged (predicted) diffusion level in the second
stage regression, its significance or the R2 of this regression are not affected by the
additional control. All this suggests that although changes in profitability may have
some effects on adoption rates, the variation we use to identify the effect of adoption
on voting patterns is orthogonal to changes in profitability.
Table 7.9 explores the third stage. Columns (1) and (2) show a positive and signif-
icant association between changes in profitability and the increment in green votes.
We interpret this coefficient as reflecting the larger increase in green votes in the
southern regions of Germany during the 2002 election, the first after the EEG raised
63Indeed, in the OLS regressions (not shown) the coefficient of adoption on the increment in
green votes does not change at all after controlling for profitability.
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Table 7.8.: Second stage estimation of increase in PV diffusion on increase in share
of green votes (controlling for profitability).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆FPV,t−1 ∆FPV,t−1 ∆FPV,t−1 ∆FPV,t−1
FˆPV,t−k−1 1.990∗∗∗ 1.898∗∗∗ 1.831∗∗∗ 1.678∗∗∗
(20.63) (21.65) (16.22) (11.88)
∆pPV,t−1/pPV,t−k−1 ∗ sun 0.000482 0.00367∗∗∗ 0.0321∗∗∗ 0.00837
(0.63) (4.04) (5.33) (0.52)
ln(GDPcap,t) 0.000276 0.0236∗∗∗ 0.000161 0.0133∗∗
(0.31) (5.98) (0.17) (2.84)
share si-do houst 0.000108∗∗∗ 0.000162 0.000117∗∗∗ -0.000756
(4.52) (0.43) (4.70) (-1.55)
α -0.0101 -0.00667
(-0.99) (-0.62)
NUTS-3 fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes
R2 0.671 0.763 0.680 0.769
Adj. R2 0.670 0.643 0.678 0.650
F 207.5 285.7 178.4 226.6
FInstrument=0 425.6 468.6 263.1 141.2
p-valueInstrument=0 9.98e-81 1.80e-81 1.95e-53 5.21e-30
N 1157 1157 1157 1157
t statistics in parentheses, built with Newey-West SE
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
the feed-in tariff. The main finding from Table 7.9 is that the effect of PV adop-
tion rates on voting patterns is unaffected by the profitability control. This further
confirms that our estimates are not driven by omitted variable biases.
Table 7.9.: Third stage estimation of increase in PV diffusion on increase in share
of green votes (controlling for profitability).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆vt ∆vt ∆vt ∆vt
∆FˆPV,t−1 0.867∗∗∗ 1.218∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.282∗
(15.80) (16.88) (3.53) (2.08)
∆pPV,t−1/pPV,t−k−1 ∗ sun 0.0240∗∗∗ 0.0468∗∗∗ -0.00740 0.0445
(13.46) (18.95) (-0.38) (1.09)
ln(GDPcap,t) 0.00195 0.0524∗∗∗ 0.00534∗∗∗ -0.00135
(1.47) (5.32) (5.37) (-0.15)
share si-do houst -0.000274∗∗∗ 0.00668∗∗∗ -0.0000344 -0.0000953
(-6.29) (5.62) (-0.99) (-0.09)
α 0.00399 -0.0304∗∗
(0.25) (-2.63)
NUTS-3 fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes
R2 0.184 0.442 0.580 0.642
Adj. R2 0.181 0.158 0.578 0.459
F 87.56 128.1 289.7 220.1
N 1157 1157 1157 1157
t statistics in parentheses, built with Newey-West SE
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Money for votes?
The hypothesis we test in this chapter is whether the adoption of PV increases the
propensity to vote for the Green Party. An alternative hypothesis to explain the
correlation between PV diffusion and green votes is that voters reward the Green
Party for the monetary transfers that may come with the installation of PV systems.
The robustness of our estimates to controlling for the changes in profitability of PV
systems seems hard to reconcile with this hypothesis. However, to further explore
its plausibility, we next calculate the monetary return from adopting PV systems.
We compute the income from installing a PV system relative to household income
as follows:
Profit Income Ratio = Capacity ∗
[
T=19∑
t=0
(
1− v
1 + r
)t
[ Feed-in Tariff
∗# Full-load Hours ]− Investment per kWp (7.10)
∗
(
1 +
T=19∑
t=0
b
(1 + r)t
)]
/(Household Income ∗ 20).
In this formula, both the costs and revenues from PV systems are proportional to
the capacity of the PV system. The first term in the numerator is the present
discounted value of revenues per unit of capacity installed,64 while the second term
is the cost of installing and operating the PV system per unit of capacity. Because
we want to evaluate the economic significance of the net revenues from PV systems,
we scale them by the annual average household income (DESTATIS, 2013a).
Revenues from PV systems are calculated by multiplying the level of the feed-in
tariff times the number of full-load hours the system operates per year. The feed-in
tariff varies with the year of installation of the system. The number of full-load
hours depends on the location and alignment of the installation. The average for
the number of full-load hours in Germany is 900 hours (Klaus et al., 2010; Wirth,
2013). To assess the sensitivity of our calculations to variation in solar radiation,
we also compute the profit to income ratio when calibrating the number of full-load
64We use a standard value for the annual discount rate, 5% per year (e.g., Cooley and Prescott
(1995)).
105
7. From Green Users to Green Voters
hours to 1,110 hours which is at the 90th percentile of the full-load hours for all the
systems installed in Germany through 2009.65 The depreciation of the PV systems
reduces its efficiency at a rate (v) of 0.5% per year (BMU, 2011; Wirth, 2013). (See
Table 7.10 for a definition of the parameters, their value and their source.)
Table 7.10.: Details on the calculation of PV profits.
Definition Parameter Value Source
Household Income Disposable income per household
[EUR]
Yearly DESTATIS (2013a)
Feed-in Tariff Level feed in tariff [EUR] Yearly EEG (2000, 2004, 2011)
Investment per kWp Investment costs [EUR] Yearly 2000-05: Janzing (2010);
2006-09: BSW-Solar (2012),
pvX (2012)
r Weighted average cost of capital 5.0% Cooley and Prescott (1995),
BMU (2011),Wirth (2013)
b Yearly operating costs 1.0% BMU (2011), Wirth (2013)
T + 1 Life span [years] 20 EEG (2000, 2004, 2011), BMU
(2011),Wirth (2013)
v Yearly decrease in revenue 0.5% BMU (2011), Wirth (2013)
Capacity Median capacity
[
kWp
]
4 KEK (2010), DESTATIS
(2013b)
90th percentile capacity
[
kWp
]
6.4 KEK (2010), DESTATIS
(2013b)
Full-load Hours Average [hours/year] 900 BMU (2011), Wirth (2013)
90th percentile [hours/year] 1110 DWD (2010), BMU (2011),
Wirth (2013)
The costs of installing PV systems dropped very significantly between 2000 and 2009
(Janzing (2010) and BSW-Solar (2012)). In 2000, the cost of installing one kWp
was 8,000 EUR while in 2009 it was approximately 4,000 EUR. In addition to the
installation costs, there is an annual cost of operation and maintenance (b) which
amounts to 1% of the cost of installation (BMU, 2011; Wirth, 2013).
Because we use household income as the benchmark for net PV income, we should
calibrate the capacity level to that of systems installed in single household resi-
dences. Unfortunately, this information is not directly available. However, we can
make some back of the envelope calculations by using information collected in 2010
by the Karlsruher Energie- und Klimaschutzagentur (KEK) for Karlsruhe, Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg.66 KEK is a government agency which authorized SUN-AREA (a pri-
vate company) to use information on the roof inclination, area, orientation and solar
radiation to calculate the potential capacity of PV systems on each roof. Combining
65These values come from combining data on solar global radiation (DWD, 2010) with an
optimistic performance ratio of 85%. KEK (2010), BMU (2011) and Wirth (2013) confirm our
calculations.
66Karlsruhe is a 300,000 city (among the 25 largest in Germany) with a global solar radiation
similar to the average in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg and Bavaria (DWD, 2010), two of the regions with
highest solar radiation in Germany and where most German PV systems are installed.
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this data with information on the fraction of single-family residences in Karlsruhe,67
it follows that the median potential area for PV installation in single household resi-
dences is 37 sqm, and the 90th percentile is 58 sqm.68 Given this potential roof area,
we estimate that the capacity supported by the median single-family residence is
approximately 4 kWp, while for the residence at the 90
th percentile it is 6.4 kWp.
Table 7.11 reports the value of (7.10) for four combinations of full-load hours and
capacity, that represent the average/median and 90th percentile values in each di-
mension. Given the time series variation in the feed-in tariff and installation costs,
we report the ratios for four years over the period 2000-2009. The profit to income
ratio ranges from -2.7% to 0.8% with lower values for earlier years and for systems
with lower capacity and full-load hours.
Table 7.11.: Yearly profits from investment in PV as share of yearly average house-
hold income according to yearly full load hours and time of installation.
Year of installation PV system with 4 kWp PV system with 6.4 kWp
Full load hours [h/a] Full load hours [h/a]
900 1110 900 1110
2000 -1.7% -1.0% -2.7% -1.6%
2004 -0.5% 0.2% -0.9% 0.3%
2006 -0.3% 0.3% -0.5% 0.5%
2009 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 0.8%
Beyond this variation, the main conclusion we extract from the table is that, even for
systems with high capacity and installed in areas with high global solar radiation, the
net revenues from PV electricity production are negligible for households. Therefore,
we do not consider plausible that current and future PV adopters compensate the
Green Party with their votes in exchange for the net income from PV systems.69
This observation implies that the effects of adoption on green votes are general and
not just driven by the southern regions.
67According to DESTATIS (2013b) there were 39,607 residential buildings in Karlsruhe in 2010;
17,631 of these were single-family homes. Assuming that, out of all the residential buildings, single-
family houses are those with smaller roofs, we can use KEK (2010) data to measure the potential
roof area of single family residences. In particular, according to KEK (2010) there were 40,043
residential buildings in the city of Karlsruhe in 2010.
68It is necessary to install between 8 and 10 sqm of solar modules to reach a capacity of 1 kWp
(KEK, 2010). We use a value of 9 sqm per kWp in our calculations.
69In results not reported here, we have shown that the effect of adoption on Green Party votes
is robust to eliminating the regions from the south of Germany (where solar radiation is highest)
from the third stage (in Appendix F.2.1, see Table F.3 for the estimates and Table F.4 for the
descriptive statistics).
107
7. From Green Users to Green Voters
7.4.2. Lagged diffusion
As we have shown in Section 7.3, the non-linearity that characterizes logistic curves
implies that lagged diffusion is a good predictor of adoption rates. So far, we have
used the predicted diffusion level one year before the previous election year to instru-
ment for the adoption rate between the previous and current election years. But,
in principle, we could also use earlier predicted diffusion levels to instrument for
current adoption rates. This alternative strategy would provide even greater assur-
ance for the exogeneity of the instruments since it seems unreasonable that drivers
of changes in attitudes between t − k and t are correlated with the predicted PV
diffusion level at t− 2 ∗ k − 1 (after including time and fixed effects).
Tables 7.12, 7.13 and 7.14 report the results from the first, second and third stage,
respectively. The NLS estimation for the first stage again has a very good fit. Global
solar radiation is only significant at the 10% level, the share of single and double
family houses and the east dummy are not significant. Still, they have their expected
sign. They may not be significant, as the two-period lag implies dealing with the
adotion levels in 1993, 1997 and 2001, i.e., an early phase of PV adoption.70 The
main finding from the second stage regression is that, as implied by the theory, the
predicted diffusion level at t − 2 ∗ k − 1 is a good predictor of the adoption rate
between t−k− 1 and t− 1. When comparing Tables 7.13 and 7.6, we see only small
reductions in the R2. The third stage estimates in Table 7.14 are also very similar
to those in Table 7.7. There is no significant difference in the estimated effects
of adoption rates on voting patterns or in the R2 of this relationship under both
instrumentation strategies. I.e., the analysis with a two-period lag in the predicted
diffusion level supports the validity of our results.
7.4.3. Synthetic instrument
Can we provide further assurance that FˆPV,t−k−1 is indeed exogenous to ∆vt? We
put our results to the test with a synthetic instrument: FPV, synthetic,t−k−1.
70E.g., at the beginning of the 1990s, the feed-in tariff for PV was very low and the 1,000 roofs
program (precurser of the 100,000 roofs program) fostered PV adoption. Importantly, the 1,000
roofs program led to installations across Germany since a maximum quota of installations was
allocated to every federal state (Hoffmann et al., 1998). The homogeneous distribution of PV
systems in Germany in the early diffusion phase may be the reason for less strong predictors of
the logistic curve’s ceiling (in comparison to Table 7.5).
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Table 7.12.: First stage NLS estimation of logistic PV diffusion (two-period lag).
(1)
Ft−2k−1
a -0.337+
(-1.77)
asun 0.375+
(1.72)
ashare si-do houses 0.000953
(0.24)
aeast -0.0241
(-1.62)
b 3.253***
(4.26)
c 4.932***
(12.25)
NUTS-3 fixed effects No
Time fixed effects No
R2 0.717
Adj. R2 0.716
N 1156
t statistics in parentheses, robust SE
+ p¡0.10, * p¡0.05, ** p¡0.01, *** p¡0.001
Table 7.13.: Second stage estimation of increase in PV diffusion on increase in share
of green votes (two-period lag).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆FPV,t−1 ∆FPV,t−1 ∆FPV,t−1 ∆FPV,t−1
FˆPV,t−2k−1 6.280∗∗∗ 5.487∗∗∗ 6.942∗∗∗ 5.069∗∗∗
(23.86) (21.24) (14.55) (11.81)
ln(GDPcap,t) 0.00263∗∗ 0.0243∗∗∗ 0.00216∗ 0.0146∗∗
(2.90) (6.05) (2.39) (2.87)
share si-do houst 0.000275∗∗∗ -0.00240∗∗∗ 0.000264∗∗∗ -0.00311∗∗∗
(10.26) (-4.93) (10.09) (-5.06)
α -0.0462∗∗∗ -0.0429∗∗∗
(-4.32) (-4.04)
NUTS-3 fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes
R2 0.629 0.726 0.634 0.732
Adj. R2 0.628 0.588 0.633 0.595
F 203.0 311.0 167.1 241.7
FInstrument=0 569.5 451.1 211.8 139.6
p-valueInstrument=0 1.27e-102 4.07e-79 3.68e-44 1.04e-29
N 1157 1157 1157 1157
t statistics in parentheses, built with Newey-West SE
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Certainly, the average level of solar radiation is exogenous to ∆vt.
71 We rank the
regions under study according to their average level of solar radiation. Then, we
generate FPV, synthetic,t−k−1 to be the average value of FPV,t−k−1’s four nearest (rank)
neighbors.
71Table F.5 in Appendix F.2.2 shows the insignificant estimate of average solar radiation on the
increase in green votes regardless of whether we control for the level of green votes one year before
the previous election. We include year fixed effects and – as always – control for the logarithm of
per capita income in Table F.5. Note that there is neither a significant association between average
solar radiation and increase in Green Party votes before the time period in which we observe a
positive impact of PV adoption on Green Party votes, i.e., there is no significant association before
1998.
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Table 7.14.: Third stage estimation of increase in PV diffusion on increase in share
of green votes (two-period lag).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆vt ∆vt ∆vt ∆vt
∆FˆPV,t−1 0.810∗∗∗ 1.051∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.212∗
(17.50) (14.99) (3.51) (2.09)
ln(GDPcap,t) -0.000153 -0.0319∗∗ 0.00499∗∗∗ -0.000113
(-0.12) (-3.02) (5.04) (-0.01)
share si-do houst -0.000294∗∗∗ 0.000960 -0.0000495 -0.000179
(-7.03) (1.10) (-1.33) (-0.16)
α 0.0313∗ -0.0260∗
(2.01) (-2.29)
NUTS-3 fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes
R2 0.0697 0.163 0.579 0.641
Adj. R2 0.0673 -0.261 0.577 0.457
F 124.9 111.8 352.3 265.5
N 1157 1157 1157 1157
t statistics in parentheses, built with Newey-West SE
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 7.15 and 7.16 show the results for the first and second stage regression. Com-
paring the results using the synthetic instrument with Table 7.3 and 7.4 reveals that
the R2 values are lower when using the synthetic approach. Still, the estimated
coefficients and their significance levels are similar, regardless of whether NUTS-3
and time fixed effects are included. The synthetic instrumentation strategy confirms
the positive effect of adoption rates on green voting patterns.
Table 7.15.: First stage estimation of increase in PV diffusion on increase in share
of green votes using synthetic instrument.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆FPV,t−1 ∆FPV,t−1 ∆FPV,t−1 ∆FPV,t−1
FPV, synthetic,t−k−1 5.341∗∗∗ 4.203∗∗∗ 4.378∗∗∗ 2.971∗∗∗
(17.19) (14.80) (9.94) (8.72)
ln(GDPcap,t) -0.00157∗ 0.0317∗∗∗ -0.00164∗ -0.000806
(-2.16) (7.20) (-2.24) (-0.15)
α 0.0196∗∗ 0.0242∗∗
(2.66) (3.20)
NUTS-3 fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes
R2 0.471 0.630 0.488 0.661
Adj. R2 0.471 0.444 0.487 0.489
F 148.8 301.6 144.6 220.1
FInstrument=0 295.5 218.9 98.78 76.10
p-valueInstrument=0 3.73e-59 8.82e-44 2.17e-22 1.66e-17
N 1159 1158 1159 1158
t statistics in parentheses, built with Newey-West SE
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 7.16.: Two-stage least squares estimation of increase in PV diffusion on in-
crease in share of green votes using synthetic instrument.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆vt ∆vt ∆vt ∆vt
∆FˆPV,t−1 0.756∗∗∗ 1.090∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗ 0.225∗
(15.96) (13.85) (3.16) (2.25)
ln(GDPcap,t) 0.00539∗∗∗ -0.0330∗∗∗ 0.00592∗∗∗ -0.00307
(5.05) (-3.35) (6.85) (-0.36)
α -0.0488∗∗∗ -0.0393∗∗∗
(-4.56) (-4.37)
NUTS-3 fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes
R2 0.0600 0.153 0.581 0.644
Adj. R2 0.0584 -0.274 0.579 0.463
F 150.8 151.8 422.2 317.5
N 1159 1158 1159 1158
DFM 2 388 4 390
t statistics in parentheses, built with Newey-West SE
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
7.4.4. Green voting dynamics before 1998
Could a general trend which makes people more prone to vote for the Green Party
be the reason for our finding? We study this possibility by analyzing Green Party
voting in the time before our main period of study. We estimate the lagged level of
the share of Green Party votes (vt−k) on the increase in the share of Green party
votes (∆vt) for the time before 1998. Then, we use the point estimate of vt−k before
1998 to filter away the pre-1998 voting dynamics from the increase in Green votes
since 1998.
The Green Party participated in the federal elections for the first time in 1980.
Table 7.17 reports that the lagged level of the Green Party share of votes has a
mainly negative association with the increase in Green Party votes before 1998. See
Table F.6 in Appendix F.2.3 for the relevant descriptives statistics. Our preferred
specification in column (4) – with NUTS-3 and time fixed effects – has an especially
good fit in terms of R2.
We employ the instrumentation strategy used before. The estimates from the non-
linear first stage estimation and the ones from the second stage are still those given
in Table 7.5 and Table 7.6. Table 7.18 reports the third stage, which are similar to
the ones from the OLS regression (see Table F.7 in Appendix F.2.3). Our results are
unaffected by filtering away the pre-1998 voting dynamics from the increase in Green
Party voting during our main period of study (1998-2009). Column (4) of Table 7.18
suggests that an increase in the PV adoption rate of one standard deviation causes
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Table 7.17.: OLS estimation of level of share of green votes on increase in share of
green votes (1980-1998).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆vt ∆vt ∆vt ∆vt
vt−k -0.590∗∗∗ -1.004∗∗∗ 0.00242 -0.822∗∗∗
(-19.44) (-53.87) (0.13) (-19.77)
α 0.0391∗∗∗ -0.00543∗∗∗
(28.16) (-4.55)
NUTS-3 fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes
R2 0.361 0.740 0.843 0.934
Adj. R2 0.361 0.674 0.842 0.918
F 377.5 2899.5 1036.9 3356.9
N 1713 1621 1713 1621
t statistics in parentheses, built with Newey-West SE
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
an increase of 0.4% in Green Party votes. Accumulating this over the three elections
we study, we see that the increase in PV adoption is responsible for more than one
quarter of the actual increase in Green Party votes.
Table 7.18.: Third stage estimation of increase in PV diffusion on increase in share
of green votes (pre-1998 voting dynamics filtered away).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆vt − ˆβvt−kvt−k ∆vt − ˆβvt−kvt−k ∆vt − ˆβvt−kvt−k ∆vt − ˆβvt−kvt−k
∆FˆPV,t 0.893
∗∗∗ 0.988∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗
(11.84) (15.35) (3.60) (4.19)
ln(GDPcap,t) 0.0228∗∗∗ 0.0220∗∗ 0.00515∗∗∗ -0.00810
(7.20) (2.65) (5.52) (-1.05)
share si-do houst -0.000575∗∗∗ 0.00519∗∗∗ -0.0000354 0.00114
(-5.79) (4.82) (-1.07) (1.36)
α -0.137∗∗∗ -0.0284∗∗
(-3.72) (-2.64)
NUTS-3 fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes
R2 0.273 0.556 0.581 0.749
Adj. R2 0.271 0.330 0.579 0.622
F 117.9 227.6 344.7 339.1
N 1157 1157 1157 1157
t statistics in parentheses, built with Newey-West SE
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
7.4.5. Placebo tests
The hypothesis we are testing in this chapter is that using green technology makes
voters more prone to vote for the Green Party. If this is the case, the effect of green
adoption on green voting should be entirely driven by the adoption of household sys-
tems. By the same token, we should observe no effect for the adoption of industrial
112
7. From Green Users to Green Voters
green energy systems on voting patterns. Next, we implement this placebo test in
two exercises. Firstly, we differentiate between large PV systems which are feasible
only in industrial installations and small PV systems that are typically installed by
households. Secondly, we also explore the relationship between the adoption of eolic
systems and voting patterns, since the investments required to install eolic systems
are too large to be financed by households.
Industrial vs. household PV systems
To assess whether the relationship between PV adoption and green voting is driven
by the adoption of household or industrial systems we construct series for the adop-
tion of low and high capacity systems. We use two thresholds for the maximum
capacity of household systems, 30 kWp and 100 kWp. In addition we study the ef-
fects of the diffusion of very large PV systems (1,000 kWp or more) which definitely
are industrial. To save space, we focus on our preferred specification with regional
and time fixed effects and only report the three-stage estimates which are consis-
tent with the OLS estimates. Table F.8 and Table F.9 in Appendix F.2 presents
the first and second stage regressions for the adoption of PV systems of various
capacities. For the industrial installations, we have to adjust the non-linear first
stage estimation since both, the share of single and double family houses and their
location in the east or west, are less relevant for their adoption level. Instead we
add a squared global radiation term and a dummy for urban areas. For household
installations the goodness-of-fit measures are higher than for industrial installations.
For all capacity groupings besides very large systems, the lagged predicted diffusion
level is a strong and very significant predictor of current adoption rates. The R2 of
the second stage regressions are very high for household and sufficient for industrial
systems suggesting that the logistic provides a good characterization of the diffusion
for both.
Table 7.19 reports the estimates of the instrumented adoption rates and changes in
green voting rates for industrial and household systems. For household systems we
basically estimate the same effects as in the full sample (Table 7.7). The estimated
effect is slightly higher for systems with a capacity of at most 30 kWp than for
systems of at most 100 kWp. In both cases, the effect of PV adoption on green voting
is significant with p-values smaller than 0.05. The estimates change dramatically
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for industrial systems. When we focus on systems with capacity above 100 kWp,
we find a significantly negative association between instrumented adoption rates
and changes in green votes. For very large PV systems (over 1 MWp capacity), the
relationship between instrumented adoption rates and voting patterns disappears
completely. These findings are consistent with the view that using (rather than
seeing) green technologies is what induces voters to vote for the Green Party.
Table 7.19.: Third stage estimation of increase in PV diffusion on increase in share
of green votes (industrial vs. household systems).
Household installations Industrial installations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆vt ∆vt ∆vt ∆vt
∆FˆPV≤30 kWp,t−1 0.193
∗
(2.17)
∆FˆPV≤100 kWp,t−1 0.175
∗
(2.20)
∆FˆPV>100 kWp,t−1 -26.82
∗∗∗
(-3.77)
∆FˆPV>1 MWp,t−1 -30.69
(-1.43)
ln(GDPcap,t) -0.000132 -0.0000744 0.0122 0.00532
(-0.01) (-0.01) (1.10) (0.27)
share si-do houst -0.000400 -0.000407
(-0.38) (-0.39)
R2 0.640 0.640 0.389 0.150
Adj. R2 0.456 0.457 0.0792 -0.285
F 255.3 255.8 185.9 72.27
N 1157 1157 1134 747
t statistics in parentheses, built with Newey-West SE
NUTS-3 and time fixed effects included
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Capacity-adjusted measures of diffusion
The measures of PV system diffusion used so far make no adjustment for the capacity
of the system. To explore the robustness of our findings to alternative measures
of diffusion, we consider the following measure of the capacity-adjusted adoption
rate:
4FPVCapac.,nt = 4 Total solar capacity installednt
# Buildingsnt * Avg. capacity
(7.11)
where “Avg. capacity” is the average capacity of all PV systems installed across all
regions in all periods.
Column (1) of Table 7.20 presents the OLS estimates of the effect of the increase in
capacity on the increase in the share of green votes in our preferred specification with
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both year and region fixed effects. The main finding is that now the relationship
between the two is negative (and significant at the 5% level).
Table 7.20.: OLS estimation of increase in PV diffusion (capacity-adjusted measure)
on increase in share of green votes.
All inst. Household installations Industrial installations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆vt ∆vt ∆vt ∆vt ∆vt
∆FPVCapac.,t−1 -0.0247∗
(-2.08)
∆FPVCapac.≤30 kWp,t−1 0.196
∗∗∗
(5.92)
∆FPVCapac.≤100 kWp,t−1 0.191
∗∗∗
(5.73)
∆FPVCapac.>100 kWp,t−1 -1.683
∗
(-2.14)
∆FPVCapac.>1 MWp,t−1 -1.687∗
(-2.14)
ln(GDPcap,t) -0.000677 -0.000484 -0.000112 -0.000623 -0.000619
(-0.07) (-0.05) (-0.01) (-0.07) (-0.07)
R2 0.632 0.642 0.642 0.633 0.633
Adj. R2 0.445 0.460 0.461 0.446 0.446
F 280.9 299.6 292.7 281.3 281.4
N 1160 1160 1160 1160 1160
t statistics in parentheses, built with Newey-West SE
NUTS-3 and time fixed effects included
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
As one could expect from the previous analysis, this change in the sign is entirely
driven by the fact that capacity-weighted adoption measures, such as ∆FPVCapac.,
are dominated by industrial installations which have much larger capacity than
household installations. To make this clear, columns (2) and (3) of Table 7.20 use
the capacity-weighted measure of adoption but consider only installations with a
capacity of at most 30 kWp in column (2) and of at most 100 kWp in column (3).
After excluding industrial installations, the sign of the relationship between capacity-
weighted adoption rates of PV systems and changes in the Green Party share of votes
is again positive and significant as we found in the previous section. In contrast,
when we only consider installations with a capacity larger than 100 kWp (column 4)
or 1,000 kWp (column 5) we find a negative relationship between adoption rates and
green votes, again.
The conclusions from the OLS estimates remain after instrumenting capacity-weight-
ed adoption rates with lagged predicted capacity-weighted diffusion levels. In re-
sults not shown here, we find that the non-linear first stage estimations have a very
good fit for household systems and are also sufficient for industrial systems. The
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predicted instrument is strong, especially for household systems. As before, instru-
menting does not change the magnitude or sign of the OLS estimates. In particular,
Table 7.21 shows the third stage coefficients. We only find positive and signifi-
cant effects of capacity-weighted measures of adoption on the increase in the Green
Party share of votes in the small capacity systems. Therefore, we conclude that our
findings are robust to using capacity-weighted measures of diffusion.
Table 7.21.: Third stage estimation of increase in PV diffusion (capacity-adjusted
measure) on increase in share of green votes.
All inst. Household installations Industrial installations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆vt ∆vt ∆vt ∆vt ∆vt
∆FˆPVCapac.,t−1 -0.168∗
(-2.24)
∆FˆPVCapac.≤30 kWp,t−1 0.151
∗
(2.29)
∆FˆPVCapac.≤100 kWp,t−1 0.167
∗∗
(2.78)
∆FˆPVCapac.>100 kWp,t−1 -13.63
∗
(-2.45)
∆FˆPVCapac.>1 MWp,t−1 -11.15
(-1.05)
ln(GDPcap,t) 0.00615 -0.000401 -0.00144 0.00811 -0.00437
(0.67) (-0.04) (-0.16) (0.88) (-0.29)
share si-do houst -0.000383 -0.000113
(-0.37) (-0.11)
R2 0.560 0.641 0.643 0.516 0.466
Adj. R2 0.337 0.457 0.461 0.270 0.193
F 237.4 268.5 262.2 216.1 105.3
N 1160 1157 1131 1160 747
t statistics in parentheses, built with Newey-West SE
NUTS-3 and time fixed effects included
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The diffusion of eolic systems
A similar investigation can be conducted with eolic installations which, because
of the large investments they require, are all industrial. Table 7.22 column (1)
and (2) report the OLS estimates of the relationship between eolic adoption rates and
increase in green share of votes.72 In particular, column (1) focuses on the number
of new eolic installations over the electoral period normalized by the forestal and
agricultural land area in the region. Note that this normalization reflects the fact
72See Table F.10 in Appendix F.2 for the descriptive statistics.
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that, unlike most PV systems, eolic plants are not installed on buildings. Column (2)
uses a capacity-weighted measure of adoption given by this formula
4FEolicCapac.,nt = 4 Total eolic capacity installednt
Agricultural & forestal arean * Avg. capacity
(7.12)
where “Avg. capacity” is the average capacity of all eolic installations across all
regions in all periods.
Table 7.22.: Estimation of increase in eolic diffusion on increase in share of green
votes.
OLS Third stage estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆vt ∆vt ∆vt ∆vt
∆FEolic,t−1 -0.0367∗
(-2.21)
∆FEolicCapac.,t−1 -0.0128
(-1.38)
∆FˆEolic,t−1 -0.335∗∗
(-2.70)
∆FˆEolicCapac.,t−1 -2.616
(-0.38)
ln(GDPcap,t) -0.00114 -0.00193 0.0123 0.176
(-0.13) (-0.22) (0.87) (0.31)
R2 0.632 0.631 0.496 -27.14
Adj. R2 0.445 0.443 0.240 -41.44
F 275.0 274.9 205.4 5.179
N 1161 1161 1161 1161
t statistics in parentheses, built with Newey-West SE
NUTS-3 and time fixed effects included
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
For both measures of adoption, the OLS estimates are not significantly positive.
Table F.11 and F.12 in Appendix F.2 and Table 7.22 column (3) and (4) present
the estimates in the first, second and third stage. After instrumenting adoption
rates for eolic systems, we still find no positive effect on the increase in the share of
Green Party votes. This result confirms our hypothesis that observing the diffusion
of green technologies is not sufficient for voters to vote for the Green Party. Our
findings suggest that voters need to actually adopt/use green technologies to become
more prone to vote for the Green Party.
7.4.6. Evidence on the individual level
So far, we have studied the effect of the diffusion of PV systems on the fraction
of votes obtained by Germany’s Green Party on the NUTS-3 level. Certainly, an
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analysis on the aggregate level does not reveal whether PV adopters are indeed
more likely to vote for the Green Party. We use German survey data from 2013’s
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to put our findings to the test at the individual level.
We employ the SOEP’s cross-sections from 2007 through 2012 since these include
information on PV adoption.
See Table F.13 in Appendix F.2.6 for the descriptive statistics. We define ∆Greenit
to be one if individual i states a change in support from another party to green or
if i states a change from a weaker to a stronger level of Green Party support between
consecutive years, zero otherwise. We set PVit−1 to one if individual i states that
her dwelling has a PV system in t− 1.
Table 7.23 reports the odds ratios obtained through logit estimation. Column (1)
shows that the odds that a person who has installed a PV system becomes greener
is 1.4 times higher than for a person without PV. The estimate is significant at the
1% level.73 Note that we control for the natural logarithm of real household income,
year times NUTS-1 fixed effects (i.e., a NUTS-1 fixed effect interacted with every
year of study) and a set of individual characteristics by including fixed effects for
the level of education and the labor force status. See Appendix F.2.6 for details
regarding the controls.
Table 7.23.: Odds ratio of PV level on change in green attitude.
All Home owners Non-home owners
(1) (2) (3)
∆Greent ∆Greent ∆Greent
PVt−1 1.438∗∗ 1.728∗∗∗ 0.521
(2.76) (3.84) (-1.38)
ln RHHINCt 1.093 1.167 1.169
(1.31) (1.51) (1.56)
Time∗NUTS-1 dummies Yes Yes Yes
College and vocational degree dummyt Yes Yes Yes
Labor status dummyt Yes Yes Yes
Observations 45455 25062 19268
DFM 67 64 61
Final log-likelihood L -5144.0 -2853.3 -2240.9
Exponentiated coefficients; Robust t statistics in parentheses clustered on households
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
In contrast to the effect from the adoption of household PV systems, we find no effect
from the adoption of industrial PV systems and eolic systems on voting patterns
at the NUTS-3 level. We conclude that voters have to be involved in the adoption
73We only contemplate at respondents who do not claim to have removed their PV system.
There is strong evidence that this group best illustrates the effect under study. Comparing the
SOEP data set with reported data from the German transmission system operators, shows that
disproportionately many PV systems were removed according to the SOEP data, see Figure F.1
in Appendix F.2.6.
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and operation of the technology to affect their voting patterns. Only the owner of a
house will actually use a PV system. The owner is usually the one who decides if a
PV system is adopted. We should therefore only contemplate people living in their
own house or flat. Column (2) of Table 7.23 shows that the odss that a home owner
who has installed a PV system becomes greener is 1.7 times higher than for a home
owner who has not installed PV. This estimated coefficient is significant at the 0.1%
level and confirms that direct involvement in the technology may increase the odss
to affect voting patterns. Note that we do not find a positive association between
PV adoption and becoming greener for non-home owners (see column (3)).
So far, we cannot confirm a causal effect for our analysis of the SOEP data. To deal
with causality, we could only include newly installed PV systems on the right hand-
side, i.e., ∆PVt−1. However, we do not know when an increase in green attitude
occurs due to PV adoption. For this reason, we introduce ∆PVt−1,t−2,t−3, which
captures a newly installed PV system in t causing an increase in green attitude not
only in t+ 1, but also in t+ 2, and t+ 3.
Table 7.24 column (1) shows that new PV adopters are more, but not significantly
more, likely to become greener. However, as discussed earlier, we should focus on
home owners. Column (2) reveals that under home owners, the odds of becoming
greener is 1.4 times higher for new PV adopters. The respective coefficient is signif-
icant at the 10% level. Note that we control for changes in the natural logarithm
of real household income and – as before – year times NUTS-1 fixed effects and
individual characteristics. Appendix F.2.6 contains further robustness checks.
Table 7.24.: Odds ratio of PV change on change in green attitude.
All Home owners Non-home owners
(1) (2) (3)
∆Greent ∆Greent ∆Greent
∆PVt−1,t−2,t−3 1.270 1.441+ 0.432
(1.15) (1.72) (-1.18)
∆ ln RHHINCt 0.971 0.751+ 1.281
(-0.23) (-1.76) (1.60)
Time∗NUTS-1 dummies Yes Yes Yes
College and vocational degree dummyt Yes Yes Yes
Labor status dummyt Yes Yes Yes
Observations 45044 24831 19100
DFM 67 64 61
Final log-likelihood L -5281.5 -2925.7 -2317.2
Exponentiated coefficients; Robust t statistics in parentheses clustered on households
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
To deal even more confidently with causality, we can instrument the lagged level
of PV adoption (PVit−1) by using natural instruments: the adoption of other (not
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related) technologies. We define Internetit−1 to one if individual i has an Internet
connection in her household t − 1, zero otherwise. The same applies to PCit−1
regarding a personal computer (PC) in the household. Simply speaking, there are
neither theories nor empirical studies claiming that computer or Internet usage are
endogenous to becoming greener. Therefore, we consider our instruments to be valid
ex-ante. Table 7.25 reports the probit and bi-probit results for home owners. Note
that we again control for the natural logarithm of real household income, year times
NUTS-1 fixed effects and a set of individual characteristics. The probit and bi-
probit estimates confirm the logit estimates presented earlier. We cannot interpret
the former as odds ratios (we show the coefficients) and – for reasons of clarity – only
use them to confirm the effect found before. Column (2) illustrates that Internet
usage and PC usage are strong predictors for PV adoption. A χ2 test confirms that
the instruments are not irrelevant to any level of significance. ρ is the correlation
between the error terms of the first and the second stage regression and does not
significantly differ from zero. This indicates ex-post that our instruments are indeed
not endogenous to changes in green voting (for details see Wooldridge (2002, p.
477)). A Wald test on ρ = 0 points in the same direction as the p-value is greater
0.05. In Table F.17 of Appendix F.2.6 we report that a two-stage least squares
estimation further supports the previous results. As we include two instruments, we
can make use of an overidentification restriction test which also confirms the validity
of our instruments.74
A critical reader may still question if our analysis on the individual level allows us
to speak about a causal effect of PV adoption on becoming greener. Could it also
be the other way around? In order to check, we set Green2it to one if respondent i
claims to support the Green Party at t. Table 7.26 and 7.27 report odds ratios. In
Table 7.26 we see that Green Party supporters are not more likely to adopt PV than
those who do not support the Green Party. This finding holds true no matter if we
include all individuals or only home owners into the analysis. Table 7.27 illustrates
74In Appendix F.2.6, we show that – when analyzing all individuals in comparison to only
including home-owners – the effect is significant for the two-stage least squares estimation (Ta-
ble F.18) but not for bi-probit (Table F.19). Further, there is no effect for non-home owners
(see Appendix F.2.6, Table F.20 for the bi-probit estimation and Table F.21 for the two-stage least
squares estimation). Appendix F.2.6 contains further robustness checks.
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Table 7.25.: Estimation of PV level on change in green attitude (for home owners).
Probit Bi-Probit
(1) (2)
∆Greent ∆Greent
PVt−1 0.241∗∗∗ 0.652∗
(3.71) (2.10)
ln RHHINCt 0.0808+ 0.0630
(1.86) (1.41)
First stage
Internett−1 0.124∗
(2.54)
PCt−1 0.236∗∗∗
(3.74)
ln RHHINCt 0.226∗∗∗
(4.35)
Time∗NUTS-1 dummies Yes Yes
College and vocational degree dummyt Yes Yes
Labor status dummyt Yes Yes
ρ -0.214
χ2ρ=0 (p-value) 1.855 (0.173)
χ2Instruments=0 (p-value) 25.87 (0.00000241)
Observations 25062 25706
DFM 64 133
Final log-likelihood L -2851.0 -11009.2
Robust t statistics in parentheses clustered on households
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
that individuals who became greener are also not more likely to adopt PV than
those who did not become greener in a previous period.75
Table 7.26.: Odds ratio of green attitude level on PV change.
All Home owners Non-home owners
(1) (2) (3)
∆PVt−1 ∆PVt−1 ∆PVt−1
Green2t−1 0.778 0.692 0.977
(-1.08) (-1.21) (-0.06)
ln RHHINCt 1.768∗∗∗ 1.554∗∗ 1.641∗
(4.83) (2.80) (2.54)
Time∗NUTS-1 dummies Yes Yes Yes
College and vocational degree dummyt Yes Yes Yes
Labor status dummyt Yes Yes Yes
Observations 42755 23045 15121
DFM 54 47 44
Final log-likelihood L -2566.7 -1781.5 -718.3
Exponentiated coefficients; Robust t statistics in parentheses clustered on households
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
To sum up, the SOEP analysis confirms our hypothesis, i.e., PV adopters are more
likely to become greener than non-adopters. Further, there is evidence for a causal
effect of PV adoption on becoming greener. We also rule out reverse causality.
75We define becoming greener as switching from supporting another (or no) party to supporting
the Green Party or as increasing the intensity of Green Party support. Appendix F.2.6 contains
further robustness checks.
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Table 7.27.: Odds ratio of change in green attitude on PV change.
All Home owners Non-home owners
(1) (2) (3)
∆PVt−1 ∆PVt−1 ∆PVt−1
∆Greent−1,t−2,t−3 0.677 0.461∗ 1.140
(-1.60) (-2.08) (0.39)
∆ ln RHHINCt 0.836 0.885 0.799
(-0.82) (-0.43) (-0.64)
Time∗NUTS-1 dummies Yes Yes Yes
College and vocational degree dummyt Yes Yes Yes
Labor status dummyt Yes Yes Yes
Observations 42534 22917 15052
DFM 54 47 44
Final log-likelihood L -2569.5 -1772.4 -721.1
Exponentiated coefficients; Robust t statistics in parentheses clustered on households
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
7.4.7. Discussion
So far, we have uncovered the impact that the diffusion of PV systems has on the
votes obtained by the Green Party. However, we have not explored the mechanisms
that may lead PV adopters to vote green. Answering this question is beyond the
scope of this study. However, we would like to point to some mechanisms that
may cause this effect. Broadly speaking, we can think of two mechanisms. One is
Bayesian learning about the Green Party. As potential voters adopt PV systems they
learn about values and technologies supported by the Green Party. They update
upwards their prior on the political value of the Green Party raising the odss of
voting green. An alternative channel by which green adoption may affect voting
behavior is based on the notion that voters suffer from cognitive dissonance (e.g.,
Akerlof and Dickens (1982)). That is, the choice to adopt green technologies may
trigger a change in voters preferences towards green values which may ultimately
induce them to vote for the Green Party.
Both of these hypotheses are consistent with the new findings uncovered in this
study. To fully discern between the two hypothesis would require the use of adequate
survey data. However, we may learn about their plausibility by studying how the
effect of PV adoption on green votes varies between federal states (‘La¨nder’) where
the Green Party was in power and those where it was not. One feature of Bayesian
learning is that the marginal effect on the posterior of a given signal diminishes with
the information the agent has (i.e., with the precision of the prior). We consider it
safe to assume that voters in NUTS-1 regions ruled by the Green Party have more
precise priors about the Green Party and green values than those in NUTS-1 regions
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where the Green Party had not ruled before 1998 (i.e., our first data point in our
main analysis). Therefore, if our findings are the result of Bayesian learning, we
should expect a smaller effect of PV system adoption on green voting in NUTS-1
regions where the Green Party had ruled.
Table 7.28 evaluates this prediction by introducing an additional regressor in our
baseline specification which is an interaction between the adoption rate of PV sys-
tems and a dummy that equals one if the Green Party was in a governing coalition
in the NUTS-1 regions before 1998. The first column reports the OLS estimates
and the second the three-stage estimates. In both cases, the differential effect of
adoption on green voting is, if anything, positive in regions where the Green Party
was in power through 1998. This is precisely the opposite of what we would expect
from a Bayesian learner. Therefore, we interpret this result as suggestive that voters’
cognitive dissonance is likely to be the mechanism driving our findings. However,
as emphasized above, much more work needs to be undertaken to establish that.
Table 7.28.: Estimation of increase in PV diffusion on increase in share of green
votes (Bayesian learning).
OLS Third stage estimation
(1) (2)
∆vt ∆vt
∆FPV,t−1 0.242***
(5.86)
∆FPV,t−1 ∗GreenLand 0.162+
(1.75)
∆FˆPV,t−1 0.193+
(1.80)
∆ ˆFPV,t−1 ∗GreenLand 0.0663
(0.39)
ln(GDPcap,t) -0.000396 -0.000322
(-0.04) (-0.04)
share si-do houst -0.000236
(-0.20)
R2 0.643 0.641
Adj. R2 0.461 0.458
F 257.4 214.2
N 1160 1157
t statistics in parentheses, built with Newey-West SE
NUTS-3 and time fixed effects included
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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7.5. Summary
In this chapter we have posed a new research question: Does the diffusion of tech-
nology affect voting patterns? To start understanding the political consequences
of technology diffusion, we have explored two specific technologies (PV and eolic
systems) in one country (Germany). Our identification strategy has exploited the
(widely documented) non-linearities in the diffusion of new technologies to obtain
exogenous variation in adoption rates. Our analysis implies that approximately a
quarter of the increase in the share of votes experienced by the Green Party between
1998 and 2009 is driven by the diffusion of PV systems. These estimates are robust
to controlling for measures of profitability of solar energy, income and a set of re-
gional and time fixed effects. In contrast, we find no such effects from the diffusion of
industrial PV systems and eolic systems. This contrast confirms the importance of
voters’ direct involvement with the adoption and/or operation of the technology for
this to affect their voting patterns. Survey data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel confirms our results. The survey analysis even allows us to disprove reverse
causality.
Our findings raise many new questions. First, more work is needed to uncover the
mechanism by which adoption of PV systems leads to vote for the Green Party. Sec-
ond, do we see similar effects of the diffusion of PV systems in other countries? In
Spain, for example, green parties continued to be irrelevant despite the large diffu-
sion of PV systems. However, unlike Germany, in Spain most of the systems installed
were industrial and households have not yet adopted them in any significant way.
Third, are there political consequences of the diffusion of other technologies? Do
they also affect voting patterns?76 Fourth, in addition to voting patterns, does the
diffusion of technology affect other political phenomena such as campaign contribu-
tions, party affiliation, voter turnout, civic involvement in politics, etc. Finally, for
which technologies do we observe these effects and what do they have in common?
76E.g., without the diffusion of Internet technology the Pirate Party may not have been founded
in Sweden in 2006 (and in many other countries at a later stage).
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We set out to study drivers, barriers and implications of renewable energy adoption
in Germany. In order to do so, we exploit a new unique dataset which includes
the location, date of installation and size of all PV systems, wind power plants
and biomass plants for generating electricity installed in Germany through 2011.
Importantly, a strong federal subsidy scheme has fostered the adoption of the three
technologies since 2000.
We start our analysis by delineating the topic. Then, we review models of technology
diffusion. Along with the theory, numerous studies confirm that technology diffusion
follows an S-shaped, logistic pattern. A description of the institutional context,
aggregate trends and regional differences in renewable energy adoption in Germany
follows.
In Chapter 4, we test whether peer effects drive PV adoption. We aggregate the
data to different levels and employ an epidemic diffusion model which includes a
spatial dimension. According to our results, peer effects are highly localized and
an important factor for the adoption of PV systems. Observing a PV system in
operation and talking about it with a person of trust may increase the likelihood
of installing PV. This finding is in line with Bollinger and Gillingham (2012) and
Mu¨ller and Rode (2013), who also study peer effects in PV adoption. Peer effects
imply that locally distributed eye- and attention-catching projects could be placed as
PV seeds in key regions. These simply signal that the technology or product works.
In the same line of reasoning, schemes on the local level that support spreading
of information, such as referral reward programs and impact campaigns, could be
promising. For instance, Mu¨ller and Rode (2013) refer to Cardwell (2012) who
shows that, in the U.S., enthusiastic PV users inform their neighbors about PV.
To conclude, if fostering technology diffusion is on the agenda, creating incentives
for enthusiastic technology users to share their experience with neighbors – i.e.,
facilitating the spread of information – may be rewarding.
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In the following Chapter 5, we change our focus to spatio-temporal variation of peer
effects in PV adoption. We add detailed locational data on potential adopters. This
data allows us to construct an individual measure of peer effects for each potential
adopter. Based on a discrete choice model and the more accurate data, we confirm
again that peer effects are mostly localized. They generally occur within a radius of
500 meters around a decision-maker’s residence. We also find that the peer effect’s
impact on the decision to adopt decreases over time. The policy implications of the
latter result are straightforward. It would be efficient to influence the adoption of
PV systems using seed installations or schemes supporting the spread of information
in the very early periods of diffusion.
In the first part of this thesis, we study PV adoption in Germany. Certainly, a
similar analysis in other countries with different residential structures or climate
zones would be of interest. Studying PV adoption at locations where subsidies
do not drive their diffusion and further disentangling of the peer effect may be
rewarding. For example, employing data on regional differences in Internet search
engine usage may help to find out if the identified effect is driven by communication
from face to face or, instead, seeing a PV system in operation is sufficient. Our
models could also be used to forecast PV adoption at the local level.
In Chapter 6 of this thesis, we turn to barriers to renewable energy adoption. We
make use of the well-studied logistic shape of technology diffusion. The common
diffusion path allows us to test whether the adoption rate of renewable energy plants
differs between German NUTS-3 regions in which a successful referendum against
a single plant was organized and the remaining regions. We exploit the fact that
referenda are mainly organized on the municipal district level against a single plant
or building area. Our analysis reveals that the adoption rate (i.e., the first difference
in the diffusion level) is indeed lower in NUTS-3 regions where a referendum took
place. This finding holds true for wind power and large biomass plants, which are
both industrial. In contrast, we do not find the same for PV installations which are
mainly private, household installations. We interpret this as evidence that potential
investors in wind power and large biomass plants not only avoid the municipal
district where a referendum against the specific technology was organized but stay
away from the municipal district’s NUTS-3 region.
Our results are good news to those who protest against renewable energy plants.
Referenda have their intended effect on renewable energy adoption in Germany.
This finding is relevant to the discussion on the effect of democratic political in-
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stitutions on technology diffusion. According to the literature there is a positive
link (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Comin and Hobijn, 2004). If, however, the local public
participates in the decision whether, e.g., a wind park, or more general infrastruc-
ture projects should be built, their adoption may be slowed down. Still, potential
investors in wind power or large biomass plants may be able to convince the local
public of the benefits of their plans, which may prohibit resistance. For instance, in
the municipal district Sauerlach (NUTS-3 region Landkreis Mu¨nchen, Bavaria), the
local public was involved early on when a biomass plant was built. In Sauerlach no
organized resistance occurred (Bernstein and Knoll, 2011).
In recent years we have observed more and more referenda against renewable energy
plants (see Datenbank Bu¨rgerbegehren (2014)). It would be interesting to study
whether our findings hold true when we can employ updated data sets on renewable
energy adoption in Germany and in other countries. To investigate why local resis-
tance did not occur in the cases in which wind parks and large biomass plants were
actually built is also promising. Another topic for future research is the persistence
of the adoption barrier from a referendum.
In Chapter 7, we turn to implications from renewable energy adoption. We esti-
mate the effect of the diffusion of PV systems on the fraction of votes obtained by
Germany’s Green Party in federal elections. We take first differences and instru-
ment adoption rates by lagged diffusion levels. We predict the diffusion levels with
a logistic diffusion curve. The existing rationales for non-linearities in diffusion,
and ubiquity of logistic curves ensure that our predicted instrument is orthogonal
to variables that directly affect voting patterns. We find that the diffusion of do-
mestic PV systems caused a quarter of the increment in green votes between 1998
and 2009. In contrast, we find no such effects from the diffusion of industrial PV
systems and eolic systems. This contrast confirms the importance of voters’ direct
involvement with the adoption and/or operation of the technology for this to affect
their voting patterns. We confirm our findings with survey data from the German
Socio-Economic Panel.
Certainly, the mechanism by which adoption of PV systems leads to vote for the
Green Party needs more scrutiny. Whether we see similar effects from the diffusion
of PV systems in other countries and investigating political consequences of the
diffusion from other technologies would be of interest.
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A. Appendix to Chapter 2 – Models
of Technology Diffusion
In the following, we derive the mixed information source epidemic model. The mixed
information source model can be written as
∆y(t) = [α + βy(t)]× [N − y(t)]. (A.1)
Letting t→ 0, the differential equation is
y′ = [α + βy]× [N − y],
which is a Riccati differential equation (Merziger et al., 2001, p. 157):
y′ + (α− βN)y = (αN) + (−β) y2. (A.2)
To solve the differential given above, one needs a particular solution v. One can see
that v = N is a particular solution of (A.2). By applying the substitution
y = v +
1
u
(A.3)
we obtain the first order linear differential equation
u′ + (−2Nβ − α + βN)u = βN. (A.4)
We may then solve (A.4) by finding a solution of the homogeneous and inhomoge-
neous differential equation separately. The solution of the homogeneous differential
equation is a general solution uH , whereas the solution of the inhomogeneous differ-
ential equation is a particular solution uP . The general solution of the homogeneous
differential equation is then
u = uH + uP .
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Homogeneous Solution. We find a solution to be
uH = C × exp [(α + βN)t], C ∈ R. (A.5)
We solve for the constant C later in order to have y(0) = y0.
Inhomogeneous Solution. It is easily seen, that
uP =
−β
α + βN
(A.6)
is a particular solution to the inhomogeneous equation. We therefore obtain:
y = N +
1
uH + uP
= N +
1
C × exp [(α + βN)t] + −β
α+βN
. (A.7)
To solve for C, we set y(0) = y0. This yields:
C =
1
y0 −N +
β
α + βN
. (A.8)
Replacing (A.8) into (A.7) results in:
y(t) = N +
[(
1
y0 −N +
β
α + βN
)
× exp[(α + βN)t]− β
α + βN
]−1
,
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which is equivalent to
y(t) = N +
1(
α+βN+βy0−βN
(y0−N)×(α+βN)
)
× exp[(α + βN)t]− β
α+βN
= N +
1
(α+βy0) exp[(α+β)t]−βy0+βN
(y0−N)(α+βN)
= N +
(y0 −N)(α + βN)
(α + βy0) exp[(α + βN)t]− βy0 + βN
=
N [(α + βy0) exp[(α + βN)t]− βy0 + βN ] + (y0 −N)(α + βN)
(α + βy0) exp[(α + βN)t]− βy0 + βN
=
N + N(βN−βy0)+(y0−N)(α+βN)
αN+βy0
exp[−(α + βN)t]
1− β(y0−N)
α+βy0
exp[−(α + βN)t]
=
N − α(N−y0)
α+βy0
exp[−(α + βN)t]
1 + β(N−y0)
α+βy0
exp[−(α + βN)t] . (A.9)
This is equivalent to the solution given by Mahajan and Peterson (1985):
y(t) =
N − α(N−y0)
α+βy0
exp[−(α + βN)t]
1 + β(N−y0)
α+βy0
exp[−(α + βN)t] .
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Institutional Context, Aggregate
Trends and Regional Differences
B.1. Capacity-adjusted measures
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Figure B.1.: Adoption of PV systems in Germany per year (capacity-adjusted mea-
sures).
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Figure B.2.: Adoption of wind power plants in Germany per year (capacity-adjusted
measures).
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Figure B.3.: Adoption of biomass plants in Germany per year (capacity-adjusted
measures).
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B.2. Maps with counts
Cumulative fraction of buildings with PV in 2011
<0.03 0.03-0.06 0.06-0.09 0.09-0.12 >0.12 No data
0 200 km
Figure B.4.: Fraction of buildings with PV system at NUTS-3 level in 2011.
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Cumulative wind power plants in 2011
0 1-10 11-40 41-70 71-150 >150
0 200 km
Figure B.5.: Counts of wind power plants at NUTS-3 level in 2011.
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C.1. The profitability of PV in Germany since 2000
In order to find out whether PV systems have been an interesting investment in
Germany since the year 2000, we conduct calculations on their net present value
(NPV). In a rather conservative scenario, we assume a weighted average cost of
capital w of 5.0%, yearly operating costs b of 1%, an operating time of T + 1 = 20
years and a yearly decrease in revenue v of 0.5%. Furthermore, fyear specifies the
rate of the feed-in tariff with respect to the installation year, cap the assumed system
capacity of 4, 000Wp and full the full load hours. In addition, Iyear denotes the year
specific investment costs, including value added tax (VAT). Finally, we calculate the
net present value as
NPVyear,cap =
T=19∑
t=0
(
fyear × cap× full × (1− v)t
(1 + w)t
)
(C.1)
−
(
Iyear × cap+
T=19∑
t=0
(
Iyear × cap× b
(1 + w)t
))
.
Iyear was available for the years 2006 through 2009 from BSW-Solar (2012). For this
period, the reliability of Iyear was confirmed by data from pvX (2012). Data on Iyear
from 2000 through 2005 comes from Janzing (2010). When assuming full = 900h/a,
which is commonly seen as the average for Germany (Klaus et al., 2010), we can
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only find a positive net present value for the fourth quarter in 2009 (see Table C.1).
However, in the southern part of Germany, full = 1000h/a is realistic. There, we
find a slightly positive NPV for quarter 4 in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009. Further, if
a reduced weighted average cost of capital is assumed (e.g., 3%), which makes sense
from 2000 through 2003 when the 100,000 roofs program offered subsidized interest
rates, we find a slightly positive NPV for full = 1000h/a in the year 2002.
Table C.1.: NPV according to full load hours.
NPV according to average full load hours
t Iyear Iyear without VAT 850 h/a 900 h/a 1000 h/a 1100 h/a
2000 8.00 EUR/Wp 6.90 EUR/Wp -14,551 EUR -13,277 EUR -10,729 EUR -8,182 EUR
2001 6.96 EUR/Wp 6.00 EUR/Wp -9,828 EUR -8,554 EUR -6,007 EUR -3,459 EUR
2002 6.03 EUR/Wp 5.20 EUR/Wp -6,708 EUR -5,498 EUR -3,077 EUR -656 EUR
2003 6.44 EUR/Wp 5.55 EUR/Wp -9,572 EUR -8,422 EUR -6,122 EUR -3,822 EUR
2004 6.73 EUR/Wp 5.80 EUR/Wp -5,878 EUR -4,434 EUR -1,545 EUR 1,344 EUR
2005 6.21 EUR/Wp 5.35 EUR/Wp -4,788 EUR -3,418 EUR -679 EUR 2,061 EUR
Q4 2006 5.69 EUR/Wp 4.91 EUR/Wp -3,583 EUR -2,279 EUR 328 EUR 2,935 EUR
Q4 2007 5.31 EUR/Wp 4.46 EUR/Wp -2,945 EUR -1,707 EUR 70 EUR 3,246 EUR
Q4 2008 5.19 EUR/Wp 4.36 EUR/Wp -3,465 EUR -2,288 EUR 65 EUR 2,417 EUR
Q4 2009 3.87 EUR/Wp 3.26 EUR/Wp 878 EUR 1,960 EUR 4,125 EUR 6,290 EUR
As most PV systems were installed at the end of a year, we only show the last quarter if quarterly data is available.
VAT changed from 16% to 19% on 1.1.2007.
C.2. Geocoding
The data on PV installations used in Chapter 4 was downloaded in September 2010
which ensures that most installations having received their remuneration for 2009 are
included as the annual statement of feed-in subsidies is completed by July/August.
The files include a total of 572, 379 PV installations until the end of the year 2009.
According to our data less than 0.5% of the PV systems are decomissioned during
our period of analysis.77 We therefore neglect this very small share. In order to
perform our analysis, we have to geocode the data. The accuracy of the geocoding
is shown in Table C.2. For nearly 88% of the PV systems we reach an address or
street level accuracy.
Table C.2.: Geocoding accuracy of PV data.
Accuracy Amount Fraction
Address level 262,090 45.79%
Street level 239,845 41.90%
Town (city, village) level 40,048 7.00%
Ambiguous 13,365 2.33%
Post code level 10827 1.89%
No result / ambiguous 4,656 0.81%
No result 1,157 0.20%
Premise (building name, property name, shopping center, etc.) level 356 0.06%
Unknown location 31 0.01%
Region (state, province, prefecture, etc.) level accuracy 3 0.00%
Country level accuracy 1 0.00%
Sum 572,379 100 %
77As PV systems are designed for a life span of more than 20 years such a small fraction makes
sense.
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When we test if the geocoded data results in positions within Germany, we have to
drop some of the observations and finally end up with 552, 259 PV systems for our
analysis. The location test is performed with a SHP-file containing information on
2006’s NUTS-3 level on a map scale of 1:3 million obtained from Eurostat (2010).
C.3. Spatial aggregation
In the following, we outline how we handle the NUTS-3 data, the CLC data and
the 1-km raster data with inner circles. For the case of NUTS-3 and CLC data, our
approach is illustrated in Figure C.1: the intersection area between the circle of the
spatial aggregation function and the spatial shapes A, B and C – e.g., representing
three administrative regions – is taken to weight the values.
A A A A A
A A
A A A A A
A A A A
A A A A A
A
B
B
B B
B B B
B B B
B B B B
B B B B B
B
B B B B B
B B B B B
B
C C C C C
C C C C C
C C C C C
C C C C C
C
C C C C C
C C C C C
C
C C C C C
C C C C
C C C C C
C C C
C C C C C
C C C
C C C C C
C C
C C C C C
C C C C C
C
C C C C C
C C C C
C C C
A
B
CPoint in A
Point in B
Point in C
Scanning point
N
r0 = 707.1m
Figure C.1.: Spatial aggregation of point data defined for arbitrary areas.
To optimize the time needed for computation, we do not use the spatial shapes
directly to calculate the weights. Instead, we create a 200 m scanning raster all over
Germany. Then, we match the values of the control variables to each point of the
scanning raster according to their location related to the spatial shapes. Finally, we
use the intersection area between the inner circle and the relevant points of the 200 m
scanning raster to calculate the weighted averages. In Figure C.1 these intersecting
points are black whereas the others are gray.
The 1-km raster data is converted to the center points of the polygons. Then, the
mean of the values associated with all points being covered by a certain inner circle
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is calculated. In general, applying our modeling approach enables us to reach more
detailed results in comparison to ordinary spatial models with a weights matrix
since disaggregated point data can be analyzed on an arbitrary level of geographical
aggregation and the usual boundary problems are avoided.
C.4. Correcting Ni,t for resampling
yt is the amount of PV installations within Germany in year t and St is the cor-
recting factor denoting the year specific sum over the number of PV systems of
the scanning points divided by the actual amount of installations in year t: thus
St =
∑
∀i (yi,t/yt). We denote the number of points i within region k with POINTSk
and the number of points within k which have a yi,2009 of 0 with NOPVk. Further-
more, we multiply (BUILDki,t −NOPVki) / (POINTSki −NOPVki) by St if our
yi,t < (BUILDki,t −NOPVki)×St/ (POINTSki −NOPVki). Finally, we determine
the population by:
Ni,t =

1 if yi,2009 = 0,
(BUILDki,t−NOPVki)×St
POINTSki−NOPVki
if yi,t <
(BUILDki,t−NOPVki)×St
POINTSki−NOPVki
,
yi,t + 1 else.
(C.2)
C.5. Estimation procedure
The estimation is parameterized as NB-2 since this suites the data best. NB-2 means
that the model has a variance V = µ + θ−1µ2, where µ is the mean and θ−1 ∈ R+
is the NB-2 dispersion parameter, also known as alpha. We use the former nota-
tion to avoid confusion with the coefficient of internal influence. However, as an
identity link does not inherently exclude negative predictions (which are undefined
for the negative binomial distribution), we have to constrain the estimation proce-
dure to non-negative coefficients. Therefore, we allow the iteratively re-weighted
least-squares algorithm of the GLM procedure to update only one coefficient es-
timate at a time. The estimation algorithm consists of an iteratively re-weighted
least squares (IRLS) loop, which ends when the model deviance improvement is less
than 1E-6, and a surrounding Nelder-Mead Simplex Algorithm (Nelder and Mead,
1965) for the estimation of θ−1, which stops when the absolute difference between
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the worst and the best values of the current simplex (measured in log-likelihood) is
below 1E-4. When estimating the epidemic diffusion model with NUTS-3 controls
for Bavaria, Saarland and Sachsen, we had to end the IRLS algorithm after 200
iterations, because it did not converge within reasonable time. For performance rea-
sons, we implemented the modified negative binomial estimation program in C++
with openMP multi-processor support.
Although the left-hand side of our observations is often zero, using a zero-inflated
negative binomial model is not necessary. We can explain the vast part of zero
appendices with the fact that none of the distance bands shows any installations
(92.9%).
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C.6. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
Table C.3.: Descriptive statistics (step: 1 km, r0: 0.7 km).
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. Missing Values
∆yi,t 0 0 0 0.1437 0 680 0
yi,t 0 0 0 0.3981 0 789 0
yi,1,t 0 0 0 0.3973 0 789 0
yi,2,t 0 0 0 0.3994 0 789 0
yi,3,t 0 0 0 0.3977 0 792 0
yi,4,t 0 0 0 0.3978 0 209 0
yi,5,t 0 0 0 0.3983 0 790 0
yi,6,t 0 0 0 0.3989 0 789 0
yi,7,t 0 0 0 0.397 0 794 0
yi,8,t 0 0 0 0.3999 0 794 0
yi,9,t 0 0 0 0.3981 0 789 0
yi,10,t 0 0 0 0.3986 0 792 0
INCi,t 633.4 1135 1252 1267 1409 2443 0
GRi 928 989 1016 1031 1067 1259 0
PDi,t 38.15 90.5 128 232.2 209.7 4275 0
HOUSi,t 33.9 84.4 88.7 87.09 92.1 97.5 0
URBANi 0 0 0 0.07757 0.05405 1 0
FIELDi 0 0.3243 0.6829 0.6087 0.9268 1 0
Ni,t 1 1 1 73.41 118.9 909.9 0
yi,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 0 76.75 0 73660 0
yi,1,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 0 64.65 0 54950 0
yi,2,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 0 58.98 0 39860 0
yi,3,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 0 55.28 0 36060 0
yi,4,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 0 53.29 0 44160 0
yi,5,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 0 52.13 0 47630 0
yi,6,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 0 51.73 0 114800 0
yi,7,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 0 50.55 0 38670 0
yi,8,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 0 50.75 0 116000 0
yi,9,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 0 49.89 0 32950 0
yi,10,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 0 49.75 0 115200 0
GRi(Ni,t − yi,t) 929 1009 1075 75060 122200 881600 0
PDi,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 38.15 105.6 224.5 45250 14740 3174000 0
INCi,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 633.4 1184 1440 98490 152800 1626000 0
HOUSi,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 33.9 86.9 92.7 6018 10650 76740 0
URBANi(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 0 18.12 0.1707 908.9 0
FIELDi(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0.4634 1 43.15 72.01 909.9 0
Table C.4.: Descriptive statistics (step: 4 km, r0: 2.8 km).
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. Missing Values
∆PVi,t 0 0 0 2.305 2 686 0
yi,t 0 0 0 6.384 4 808 0
yi,1,t 0 0 0 6.357 4 367 0
yi,2,t 0 0 0 6.402 4 813 0
yi,3,t 0 0 0 6.348 4 353 0
yi,4,t 0 0 0 6.366 5 832 0
yi,5,t 0 0 0 6.391 5 835 0
yi,6,t 0 0 0 6.419 5 817 0
yi,7,t 0 0 0 6.311 5 800 0
yi,8,t 0 0 0 6.397 5 836 0
yi,9,t 0 0 0 6.344 5 803 0
yi,10,t 0 0 0 6.372 5 333 0
Ni,t 1 590.5 809.4 1158 1224 17750 0
yi,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 0 11780 4149 1919000 0
yi,1,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 0 11610 4387 2041000 0
yi,2,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 0 11510 4531 2073000 0
yi,3,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 0 11310 4632 1669000 0
yi,4,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 0 11320 4766 2267000 0
yi,5,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 0 11200 4816 1571000 0
yi,6,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 0 11160 4928 2461000 0
yi,7,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 0 10940 4860 1864000 0
yi,8,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 0 11060 5002 2017000 0
yi,9,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 0 10860 5009 1258000 0
yi,10,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 0 10870 5120 1640000 0
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Table C.5.: Descriptive statistics (step: 10 km, r0: 7 km).
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. Missing Values
∆PVi,t 0 0 1 14.16 14 707 0
yi,t 0 0 3 39.22 30 1240 0
yi,1,t 0 0 3 39.08 32 1101 0
yi,2,t 0 0 3 39.15 32 1086 0
yi,3,t 0 0 3 39.43 33 1035 0
yi,4,t 0 0 3 39.72 34 1093 0
yi,5,t 0 0 3 39.34 34 1137 0
yi,6,t 0 0 3 39.98 35 1014 0
yi,7,t 0 0 3 39.32 34 996 0
yi,8,t 0 0 3 39.68 35 929 0
yi,9,t 0 0 3 39.64 35 994 0
yi,10,t 0 0 4 39.85 35 904 0
Ni,t 936 3355 4627 6802 7238 130100 0
yi,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 12490 401500 181400 81820000 0
yi,1,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 14300 388000 190700 71720000 0
yi,2,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 14470 373600 194100 61880000 0
yi,3,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 15550 372000 203000 53340000 0
yi,4,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 16340 375300 202200 48030000 0
yi,5,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 17000 369300 205100 48810000 0
yi,6,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 17460 366800 210300 40600000 0
yi,7,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 17430 361900 206100 52610000 0
yi,8,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 17640 359700 210800 37340000 0
yi,9,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 17980 360900 214000 46130000 0
yi,10,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 0 18580 359300 213200 45820000 0
Table C.6.: Descriptive statistics (step: 20 km, r0: 14 km).
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. Missing Values
∆PVi,t 0 0 7 56.11 60 1064 0
yi,t 0 1 12 156.2 127 3630 0
yi,1,t 0 2 13 156.6 136 2794 0
yi,2,t 0 2 14 154.9 137 3235 0
yi,3,t 0 2 15 155.6 138 3187 0
yi,4,t 0 2 14 154.1 138 3379 0
yi,5,t 0 2 15 153.9 141 2690 0
yi,6,t 0 2 16 155.7 143 2654 0
yi,7,t 0 2 16 154.7 141 2513 0
yi,8,t 0 2 16 155.1 142 2739 0
yi,9,t 0 2 16 154.9 143 2453 0
yi,10,t 0 3 16 155.4 144 2622 0
Ni,t 3289 10650 15460 22070 24290 202800 0
yi,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 16150 207100 4909000 2553000 457100000 0
yi,1,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 21840 225100 4707000 2665000 345000000 0
yi,2,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 27020 253000 4561000 2697000 406600000 0
yi,3,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 28490 255700 4448000 2757000 311200000 0
yi,4,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 26600 240700 4343000 2677000 351000000 0
yi,5,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 32030 253900 4275000 2715000 361100000 0
yi,6,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 32290 274100 4241000 2765000 344600000 0
yi,7,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 35910 264900 4209000 2725000 337400000 0
yi,8,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 36480 271200 4230000 2814000 363300000 0
yi,9,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 37700 276200 4156000 2821000 284600000 0
yi,10,t(Ni,t − yi,t) 0 37080 271600 4161000 2809000 319000000 0
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Table C.7.: Correlation (step: 1 km, r0: 0.7 km).
X yi,t yi,1,t yi,2,t yi,3,t yi,4,t yi,5,t yi,6,t yi,7,t yi,8,t yi,9,t yi,10,t GRi POPi,t INCi,t HOUSi,t URBANi FIELDi
X 1.00 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
yi,t 0.35 1.00 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
yi,1,t 0.35 0.62 1.00 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
yi,2,t 0.36 0.55 0.65 1.00 – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
yi,3,t 0.36 0.52 0.60 0.68 1.00 – – – – – – – – – – – – –
yi,4,t 0.35 0.49 0.55 0.61 0.67 1.00 – – – – – – – – – – – –
yi,5,t 0.35 0.47 0.52 0.58 0.61 0.65 1.00 – – – – – – – – – – –
yi,6,t 0.34 0.46 0.50 0.54 0.57 0.59 0.63 1.00 – – – – – – – – – –
yi,7,t 0.36 0.48 0.51 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.61 0.62 1.00 – – – – – – – – –
yi,8,t 0.35 0.46 0.50 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.65 1.00 – – – – – – – –
yi,9,t 0.36 0.48 0.52 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.57 0.57 0.62 0.63 1.00 – – – – – – –
yi,10,t 0.33 0.44 0.47 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.56 0.56 0.61 1.00 – – – – – –
GRi 1.00 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.34 1.00 – – – – –
POPi,t 0.73 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.33 0.72 1.00 – – – –
INCi,t 0.98 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.38 0.98 0.73 1.00 – – –
HOUSi,t 0.98 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.98 0.59 0.96 1.00 – –
URBANi 0.73 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.72 0.80 0.72 0.64 1.00 –
FIELDi 0.76 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.76 0.33 0.74 0.80 0.20 1.00
All variables are multiplied by X =
(
Ni,t − yi,t
)
, except X in the second row, respectively second column
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C.7. Results on NUTS-1 level
In order to check the robustness of our results, we also estimate the epidemic diffusion
model including αNUTS-3 for the remaining NUTS-1 regions, see Table C.8. Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg and Nordrhein-Westphalia are missing since our estimation algorithm
does not converge for these within reasonable time.
The estimations shown in Table C.8 confirm that including αNUTS-3 only slightly
changes the results and nearly all estimations indicate that βq is decreasing (and
then roughly staying constant) with distance.78 The results without αNUTS-3 are not
shown to maintain clarity.
78Only in the case of Brandenburg β1 is estimated to be larger than β0. This result may be
caused by installations close to Brandenburg’s border but situated in another NUTS-1 region, e.g.,
Berlin. For the regressions on the NUTS-1 level, we include all scanning points located within the
NUTS-1 region of study no matter if their inner circle or distance bands cover areas outside of the
specific NUTS-1 region.
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Table C.8.: Estimations (step: 1 km, r0: 0.7 km) for the remaining NUTS-1 regions.
Berlin Branden-
burg
Bremen Hamburg Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern
Rhineland-
Palatinate
Saarland Sachsen Sachsen-
Anhalt
Lower
Saxony
Schleswig-
Holstein
Thu¨ringen
Specification Me Mf Mg Mh Mi Mj Mk Ml Mm Mn Mo Mp
Step width 1 km 1 km 1 km 1 km 1 km 1 km 1 km 1 km 1 km 1 km 1 km 1 km
α0 4.09E-05
∗∗∗ 1.43E-61 6.61E-11† 2.73E-05∗∗∗ 0 8.47E-07∗∗∗ 6.40E-13∗∗∗ 3.79E-06∗∗∗ 6.06E-07∗∗∗ 1.40E-06† 5.59E-06∗∗ 0
(1.23E-06) (3.15E-61) (4.16E-11) (6.37E-07) (2.88E-09) (7.72E-08) (1.22E-13) (6.63E-07) (3.99E-08) (9.81E-07) (2.10E-06) (6.10E-07)
β0 7.08E-05
∗∗∗ 7.87E-05∗∗∗ 3.40E-05∗∗∗ 2.97E-05∗∗∗ 3.27E-04∗∗∗ 8.09E-04∗∗ 4.71E-04∗ 1.74E-04∗∗∗ 1.63E-04∗∗∗ 6.09E-04∗∗∗ 5.49E-04∗∗∗ 3.00E-04∗∗
(1.03E-05) (1.48E-05) (4.48E-06) (2.22E-06) (6.65E-05) (3.13E-04) (2.03E-04) (3.10E-05) (4.24E-05) (8.16E-05) (1.46E-04) (1.15E-04)
β1 3.34E-05
∗∗∗ 1.08E-04∗∗∗ 2.12E-05∗∗∗ 1.77E-05∗∗∗ 2.71E-04∗∗∗ 8.62E-05∗ 6.98E-05† 8.22E-05∗∗∗ 1.23E-04∗∗∗ 2.00E-04∗∗∗ 1.99E-04∗∗ 1.30E-04∗∗∗
(7.09E-06) (2.02E-05) (4.79E-06) (2.05E-06) (5.02E-05) (5.03E-05) (4.69E-05) (1.93E-05) (2.03E-05) (4.88E-05) (7.16E-05) (3.17E-05)
β2 1.37E-05
∗∗ 5.52E-05∗∗∗ 5.55E-06† 5.99E-06∗∗ 1.48E-04∗∗∗ 0 2.58E-06 6.36E-05∗∗ 6.72E-05∗∗∗ 1.20E-04∗∗ 5.52E-05† 6.42E-05∗∗
(5.08E-06) (1.56E-05) (4.14E-06) (2.00E-06) (3.25E-05) (7.87E-06) (1.07E-05) (2.15E-05) (1.32E-05) (3.95E-05) (3.75E-05) (2.16E-05)
β3 1.08E-05
∗∗ 1.38E-05‡ 1.86E-05∗∗∗ 3.48E-06∗ 7.07E-05∗∗ 0 0 3.60E-05∗∗ 5.09E-05∗∗∗ 3.38E-05† 5.51E-05† 1.17E-05‡
(4.31E-06) (1.18E-05) (5.72E-06) (1.81E-06) (2.55E-05) (1.25E-05) (9.48E-12) (1.39E-05) (1.22E-05) (2.31E-05) (4.30E-05) (1.14E-05)
β4 8.90E-06
∗ 7.54E-07 2.02E-06 2.78E-06† 7.44E-05∗∗ 0 9.95E-06 1.82E-06 4.91E-05∗∗ 2.25E-05‡ 4.71E-05† 0
(4.15E-06) (3.31E-06) (3.35E-06) (1.98E-06) (2.70E-05) (8.72E-06) (1.84E-05) (5.93E-06) (1.83E-05) (2.50E-05) (3.02E-05) (1.10E-07)
β5 1.01E-06 3.21E-05
∗ 0 7.15E-06∗∗∗ 8.57E-05∗∗ 0 2.22E-11 4.21E-05∗∗ 2.06E-05∗ 3.04E-05‡ 1.66E-05 0
(4.56E-06) (1.57E-05) (3.02E-06) (1.99E-06) (3.33E-05) (8.34E-06) (1.65E-10) (1.77E-05) (1.10E-05) (2.54E-05) (2.72E-05) (3.76E-08)
β6 0 4.07E-05
∗ 0 4.99E-06∗∗ 6.01E-05∗∗ 0 0 6.44E-05∗∗ 2.90E-05∗∗ 2.86E-06 3.64E-05‡ 7.29E-06
(4.52E-06) (2.00E-05) (2.90E-06) (2.00E-06) (2.30E-05) (9.28E-06) (9.65E-12) (2.22E-05) (1.11E-05) (1.51E-05) (3.39E-05) (1.61E-05)
β7 9.44E-06
∗∗ 0 0 3.25E-06∗ 7.08E-05∗∗ 0 0 1.39E-05‡ 1.88E-05∗ 6.98E-06 3.25E-05‡ 2.68E-05†
(3.82E-06) (1.27E-05) (3.08E-06) (1.74E-06) (2.41E-05) (5.41E-06) (1.12E-11) (1.13E-05) (9.45E-06) (1.61E-05) (2.99E-05) (1.84E-05)
β8 0 5.79E-05
∗∗ 0 6.12E-06∗∗∗ 2.97E-05∗ 0 0 2.38E-05∗ 3.10E-05∗∗ 0 0 1.46E-05‡
(3.72E-06) (2.24E-05) (9.50E-10) (1.49E-06) (1.62E-05) (7.71E-06) (9.24E-12) (1.32E-05) (1.24E-05) (1.19E-05) (1.35E-05) (1.26E-05)
β9 7.46E-06
∗ 0 0 0 6.14E-06 0 1.99E-11 1.52E-05‡ 2.79E-05∗∗ 0 1.74E-05 4.61E-05
(3.59E-06) (9.78E-61) (3.91E-06) (1.47E-06) (1.20E-05) (8.69E-06) (2.98E-10) (1.45E-05) (1.10E-05) (1.19E-05) (2.39E-05) (8.00E-05)
β10 0 0 8.17E-07 3.36E-06
∗ 2.98E-05† 0 0 0 0 7.07E-06 2.60E-06 3.19E-05∗
(3.35E-06) (1.58E-60) (3.94E-06) (1.72E-06) (2.00E-05) (1.02E-05) (1.05E-11) (6.60E-06) (2.55E-06) (1.51E-05) (1.42E-05) (1.91E-05)
αt YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
αNUTS-3 – YES YES – YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Nobs. 15,113 353,515 5,967 11,798 492,303 327,284 38,267 348,007 294,304 782,986 229,534 274,091
LL -6,432 -12,510 -2,109 -4,246 -24,099 -71,044 -14,580 -16,808 -26,312 -130,072 -34,926 -24,594
θ−1 0.757 1.013 0.646 0.872 0.808 0.879 0.819 0.946 1.041 1.172 1.734 1.291
AIC 12,921 25,111 4,279 8,550 48,289 142,215 29,228 33,699 52,736 260,293 69,939 49,291
AICn 0.855 0.071 0.717 0.725 0.098 0.435 0.764 0.097 0.179 0.332 0.305 0.180
BICR,n -9.182 -12.737 -8.285 -8.979 -13.057 -12.512 -10.232 -12.709 -12.502 -13.419 -12.208 -12.433
D 6,406 13,016 2,191 4,414 23,890 60,131 11,926 17,166 25,829 117,597 30,580 23,500
Dn 0.424 0.037 0.367 0.374 0.049 0.184 0.312 0.049 0.088 0.150 0.133 0.086
Robust standard errors in parentheses
‡ significant at p < .20; †p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
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D.1. Cumulative peer effects
As outlined in Section 5.3.2 of Chapter 5 adoption decisions of peers in periods
preceding t − 1 might impact the decision of choice-maker n in period t as well.
Therefore, we consider the cumulative installed base as
C IBASEnt =
∑
m∈N,
m 6=n|
dnm≤D
t−1∑
l=0
oml1f (dnm) . (D.1)
D.2. Placebo test
We use the case study data to verify that our model indeed describes PV system
adoption appropriately. We randomly allocate the same number of PV installations,
which were in fact installed in the four cities per period, to the cities’ buildings.
Estimations with the resulting data set do not reveal any significant effect of the
variables under study on the utility to adopt a PV system. I.e., the placebo test
confirms the validity of our findings.
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D.3. SOEP
The Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) includes yearly data on PV adoption for the
time period 2007-2012 (SOEP, 2013). There is no low level locational information
included in the data, i.e., SOEP does not allow to study peer effects. However,
analyzing the individual level data confirms that the impact of measures of income –
in the SOEP case real household income – on PV adoption decreases over time.
Further, we find no positive impact of green party support on PV adoption. We
also find a negative effect of population density, e.g., measured by a significantly
negative coefficient on PV adoption for households having no garden. For reasons
of clarity we do not show the SOEP results.
Although our data set’s level of detail is extraordinary high for our analysis of
Germany, we rely on the assumption that spatial differences in buying power, global
radiation, green votes, population density and urban districts stay constant across
Germany. The SOEP results justify this assumption. They also illustrate that the
characteristics of the decision-maker itself are indeed comparable to information on
characteristics of the decision-maker’s location.
D.4. Tables
For only 28,862 – thus, 3.28% – of the installations the entity type of the geocoding
accuracy is unknown and the confidence less than medium, see Table D.1. However,
86.59% of the installations have a high geocoding confidence, and 86.54% have a
high geocoding confidence and are allocated to addresses or road block entities.
Table D.1.: Geocoding accuracy.
Entity type Confidence Frequency in category
Address High 599,746
Address Medium 25,786
Neighborhood Medium 62
PopulatedPlace High 8
PopulatedPlace Medium 3,201
Postcode1 High 18
Postcode1 Medium 19,092
RoadBlock High 160,929
RoadBlock Medium 40,524
RoadIntersection High 402
RoadIntersection Medium 390
Unknown 28,862
Sum 879,020
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Table D.2.: Frequency of choice alternatives for sample of Germany.
Period t Year Alternative Frequency in category
1 2000 0: No PV system installed 1,981,222
1: PV system installed 876
2 2001 0: No PV system installed 1,979,742
1: PV system installed 2,356
3 2002 0: No PV system installed 1,980,330
1: PV system installed 1,768
4 2003 0: No PV system installed 1,980,277
1: PV system installed 1,821
5 2004 0: No PV system installed 1,977,780
1: PV system installed 4,318
6 2005 0: No PV system installed 1,976,105
1: PV system installed 5,993
7 2006 0: No PV system installed 1,976,306
1: PV system installed 5,792
8 2007 0: No PV system installed 1,975,136
1: PV system installed 6,962
9 2008 0: No PV system installed 1,971,649
1: PV system installed 10,449
10 2009 0: No PV system installed 1,965,726
1: PV system installed 1,6372
11 2010 0: No PV system installed 1,959,853
1: PV system installed 22,245
Sum of PV installations 78,952
Table D.3.: Descriptive statistics, Germany.
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
choice .0036 .06 0 1
IBASEnt .15 .31 0 13
IBASEn1 .0035 .042 0 9.2
IBASEn2 .0028 .033 0 5
IBASEn3 .0068 .056 0 10
IBASEn4 .0049 .044 0 4.7
IBASEn5 .0049 .046 0 4.7
IBASEn6 .011 .076 0 6.5
IBASEn7 .015 .1 0 9.5
IBASEn8 .016 .098 0 5.8
IBASEn9 .019 .11 0 5.9
IBASEn10 .028 .15 0 7.7
IBASEn11 .04 .21 0 13
IBASEnt*EASTn .0091 .064 0 7.4
IBASEnt*URBANn .13 .3 0 13
BUYPOWn 1 .16 0 3.2
BUYPOW*PERi .09 .29 0 3.2
BUYPOWn*EASTn .16 .33 0 1.5
BUYPOWn*URBANn .8 .43 0 3.2
GRn 1 .056 .93 1.2
GR*PERi .093 .3 0 1.2
GREENn .071 .028 .017 .19
GREENn*EASTn .0081 .021 0 .12
GREENn*URBANn .058 .039 0 .19
POPDENn .19 .34 0 13
POPDEN*PERi .017 .12 0 13
URBANn .79 .4 0 1
N 21803078
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Table D.4.: Coefficient estimates of utility functions for sample of Germany.
M6 M6Logit
0 ASCsolar -4.323
∗∗∗ (-25.09) -11.71∗∗∗ (-19.48)
1 IBASEn1 0.320∗∗∗ (8.84) 0.809∗∗∗ (8.13)
2 IBASEn2 0.238∗∗∗ (6.24) 0.624∗∗∗ (6.92)
3 IBASEn3 0.181∗∗∗ (9.12) 0.436∗∗∗ (9.43)
4 IBASEn4 0.310∗∗∗ (9.99) 0.831∗∗∗ (10.09)
5 IBASEn5 0.276∗∗∗ (12.51) 0.689∗∗∗ (12.31)
6 IBASEn6 0.193∗∗∗ (13.74) 0.465∗∗∗ (13.24)
7 IBASEn7 0.144∗∗∗ (13.42) 0.324∗∗∗ (13.29)
8 IBASEn8 0.156∗∗∗ (12.25) 0.390∗∗∗ (11.68)
9 IBASEn9 0.120∗∗∗ (11.62) 0.274∗∗∗ (10.75)
10 IBASEn10 0.0675∗∗∗ (8.16) 0.117∗∗∗ (5.85)
11 IBASEn11 0.0695∗∗∗ (10.06) 0.102∗∗∗ (6.17)
12 IBASEnt*EASTn 0.182∗∗∗ (11.73) 0.574∗∗∗ (15.46)
13 IBASEnt*URBANn 0.0390∗∗∗ (5.89) 0.154∗∗∗ (9.61)
14 BUYPOWn*PER1 0.0391 (0.60) 0.234 (1.04)
15 BUYPOWn*PER2 -0.107∗ (-2.18) -0.272 (-1.73)
16 BUYPOWn*PER3 -0.273∗∗∗ (-4.78) -0.860∗∗∗ (-4.61)
17 BUYPOWn*PER4 -0.200∗∗∗ (-3.79) -0.610∗∗∗ (-3.60)
18 BUYPOWn*PER5 -0.483∗∗∗ (-11.37) -1.385∗∗∗ (-10.91)
19 BUYPOWn*PER6 -0.467∗∗∗ (-12.27) -1.257∗∗∗ (-11.34)
20 BUYPOWn*PER7 -0.335∗∗∗ (-8.95) -0.867∗∗∗ (-7.95)
21 BUYPOWn*PER8 -0.463∗∗∗ (-12.82) -1.215∗∗∗ (-11.67)
22 BUYPOWn*PER9 -0.501∗∗∗ (-15.31) -1.276∗∗∗ (-14.14)
23 BUYPOWn*PER10 -0.663∗∗∗ (-22.37) -1.668∗∗∗ (-21.23)
24 BUYPOWn*PER11 -0.685∗∗∗ (-24.58) -1.686∗∗∗ (-23.43)
25 BUYPOWn*EASTn 0.477∗∗∗ (7.79) 1.250∗∗∗ (6.54)
26 BUYPOWn*URBANn -0.0257 (-1.07) -0.203∗∗ (-3.08)
27 GRn*PER1 1.175∗∗∗ (7.00) 4.388∗∗∗ (7.45)
28 GRn*PER2 2.254∗∗∗ (18.23) 7.525∗∗∗ (19.07)
29 GRn*PER3 2.908∗∗∗ (20.41) 10.10∗∗∗ (21.63)
30 GRn*PER4 2.913∗∗∗ (20.04) 9.984∗∗∗ (20.99)
31 GRn*PER5 2.608∗∗∗ (24.73) 8.030∗∗∗ (25.68)
32 GRn*PER6 2.101∗∗∗ (22.65) 6.054∗∗∗ (22.84)
33 GRn*PER7 1.362∗∗∗ (15.05) 3.947∗∗∗ (15.26)
34 GRn*PER8 1.754∗∗∗ (20.01) 4.935∗∗∗ (19.82)
35 GRn*PER9 2.161∗∗∗ (27.31) 5.736∗∗∗ (26.67)
36 GRn*PER10 2.148∗∗∗ (28.60) 5.328∗∗∗ (26.88)
37 GRn*PER11 1.671∗∗∗ (23.35) 3.826∗∗∗ (20.61)
38 GRn*EASTn -1.346∗∗∗ (-5.22) -3.581∗∗∗ (-4.52)
39 GRn*URBANn -0.104∗ (-2.15) 0.164 (1.23)
40 GREENn -1.972∗∗∗ (-15.95) -5.984∗∗∗ (-17.80)
41 GREENn*EASTn 0.877∗ (2.13) 2.248 (1.70)
42 GREENn*URBANn -0.233 (-1.71) -0.462 (-1.22)
43 POPDENn*PER1 -0.799∗∗∗ (-11.35) -2.471∗∗∗ (-11.32)
44 POPDENn*PER2 -0.871∗∗∗ (-12.63) -2.687∗∗∗ (-12.54)
45 POPDENn*PER3 -0.951∗∗∗ (-13.15) -3.010∗∗∗ (-12.97)
46 POPDENn*PER4 -0.958∗∗∗ (-12.66) -3.057∗∗∗ (-12.37)
47 POPDENn*PER5 -1.115∗∗∗ (-15.33) -3.530∗∗∗ (-15.40)
48 POPDENn*PER6 -1.146∗∗∗ (-16.19) -3.565∗∗∗ (-16.20)
49 POPDENn*PER7 -1.089∗∗∗ (-15.59) -3.359∗∗∗ (-15.55)
50 POPDENn*PER8 -1.031∗∗∗ (-14.85) -3.135∗∗∗ (-14.51)
51 POPDENn*PER9 -1.126∗∗∗ (-16.65) -3.397∗∗∗ (-16.39)
52 POPDENn*PER10 -1.271∗∗∗ (-18.76) -3.799∗∗∗ (-18.38)
53 POPDENn*PER11 -1.380∗∗∗ (-20.57) -4.053∗∗∗ (-19.88)
54 POPDENn*EASTn 0.327∗∗∗ (15.08) 0.975∗∗∗ (12.87)
55 POPDENn*URBANn 0.690∗∗∗ (10.57) 2.055∗∗∗ (10.29)
56 URBANn -0.0464 (-0.93) -0.499∗∗∗ (-3.59)
NUTS-1 dummies Yes Yes
Period dummies Yes Yes
Observations 21,803,078 21,803,078
DFM 81 81
Final log-likelihood L -466,538 -466,337
LR: χ2 (DF) 4,676 (36)
LR: p-value 0
Horowitz test statistic (signific. level) -3.11 (9.4e-04)
LR/Horowitz test against M5->M6 M6->M6Logit
Robust t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D.5.: Average marginal effects of utility functions for sample of Germany.
M4 M6 M6Logit
IBASEnt 0.000854∗∗∗ (30.05)
IBASEn1 0.00319∗∗∗ (8.83) 0.00289∗∗∗ (8.13)
IBASEn2 0.00237∗∗∗ (6.24) 0.00223∗∗∗ (6.92)
IBASEn3 0.00180∗∗∗ (9.12) 0.00156∗∗∗ (9.43)
IBASEn4 0.00308∗∗∗ (9.98) 0.00297∗∗∗ (10.09)
IBASEn5 0.00275∗∗∗ (12.50) 0.00247∗∗∗ (12.30)
IBASEn6 0.00192∗∗∗ (13.73) 0.00166∗∗∗ (13.23)
IBASEn7 0.00144∗∗∗ (13.41) 0.00116∗∗∗ (13.28)
IBASEn8 0.00156∗∗∗ (12.24) 0.00140∗∗∗ (11.67)
IBASEn9 0.00119∗∗∗ (11.62) 0.000979∗∗∗ (10.74)
IBASEn10 0.000672∗∗∗ (8.16) 0.000418∗∗∗ (5.85)
IBASEn11 0.000692∗∗∗ (10.06) 0.000365∗∗∗ (6.17)
IBASEnt*EASTn 0.00205∗∗∗ (13.13) 0.00181∗∗∗ (11.72) 0.00205∗∗∗ (15.44)
IBASEnt*URBANn 0.000388∗∗∗ (5.89) 0.000552∗∗∗ (9.61)
BUYPOWn -0.00628∗∗∗ (-51.67)
BUYPOWn*PER1 0.000389 (0.60) 0.000837 (1.04)
BUYPOWn*PER2 -0.00107∗ (-2.18) -0.000972 (-1.73)
BUYPOWn*PER3 -0.00272∗∗∗ (-4.78) -0.00308∗∗∗ (-4.61)
BUYPOWn*PER4 -0.00199∗∗∗ (-3.79) -0.00218∗∗∗ (-3.60)
BUYPOWn*PER5 -0.00481∗∗∗ (-11.36) -0.00495∗∗∗ (-10.91)
BUYPOWn*PER6 -0.00465∗∗∗ (-12.26) -0.00450∗∗∗ (-11.33)
BUYPOWn*PER7 -0.00333∗∗∗ (-8.95) -0.00310∗∗∗ (-7.95)
BUYPOWn*PER8 -0.00461∗∗∗ (-12.81) -0.00435∗∗∗ (-11.66)
BUYPOWn*PER9 -0.00499∗∗∗ (-15.30) -0.00457∗∗∗ (-14.13)
BUYPOWn*PER10 -0.00660∗∗∗ (-22.33) -0.00597∗∗∗ (-21.19)
BUYPOWn*PER11 -0.00682∗∗∗ (-24.53) -0.00603∗∗∗ (-23.37)
BUYPOWn*EASTn 0.00404∗∗∗ (6.54) 0.00475∗∗∗ (7.79) 0.00447∗∗∗ (6.54)
BUYPOWn*URBANn -0.000256 (-1.07) -0.000727∗∗ (-3.08)
GRn 0.0210∗∗∗ (46.44)
GRn*PER1 0.0117∗∗∗ (7.00) 0.0157∗∗∗ (7.45)
GRn*PER2 0.0224∗∗∗ (18.22) 0.0269∗∗∗ (19.04)
GRn*PER3 0.0290∗∗∗ (20.39) 0.0361∗∗∗ (21.58)
GRn*PER4 0.0290∗∗∗ (20.01) 0.0357∗∗∗ (20.94)
GRn*PER5 0.0260∗∗∗ (24.68) 0.0287∗∗∗ (25.60)
GRn*PER6 0.0209∗∗∗ (22.62) 0.0217∗∗∗ (22.79)
GRn*PER7 0.0136∗∗∗ (15.05) 0.0141∗∗∗ (15.25)
GRn*PER8 0.0175∗∗∗ (19.99) 0.0177∗∗∗ (19.79)
GRn*PER9 0.0215∗∗∗ (27.26) 0.0205∗∗∗ (26.60)
GRn*PER10 0.0214∗∗∗ (28.55) 0.0191∗∗∗ (26.82)
GRn*PER11 0.0166∗∗∗ (23.32) 0.0137∗∗∗ (20.59)
GRn*EASTn -0.0151∗∗∗ (-5.90) -0.0134∗∗∗ (-5.22) -0.0128∗∗∗ (-4.52)
GRn*URBANn -0.00103∗ (-2.15) 0.000587 (1.23)
GREENn -0.0216∗∗∗ (-26.50) -0.0196∗∗∗ (-15.94) -0.0214∗∗∗ (-17.78)
GREENn*EASTn 0.00523 (1.24) 0.00873∗ (2.13) 0.00804 (1.70)
GREENn*URBANn -0.00232 (-1.71) -0.00165 (-1.22)
POPDENn -0.00590∗∗∗ (-53.51)
POPDENn*PER1 -0.00796∗∗∗ (-11.34) -0.00884∗∗∗ (-11.31)
POPDENn*PER2 -0.00867∗∗∗ (-12.63) -0.00961∗∗∗ (-12.54)
POPDENn*PER3 -0.00947∗∗∗ (-13.15) -0.0108∗∗∗ (-12.96)
POPDENn*PER4 -0.00954∗∗∗ (-12.66) -0.0109∗∗∗ (-12.36)
POPDENn*PER5 -0.0111∗∗∗ (-15.32) -0.0126∗∗∗ (-15.38)
POPDENn*PER6 -0.0114∗∗∗ (-16.18) -0.0128∗∗∗ (-16.18)
POPDENn*PER7 -0.0108∗∗∗ (-15.58) -0.0120∗∗∗ (-15.53)
POPDENn*PER8 -0.0103∗∗∗ (-14.84) -0.0112∗∗∗ (-14.50)
POPDENn*PER9 -0.0112∗∗∗ (-16.64) -0.0122∗∗∗ (-16.37)
POPDENn*PER10 -0.0127∗∗∗ (-18.74) -0.0136∗∗∗ (-18.35)
POPDENn*PER11 -0.0137∗∗∗ (-20.55) -0.0145∗∗∗ (-19.84)
POPDENn*EASTn 0.00412∗∗∗ (12.22) 0.00325∗∗∗ (15.07) 0.00349∗∗∗ (12.86)
POPDENn*URBANn 0.00687∗∗∗ (10.57) 0.00735∗∗∗ (10.29)
URBANn -0.000462 (-0.93) -0.00179∗∗∗ (-3.59)
Observations 21803078 21803078 21803078
Marginal effects; Robust t statistics in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D.6.: Coefficient estimates of utility functions for further samples of Germany.
M6II M6III
ASCsolar -4.190
∗∗∗ (-25.21) -4.462∗∗∗ (-26.46)
IBASEn1 0.249∗∗∗ (5.89) 0.232∗∗∗ (4.84)
IBASEn2 0.253∗∗∗ (7.10) 0.187∗∗∗ (4.63)
IBASEn3 0.187∗∗∗ (9.44) 0.153∗∗∗ (6.15)
IBASEn4 0.324∗∗∗ (11.06) 0.266∗∗∗ (8.66)
IBASEn5 0.301∗∗∗ (13.74) 0.265∗∗∗ (12.10)
IBASEn6 0.222∗∗∗ (16.33) 0.207∗∗∗ (14.96)
IBASEn7 0.159∗∗∗ (15.08) 0.131∗∗∗ (12.12)
IBASEn8 0.158∗∗∗ (12.41) 0.152∗∗∗ (11.64)
IBASEn9 0.147∗∗∗ (14.38) 0.150∗∗∗ (14.73)
IBASEn10 0.0744∗∗∗ (9.06) 0.0797∗∗∗ (9.81)
IBASEn11 0.0735∗∗∗ (10.73) 0.0741∗∗∗ (10.90)
IBASEnt*EASTn 0.171∗∗∗ (11.51) 0.173∗∗∗ (11.15)
IBASEnt*URBANn 0.0285∗∗∗ (4.35) 0.0339∗∗∗ (5.18)
BUYPOWn*PER1 0.0980 (1.57) 0.136∗ (2.28)
BUYPOWn*PER2 -0.104∗ (-2.24) -0.133∗∗ (-2.93)
BUYPOWn*PER3 -0.296∗∗∗ (-5.45) -0.249∗∗∗ (-4.77)
BUYPOWn*PER4 -0.264∗∗∗ (-4.91) -0.398∗∗∗ (-7.30)
BUYPOWn*PER5 -0.571∗∗∗ (-13.33) -0.561∗∗∗ (-12.99)
BUYPOWn*PER6 -0.534∗∗∗ (-13.83) -0.543∗∗∗ (-14.05)
BUYPOWn*PER7 -0.400∗∗∗ (-10.69) -0.387∗∗∗ (-10.49)
BUYPOWn*PER8 -0.439∗∗∗ (-12.57) -0.445∗∗∗ (-12.10)
BUYPOWn*PER9 -0.539∗∗∗ (-16.34) -0.595∗∗∗ (-18.00)
BUYPOWn*PER10 -0.712∗∗∗ (-23.94) -0.690∗∗∗ (-23.08)
BUYPOWn*PER11 -0.733∗∗∗ (-25.78) -0.753∗∗∗ (-26.48)
BUYPOWn*EASTn 0.484∗∗∗ (7.86) 0.476∗∗∗ (7.74)
BUYPOWn*URBANn 0.00242 (0.10) 0.0174 (0.72)
GRn*PER1 0.981∗∗∗ (6.01) 1.212∗∗∗ (7.31)
GRn*PER2 2.060∗∗∗ (16.58) 2.331∗∗∗ (18.78)
GRn*PER3 2.824∗∗∗ (19.08) 2.701∗∗∗ (18.75)
GRn*PER4 3.225∗∗∗ (21.98) 3.412∗∗∗ (23.17)
GRn*PER5 2.366∗∗∗ (22.03) 2.424∗∗∗ (22.97)
GRn*PER6 1.989∗∗∗ (21.40) 2.209∗∗∗ (23.51)
GRn*PER7 1.325∗∗∗ (14.53) 1.405∗∗∗ (15.52)
GRn*PER8 1.655∗∗∗ (19.08) 1.728∗∗∗ (19.60)
GRn*PER9 1.954∗∗∗ (24.57) 1.982∗∗∗ (24.88)
GRn*PER10 2.093∗∗∗ (27.80) 2.070∗∗∗ (27.63)
GRn*PER11 1.706∗∗∗ (23.75) 1.563∗∗∗ (21.80)
GRn*EASTn -1.658∗∗∗ (-6.50) -1.452∗∗∗ (-5.60)
GRn*URBANn -0.107∗ (-2.20) -0.129∗∗ (-2.66)
GREENn -1.746∗∗∗ (-14.07) -1.781∗∗∗ (-14.28)
GREENn*EASTn -0.0473 (-0.11) 0.946∗ (2.32)
GREENn*URBANn -0.311∗ (-2.28) -0.363∗∗ (-2.65)
POPDENn*PER1 -0.834∗∗∗ (-11.31) -0.771∗∗∗ (-10.47)
POPDENn*PER2 -0.906∗∗∗ (-12.33) -0.848∗∗∗ (-11.86)
POPDENn*PER3 -0.914∗∗∗ (-12.13) -0.901∗∗∗ (-12.10)
POPDENn*PER4 -1.020∗∗∗ (-12.41) -0.927∗∗∗ (-11.83)
POPDENn*PER5 -1.116∗∗∗ (-14.67) -1.040∗∗∗ (-13.82)
POPDENn*PER6 -1.197∗∗∗ (-15.83) -1.122∗∗∗ (-15.19)
POPDENn*PER7 -1.119∗∗∗ (-15.27) -1.043∗∗∗ (-14.48)
POPDENn*PER8 -1.136∗∗∗ (-15.62) -1.116∗∗∗ (-15.61)
POPDENn*PER9 -1.174∗∗∗ (-16.23) -1.167∗∗∗ (-16.40)
POPDENn*PER10 -1.325∗∗∗ (-18.42) -1.277∗∗∗ (-18.17)
POPDENn*PER11 -1.376∗∗∗ (-19.26) -1.320∗∗∗ (-18.98)
POPDENn*EASTn 0.351∗∗∗ (15.99) 0.346∗∗∗ (16.49)
POPDENn*URBANn 0.711∗∗∗ (10.22) 0.663∗∗∗ (9.77)
URBANn -0.0574 (-1.14) -0.0485 (-0.97)
NUTS-1 dummies Yes Yes
Period dummies Yes Yes
Observations 21,795,334 21,799,327
DFM 81 81
Final log-likelihood L -464,214 -465,947
Robust t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D.7.: Coefficient estimates of utility functions for further cut-off distances for
Germany.
M7 M8
Cut-off 200 m 1000 m
ASCsolar -4.102
∗∗∗ (-23.61) -4.324∗∗∗ (-25.18)
IBASEn1 0.218∗∗∗ (3.32) 0.221∗∗∗ (10.47)
IBASEn2 0.303∗∗∗ (3.44) 0.166∗∗∗ (7.04)
IBASEn3 0.169∗∗∗ (3.47) 0.166∗∗∗ (12.98)
IBASEn4 0.320∗∗∗ (5.79) 0.222∗∗∗ (12.77)
IBASEn5 0.249∗∗∗ (5.91) 0.208∗∗∗ (14.60)
IBASEn6 0.127∗∗∗ (4.33) 0.151∗∗∗ (17.55)
IBASEn7 0.105∗∗∗ (4.19) 0.0949∗∗∗ (16.90)
IBASEn8 0.132∗∗∗ (4.91) 0.110∗∗∗ (14.26)
IBASEn9 0.0952∗∗∗ (4.62) 0.0934∗∗∗ (15.01)
IBASEn10 0.0328 (1.85) 0.0574∗∗∗ (11.82)
IBASEn11 0.0584∗∗∗ (4.64) 0.0615∗∗∗ (15.13)
IBASEnt*EASTn 0.154∗∗∗ (5.95) 0.127∗∗∗ (12.95)
IBASEnt*URBANn 0.144∗∗∗ (10.94) -0.00622 (-1.59)
BUYPOWn*PER1 0.0891 (1.38) -0.00823 (-0.12)
BUYPOWn*PER2 -0.0950 (-1.91) -0.122∗ (-2.46)
BUYPOWn*PER3 -0.263∗∗∗ (-4.62) -0.297∗∗∗ (-5.10)
BUYPOWn*PER4 -0.204∗∗∗ (-3.86) -0.217∗∗∗ (-4.05)
BUYPOWn*PER5 -0.487∗∗∗ (-11.49) -0.504∗∗∗ (-11.70)
BUYPOWn*PER6 -0.479∗∗∗ (-12.67) -0.483∗∗∗ (-12.54)
BUYPOWn*PER7 -0.337∗∗∗ (-9.12) -0.348∗∗∗ (-9.25)
BUYPOWn*PER8 -0.450∗∗∗ (-12.61) -0.476∗∗∗ (-13.08)
BUYPOWn*PER9 -0.497∗∗∗ (-15.32) -0.513∗∗∗ (-15.53)
BUYPOWn*PER10 -0.670∗∗∗ (-22.71) -0.667∗∗∗ (-22.43)
BUYPOWn*PER11 -0.710∗∗∗ (-25.69) -0.687∗∗∗ (-24.54)
BUYPOWn*EASTn 0.525∗∗∗ (8.66) 0.430∗∗∗ (6.95)
BUYPOWn*URBANn -0.0420 (-1.76) -0.0236 (-0.98)
GRn*PER1 0.914∗∗∗ (5.40) 1.209∗∗∗ (7.19)
GRn*PER2 2.118∗∗∗ (17.16) 2.206∗∗∗ (17.78)
GRn*PER3 2.895∗∗∗ (20.35) 2.751∗∗∗ (19.11)
GRn*PER4 3.004∗∗∗ (21.19) 2.784∗∗∗ (18.94)
GRn*PER5 2.699∗∗∗ (26.34) 2.482∗∗∗ (23.08)
GRn*PER6 2.229∗∗∗ (24.87) 1.973∗∗∗ (20.90)
GRn*PER7 1.453∗∗∗ (16.47) 1.325∗∗∗ (14.66)
GRn*PER8 1.779∗∗∗ (20.88) 1.695∗∗∗ (19.15)
GRn*PER9 2.183∗∗∗ (28.34) 2.084∗∗∗ (26.06)
GRn*PER10 2.168∗∗∗ (29.86) 2.103∗∗∗ (27.78)
GRn*PER11 1.814∗∗∗ (26.42) 1.600∗∗∗ (22.19)
GRn*EASTn -1.469∗∗∗ (-5.73) -1.336∗∗∗ (-5.16)
GRn*URBANn 0.112∗ (2.40) -0.0648 (-1.33)
GREENn -2.139∗∗∗ (-17.26) -1.921∗∗∗ (-15.50)
GREENn*EASTn 0.886∗ (2.14) 0.890∗ (2.16)
GREENn*URBANn -0.333∗ (-2.44) -0.199 (-1.46)
POPDENn*PER1 -0.729∗∗∗ (-10.59) -0.922∗∗∗ (-12.24)
POPDENn*PER2 -0.815∗∗∗ (-12.05) -0.982∗∗∗ (-13.37)
POPDENn*PER3 -0.892∗∗∗ (-12.60) -1.082∗∗∗ (-13.95)
POPDENn*PER4 -0.900∗∗∗ (-12.15) -1.083∗∗∗ (-13.39)
POPDENn*PER5 -1.063∗∗∗ (-14.88) -1.240∗∗∗ (-16.00)
POPDENn*PER6 -1.095∗∗∗ (-15.78) -1.277∗∗∗ (-16.90)
POPDENn*PER7 -1.036∗∗∗ (-15.16) -1.209∗∗∗ (-16.26)
POPDENn*PER8 -0.975∗∗∗ (-14.37) -1.154∗∗∗ (-15.57)
POPDENn*PER9 -1.069∗∗∗ (-16.16) -1.255∗∗∗ (-17.39)
POPDENn*PER10 -1.214∗∗∗ (-18.30) -1.395∗∗∗ (-19.32)
POPDENn*PER11 -1.319∗∗∗ (-20.10) -1.520∗∗∗ (-21.28)
POPDENn*EASTn 0.329∗∗∗ (15.54) 0.340∗∗∗ (14.69)
POPDENn*URBANn 0.633∗∗∗ (9.92) 0.785∗∗∗ (11.27)
URBANn -0.218∗∗∗ (-4.47) -0.0863 (-1.71)
NUTS-1 dummies Yes Yes
Period dummies Yes Yes
Observations 21,803,078 21,803,078
DFM 81 81
Final log-likelihood L -467,368 -466,538
Horowitz test statistic (signific. level) -6.31 (1.4e-10) -.0326 (.487)
Horowitz test against M7->M6 M6->M8
Robust t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D.8.: Coefficient estimates of utility functions using a cumulative peer effects
measure for Germany.
M9
ASCsolar -4.376
∗∗∗ (-25.36)
C IBASEn1 0.349∗∗∗ (9.74)
C IBASEn2 0.209∗∗∗ (7.56)
C IBASEn3 0.160∗∗∗ (10.50)
C IBASEn4 0.128∗∗∗ (9.56)
C IBASEn5 0.108∗∗∗ (11.71)
C IBASEn6 0.0851∗∗∗ (13.06)
C IBASEn7 0.0597∗∗∗ (11.52)
C IBASEn8 0.0369∗∗∗ (8.54)
C IBASEn9 0.0239∗∗∗ (6.86)
C IBASEn10 0.0151∗∗∗ (5.22)
C IBASEn11 0.0137∗∗∗ (5.34)
C IBASEnt*EASTn 0.0992∗∗∗ (13.92)
C IBASEnt*URBANn 0.0165∗∗∗ (6.89)
BUYPOWn*PER1 0.0503 (0.77)
BUYPOWn*PER2 -0.117∗ (-2.35)
BUYPOWn*PER3 -0.284∗∗∗ (-4.97)
BUYPOWn*PER4 -0.220∗∗∗ (-4.14)
BUYPOWn*PER5 -0.502∗∗∗ (-11.72)
BUYPOWn*PER6 -0.487∗∗∗ (-12.73)
BUYPOWn*PER7 -0.341∗∗∗ (-9.09)
BUYPOWn*PER8 -0.448∗∗∗ (-12.44)
BUYPOWn*PER9 -0.491∗∗∗ (-15.02)
BUYPOWn*PER10 -0.657∗∗∗ (-22.12)
BUYPOWn*PER11 -0.690∗∗∗ (-24.70)
BUYPOWn*EASTn 0.441∗∗∗ (7.14)
BUYPOWn*URBANn -0.0274 (-1.14)
GRn*PER1 1.232∗∗∗ (7.34)
GRn*PER2 2.364∗∗∗ (19.24)
GRn*PER3 2.997∗∗∗ (21.09)
GRn*PER4 3.037∗∗∗ (21.12)
GRn*PER5 2.652∗∗∗ (24.96)
GRn*PER6 2.099∗∗∗ (22.27)
GRn*PER7 1.313∗∗∗ (14.01)
GRn*PER8 1.707∗∗∗ (18.83)
GRn*PER9 2.153∗∗∗ (26.36)
GRn*PER10 2.154∗∗∗ (27.92)
GRn*PER11 1.752∗∗∗ (23.86)
GRn*EASTn -1.272∗∗∗ (-4.93)
GRn*URBANn -0.168∗∗∗ (-3.42)
GREENn -2.085∗∗∗ (-16.84)
GREENn*EASTn 1.074∗∗ (2.61)
GREENn*URBANn -0.281∗ (-2.06)
POPDENn*PER1 -0.792∗∗∗ (-11.20)
POPDENn*PER2 -0.876∗∗∗ (-12.61)
POPDENn*PER3 -0.959∗∗∗ (-13.14)
POPDENn*PER4 -0.970∗∗∗ (-12.65)
POPDENn*PER5 -1.133∗∗∗ (-15.38)
POPDENn*PER6 -1.165∗∗∗ (-16.34)
POPDENn*PER7 -1.099∗∗∗ (-15.64)
POPDENn*PER8 -1.034∗∗∗ (-14.82)
POPDENn*PER9 -1.128∗∗∗ (-16.60)
POPDENn*PER10 -1.277∗∗∗ (-18.75)
POPDENn*PER11 -1.394∗∗∗ (-20.68)
POPDENn*EASTn 0.332∗∗∗ (15.08)
POPDENn*URBANn 0.688∗∗∗ (10.50)
URBANn 0.0186 (0.37)
NUTS-1 dummies Yes
Period dummies Yes
Observations 21,803,078
DFM 81
Final log-likelihood L -466,815
Horowitz test statistic (signific. level) -3.64 (1.4e-04)
Horowitz test against M9->M6
Robust t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D.9.: Coefficient estimates of utility functions for sample of Germany using
different functional forms for peer effects.
M10 M11
f (dnm) 1/dnm 1/d2nm
ASCsolar -4.100
∗∗∗ (-23.60) -4.054∗∗∗ (-23.32)
IBASEn1 0.420∗ (1.98) 0.736 (1.35)
IBASEn2 0.910∗∗∗ (3.60) 1.732∗∗ (2.74)
IBASEn3 0.476∗∗ (2.66) 0.525 (0.94)
IBASEn4 0.963∗∗∗ (5.88) 1.880∗∗∗ (4.85)
IBASEn5 0.625∗∗∗ (4.74) 0.826∗ (2.14)
IBASEn6 0.289∗∗ (3.19) 0.122 (0.43)
IBASEn7 0.227∗∗ (2.94) 0.148 (0.64)
IBASEn8 0.322∗∗∗ (3.82) 0.349 (1.48)
IBASEn9 0.151∗ (2.23) -0.0498 (-0.26)
IBASEn10 0.0218 (0.36) -0.0648 (-0.43)
IBASEn11 0.146∗∗∗ (3.59) 0.151 (1.57)
IBASEnt*EASTn 0.457∗∗∗ (5.88) 1.119∗∗∗ (6.29)
IBASEnt*URBANn 0.607∗∗∗ (14.00) 0.616∗∗∗ (5.55)
BUYPOWn*PER1 0.0911 (1.41) 0.0942 (1.46)
BUYPOWn*PER2 -0.0945 (-1.90) -0.0939 (-1.89)
BUYPOWn*PER3 -0.263∗∗∗ (-4.63) -0.264∗∗∗ (-4.63)
BUYPOWn*PER4 -0.204∗∗∗ (-3.87) -0.206∗∗∗ (-3.90)
BUYPOWn*PER5 -0.488∗∗∗ (-11.52) -0.491∗∗∗ (-11.55)
BUYPOWn*PER6 -0.480∗∗∗ (-12.71) -0.484∗∗∗ (-12.79)
BUYPOWn*PER7 -0.339∗∗∗ (-9.16) -0.342∗∗∗ (-9.24)
BUYPOWn*PER8 -0.451∗∗∗ (-12.64) -0.451∗∗∗ (-12.64)
BUYPOWn*PER9 -0.498∗∗∗ (-15.36) -0.499∗∗∗ (-15.39)
BUYPOWn*PER10 -0.672∗∗∗ (-22.76) -0.673∗∗∗ (-22.80)
BUYPOWn*PER11 -0.713∗∗∗ (-25.79) -0.716∗∗∗ (-25.99)
BUYPOWn*EASTn 0.527∗∗∗ (8.68) 0.531∗∗∗ (8.75)
BUYPOWn*URBANn -0.0424 (-1.78) -0.0461 (-1.93)
GRn*PER1 0.911∗∗∗ (5.38) 0.863∗∗∗ (5.09)
GRn*PER2 2.118∗∗∗ (17.16) 2.086∗∗∗ (16.89)
GRn*PER3 2.901∗∗∗ (20.41) 2.891∗∗∗ (20.34)
GRn*PER4 3.011∗∗∗ (21.30) 3.011∗∗∗ (21.31)
GRn*PER5 2.712∗∗∗ (26.51) 2.710∗∗∗ (26.50)
GRn*PER6 2.240∗∗∗ (25.05) 2.240∗∗∗ (25.09)
GRn*PER7 1.461∗∗∗ (16.60) 1.462∗∗∗ (16.65)
GRn*PER8 1.784∗∗∗ (20.97) 1.778∗∗∗ (20.95)
GRn*PER9 2.193∗∗∗ (28.51) 2.187∗∗∗ (28.49)
GRn*PER10 2.172∗∗∗ (29.95) 2.174∗∗∗ (30.10)
GRn*PER11 1.819∗∗∗ (26.56) 1.860∗∗∗ (27.29)
GRn*EASTn -1.470∗∗∗ (-5.74) -1.504∗∗∗ (-5.87)
GRn*URBANn 0.109∗ (2.33) 0.164∗∗∗ (3.52)
GREENn -2.140∗∗∗ (-17.27) -2.171∗∗∗ (-17.50)
GREENn*EASTn 0.887∗ (2.14) 0.893∗ (2.16)
GREENn*URBANn -0.331∗ (-2.42) -0.343∗ (-2.51)
POPDENn*PER1 -0.730∗∗∗ (-10.59) -0.728∗∗∗ (-10.54)
POPDENn*PER2 -0.816∗∗∗ (-12.05) -0.814∗∗∗ (-12.01)
POPDENn*PER3 -0.892∗∗∗ (-12.60) -0.891∗∗∗ (-12.57)
POPDENn*PER4 -0.901∗∗∗ (-12.15) -0.900∗∗∗ (-12.12)
POPDENn*PER5 -1.064∗∗∗ (-14.89) -1.065∗∗∗ (-14.87)
POPDENn*PER6 -1.096∗∗∗ (-15.79) -1.097∗∗∗ (-15.78)
POPDENn*PER7 -1.038∗∗∗ (-15.18) -1.038∗∗∗ (-15.17)
POPDENn*PER8 -0.978∗∗∗ (-14.39) -0.977∗∗∗ (-14.37)
POPDENn*PER9 -1.072∗∗∗ (-16.18) -1.071∗∗∗ (-16.16)
POPDENn*PER10 -1.217∗∗∗ (-18.33) -1.215∗∗∗ (-18.30)
POPDENn*PER11 -1.324∗∗∗ (-20.15) -1.323∗∗∗ (-20.14)
POPDENn*EASTn 0.330∗∗∗ (15.60) 0.332∗∗∗ (15.63)
POPDENn*URBANn 0.633∗∗∗ (9.92) 0.630∗∗∗ (9.85)
URBANn -0.215∗∗∗ (-4.41) -0.260∗∗∗ (-5.35)
NUTS-1 dummies Yes Yes
Period dummies Yes Yes
Observations 21,803,078 21,803,078
DFM 81 81
Final log-likelihood L -467,425 -467,634
Horowitz test statistic (signific. level) -6.52 (3.6e-11) -7.25 (2.1e-13)
Horowitz test against M10->M6 M11->M6
Robust t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D.10.: Descriptive statistics for M12 (Address fixed effects, cut-off 200 m).
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
choice .091 .29 0 1
PER 6 3.2 1 11
IBASEnt .079 .21 0 13
Urbann .65 .48 0 1
Ruraln .35 .48 0 1
Eastn .069 .25 0 1
N 9545184
Table D.11.: Descriptive statistics for M13 (District*Period fixed effects, cut-off
200 m).
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
choice .0079 .089 0 1
PER 7.4 2.9 1 11
IBASEnt .079 .19 0 13
Urbann .77 .42 0 1
Ruraln .23 .42 0 1
Eastn .13 .34 0 1
N 109848218
Table D.12.: Frequency of choice alternatives for case study of four cities.
Period t Year Alternative Frequency in category
1 2000 0: No PV system installed 338,172
1: PV system installed 70
2 2001 0: No PV system installed 338,128
1: PV system installed 114
3 2002 0: No PV system installed 338,196
1: PV system installed 46
4 2003 0: No PV system installed 338,195
1: PV system installed 47
5 2004 0: No PV system installed 338,169
1: PV system installed 73
6 2005 0: No PV system installed 338,055
1: PV system installed 187
7 2006 0: No PV system installed 338,043
1: PV system installed 199
8 2007 0: No PV system installed 337,983
1: PV system installed 259
9 2008 0: No PV system installed 337,943
1: PV system installed 299
10 2009 0: No PV system installed 337,784
1: PV system installed 458
11 2010 0: No PV system installed 337,674
1: PV system installed 568
Sum of PV installations 2,320
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Table D.13.: Descriptive statistics case study.
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
choice .00062 .025 0 1
IBASEnt .1 .2 0 3.7
BUYPOWn 1.1 .16 .73 1.6
GRn 1.1 .027 .99 1.1
GR BUILDINGn .6 .5 0 1.3
POPDENn .39 .5 .0027 3.3
N 3720662
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My Backyard! Local Resistance
E.1. Descriptive statistics
Table E.1.: Descriptive statistics, wind.
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
∆FWind,t .0028 .0064 0 .092
∆FWind>0.5 MW,t .0024 .0058 0 .092
∆FWi.Cap>0.5 MW,t 3.7 9.5 0 146
∆#Wind>1 MW,t 2.9 7.6 0 86
FWind,t−1 .026 .048 0 .49
FWind>0.5 MW,t−1 .018 .036 0 .34
FWi.Cap>0.5 MW,t−1 25 51 0 461
#Wind>1 MW,t−1 22 49 0 476
W FWind>1 MW,t−1 .027 .039 0 .45
W #Wind>1 MW,t−1 15 25 0 281
REFWind,t−1 .0027 .052 0 1
REFWind,n.o.,t−1 .0065 .08 0 1
W REFWind,t−1 .0018 .016 0 .25
N 6004
Table E.2.: Descriptive statistics, biomass.
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
∆FBiomass,t .003 .0071 0 .33
∆FBiomass>1 MWe,t .00011 .00081 0 .034
∆FBio.Cap>1 MWe,t .49 5.7 0 346
∆#Biomass>1 MWe,t .066 .29 0 4
FBiomass,t−1 .012 .022 0 .17
FBiomass>1 MWe,t−1 .00066 .002 0 .032
FBio.Cap>1 MWe,t−1 3.4 16 0 346
#Biomass>1 MWe,t−1 .39 .96 0 9
W FBiomass>1 MWe,t−1 .0019 .0048 0 .047
W #Biomass>1 MWe,t−1 .35 .56 0 5.5
REFBiomass,t−1 .0015 .039 0 1
REFBiomass,n.o.,t−1 .014 .12 0 1
W REFBiomass,t−1 .0019 .034 0 1
N 6004
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Table E.3.: Descriptive statistics, PV.
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
∆FPV,t .0043 .0074 0 .067
∆FPV>100 kWp,t .012 .04 0 .83
∆#PV>100 kWp,t 3.3 9.5 0 196
FPV,t−1 .012 .023 0 .25
FPV>100 kWp,t−1 .018 .062 0 1.1
#PV>100 kWp,t−1 4.3 14 0 335
W FPV>100 kWp,t−1 .019 .046 0 .66
W #PV>100 kWp,t−1 4.6 11 0 159
REFPV,t−1 .00078 .028 0 1
W REFPV,t−1 .00095 .019 0 1
N 6435
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E.2. Estimations with capacity-adjusted measures
Table E.4.: Estimation of successful referendum on adoption of large wind power
plants (capacity-adjusted).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆FWi.Cap>0.5 MW,t ∆FWi.Cap>0.5 MW,t ∆FWi.Cap>0.5 MW,t ∆FWi.Cap>0.5 MW,t
Estimator OLS FE Cond. Poisson FE OLS FE Cond. Poisson FE
REFWind,t−1 -3.491∗∗∗ -1.013+ -2.698+ -0.682+
(-8.75) (-1.85) (-1.72) (-1.83)
FWi.Cap>0.5 MW,t−1 0.0299∗∗ -0.00349∗ 0.0852∗∗∗ 0.00838∗∗∗
(2.59) (-2.00) (11.61) (12.94)
NUTS-3 and Year FE Yes Yes
NUTS-2xYear FE Yes Yes
R2 0.111 0.125
Adj. R2 0.108 0.124
LL -16981.9 -17820.4
F 18.97 70.88
χ2 610.6 199.0
FREF=0 / χ
2
REF=0 (p-value) 76.58 (1.31e-16) 3.424 (0.0643) 2.964 (0.0856) 3.351 (0.0672)
N (DFM) 6004 (19) 4940 (20) 6004 (1) 4728 (2)
Robust t statistics in parenth., built with HAC SE, estim. constant omitted in column (3)
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table E.5.: Estimation of successful referendum on adoption of large biomass plants
(capacity-adjusted).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆FBio.Cap>1 MWe,t ∆FBio.Cap>1 MWe,t ∆FBio.Cap>1 MWe,t ∆FBio.Cap>1 MWe,t
Estimator OLS FE Cond. Poisson FE OLS FE Cond. Poisson FE
REFBiomass,t−1 -0.554∗∗∗ -15.12∗∗∗ -0.615∗ -14.01∗∗∗
(-3.60) (-14.90) (-2.03) (-23.21)
FBio.Cap>1 MWe,t−1 -0.0856∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗ 0.00983+ 0.0130∗
(-19.28) (-3.11) (1.68) (2.20)
NUTS-3 and Year FE Yes Yes
NUTS-2xYear FE Yes Yes
R2 0.0420 0.000832
Adj. R2 0.0388 0.000499
LL -4316.8 -5207.7
F 70.69 3.275
χ2 428.0 539.1
FREF=0 / χ
2
REF=0 (p-value) 12.99 (0.000364) 221.9 (3.46e-50) 4.115 (0.0429) 538.8 (3.38e-119)
N (DFM) 6004 (19) 3382 (20) 6004 (1) 2229 (2)
Robust t statistics in parenth., built with HAC SE, estim. constant omitted in column (3)
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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E.3. A placebo test – Neighborhood effects of
referenda against PV on the NUTS-3 level
Table E.6.: Estimation of successful referendum nearby on adoption of large PV
systems.
(1) (2) (3)
∆FPV>100 kWp,t ∆FPV>100 kWp,t ∆#PV>100 kWp,t
Estimator OLS FE Cond. Poisson FE Uncond. Neg. Bin. FE
REFPV,t−1 0.000730 -0.102 0.209
(0.11) (-0.59) (1.42)
W REFPV,t−1 -0.00352 0.0238 0.132
(-0.41) (0.09) (0.45)
FPV>100 kWp,t−1 0.400
∗∗∗ -1.584∗∗∗
(9.50) (-3.35)
W FPV>100 kWp,t−1 0.0146 0.490
(0.36) (0.46)
#PV>100 kWp,t−1 -0.00397
∗∗∗
(-5.13)
W #PV>100 kWp,t−1 -0.00154
(-1.21)
θ−1 0.0901
NUTS-3 and Year FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.571
Adj. R2 0.570
LL -113.9 -6643.4
F 140.7
χ2 42799.2 93298.6
FW REF=0 / χ
2
W REF=0 (p-value) 0.169 (0.682) 0.00740 (0.931) 0.201 (0.654)
N (DFM) 6435 (17) 6420 (18) 6435 (446)
Robust t statistics in parenth., built with HAC SE, estim. constant omitted in column (3)
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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F. Appendix to Chapter 7 – From
Green Users to Green Voters
F.1. Proof of Proposition 1
If we adopt technology at t, we get
Vt = e
−rt
(
Ptej
r
− cj0e−αt
)
. (F.1)
If we adopt technology at t+ dt, we get
EtVt+dt = (1− λdt)
[
e−r(t+dt)
(
Ptej
r
− cj0e−α(t+dt)
)]
(F.2)
+ λdt
[
e−r(t+dt)
(
φPtej
r
− cj0e−α(t+dt)
)]
.
The moment of adoption corresponds to lim
dt→0
EtVt+dt − Vt
dt
= 0, and
EtVt+dt = e
−r(t+dt)
(
Ptej
r
− cj0e−α(t+dt)
)
+ λe−r(t+dt)
(φ− 1)Ptej
r
dt (F.3)
= e−rt(1− rdt)
(
Ptej
r
− cj0e−αt(1− αdt)
)
+ λe−rt
(φ− 1)Ptej
r
dt+ o(dt)
= e−rt
(
Ptej
r
− cj0e−αt
)
+ e−rt
(
−Ptej + rcj0e−αt + αe−αtcj0 + λ(φ− 1)Ptej
r
)
dt+ o(dt).
Correspondingly, the solution is
lim
dt→0
EtVt+dt − Vt
dt
= e−rt
(
−Ptej + rcj0e−αt + αe−αtcj0 + λ(φ− 1)Ptej
r
)
= 0.
(F.4)
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Rearranging, we obtain
(r + α)e−αtcj0 +
(
λ
(φ− 1)
r
− 1
)
Ptej = 0. (F.5)
Which yields the optimal adoption condition stated in Proposition 1:
cj0/ej =
(
1− λ (φ−1)
r
)
Pt
(r + α)e−αt
 (F.6)
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F.2. Tables
Table F.1.: Descriptive statistics, PV.
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
FPV,t−1 .012 .018 8.7e-05 .13
FPV≤30 kWp,t .012 .016 8.7e-05 .11
FPV≤100 kWp,t .012 .018 8.7e-05 .13
FPV>100 kWp,t .0002 .00048 0 .007
FPV>1 MWp,t .00013 .00042 0 .0064
FPVCapac.,t−1 .0077 .035 1.0e-06 .74
FPVCapac.≤30 kWp,t−1 .0096 .018 2.6e-05 .15
FPVCapac.≤100 kWp,t−1 .0097 .018 2.1e-05 .17
FPVCapac.>100 kWp,t−1 .00011 .00054 0 .011
FPVCapac.>1 MWp,t−1 .00011 .00054 0 .011
∆FPV,t−1 .0088 .012 8.7e-05 .094
∆FPV≤30 kWp,t .0081 .011 -2.0e-05 .081
∆FPV≤100 kWp,t .0086 .012 -2.0e-05 .093
∆FPV>100 kWp,t .00017 .00041 -3.4e-05 .0059
∆FPV>1 MWp,t .00011 .00036 -3.4e-05 .0054
∆FPVCapac.,t−1 .007 .033 -.00063 .69
∆FPVCapac.≤30 kWp,t−1 .0076 .013 -6.4e-06 .12
∆FPVCapac.≤100 kWp,t−1 .0078 .014 -5.1e-06 .13
∆FPVCapac.>100 kWp,t−1 .0001 .00051 -1.0e-05 .011
∆FPVCapac.>1 MWp,t−1 9.9e-05 .00051 -1.2e-05 .011
FPV,t−k−1 .0037 .006 0 .047
FPV,t−2k−1 .001 .0019 0 .021
FPV≤30 kWp,t−k .0035 .0058 0 .045
FPV≤100 kWp,t−k .0036 .006 0 .046
FPV>100 kWp,t−k 3.1e-05 9.4e-05 0 .0016
FPV>1 MWp,t−k 2.2e-05 8.1e-05 0 .0012
FPVCapac.,t−k−1 .00073 .0033 0 .046
FPVCapac.≤30 kWp,t−k−1 .0021 .0045 0 .043
FPVCapac.≤100 kWp,t−k−1 .002 .0044 0 .038
FPVCapac.>100 kWp,t−k−1 9.6e-06 5.0e-05 0 .00069
FPVCapac.>1 MWp,t−k−1 9.5e-06 4.9e-05 0 .00068
pPV,t 49 4.7 43 55
sun 1033 58 775 1162
∆pPV,t−1/pPV,t−k−1 ∗ sun .17 .24 -.022 .55
vt .079 .036 .02 .29
∆vt .012 .015 -.03 .081
ln(GDPcap,t) 10 .33 9.4 11
N 1239
Table F.2.: Descriptive statistics, PV (NLS).
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
FPV,t−k−1 .0038 .0061 0 .047
sun 1035 58 871 1162
share si do housest−k−1 83 12 42 97
east .18 .38 0 1
t 4 .82 3 5
year 2005 2.9 2002 2009
N 1157
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F.2.1. Without south
Table F.3.: Three-stage least squares estimation of increase in PV diffusion on in-
crease in share of green votes (without south of Germany).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆vt ∆vt ∆vt ∆vt
∆FˆPV,t−1 0.901∗∗∗ 1.978∗∗∗ 0.355 0.541∗
(5.58) (11.37) (1.75) (1.98)
ln(GDPcap,t) 0.00455∗ -0.0403∗∗∗ -0.00517 -0.00259
(2.43) (-3.57) (-0.76) (-0.24)
share si-do houst -0.000145∗∗ -0.00163 0.000373 0.000475
(-2.70) (-1.82) (1.91) (0.49)
α -0.0271 0.0407
(-1.29) (0.79)
NUTS-3 fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes
R2 0.0749 0.257 0.540 0.598
Adj. R2 0.0711 -0.122 0.537 0.391
F 21.59 55.56 161.9 106.2
N 737 737 737 737
t statistics in parentheses, built with Newey-West SE
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table F.4.: Descriptive statistics, PV (without south of Germany).
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
FPV,t−1 .004 .007 0 .051
∆FPV,t−1 .0036 .0059 -1.4e-05 .042
FPV,t−k−1 .0013 .0019 0 .015
sun 1002 38 775 1082
∆pPV,t−1/pPV,t−k−1 ∗ sun .12 .21 -.02 .52
vt .067 .031 .019 .21
∆vt .0065 .015 -.029 .081
ln(GDPcap,t) 10 .32 9.3 11
N 1370
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F.2.2. Solar radiation and green votes
Table F.5.: OLS estimation of solar radiation on increase in share of green votes.
(1) (2) (3)
∆vt ∆vt ∆vt
sun 0.0000117 0.000000291 0.00000372
(1.42) (0.03) (0.71)
ln(GDPcap,t) 0.00826∗∗∗ 0.00585∗∗∗
(5.58) (5.56)
α 0.000675 -0.0710∗∗∗ -0.0472∗∗∗
(0.08) (-4.75) (-4.45)
Time fixed effects No No Yes
R2 0.00212 0.0343 0.577
Adj. R2 0.00125 0.0326 0.575
F 2.030 16.99 436.7
N 1159 1159 1159
DFM 1 2 4
Robust t statistics in parentheses
# p < 0.15, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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F.2.3. Pre-1998 voting dynamics filtered away from post 1998
voting dynamics
Table F.6.: Descriptive statistics, PV (pre-1998 voting dynamics filtered away).
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
∆vt .0077 .015 -.03 .081
∆vt − ˆβvt−kvt−k .062 .03 .014 .24
vt−k .067 .03 .019 .29
ln(GDPcap,t) 10 .34 9.3 11
share si-do houst 83 12 43 97
FPV,t−1 .0094 .016 0 .13
∆FPV,t−1 .0066 .011 -1.4e-05 .094
FPV,t−k−1 .0028 .0054 0 .047
FˆPV,t−k−1 .0028 .0046 -.0072 .021
N 1633
Table F.7.: OLS estimation of increase in PV diffusion on increase in share of green
votes (pre-1998 voting dynamics filtered away).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆vt − ˆβvt−kvt−k ∆vt − ˆβvt−kvt−k ∆vt − ˆβvt−kvt−k ∆vt − ˆβvt−kvt−k
∆FPV,t 0.377
∗∗∗ 0.705∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
(6.22) (13.76) (4.78) (5.25)
ln(GDPcap,t) 0.0352∗∗∗ 0.0637∗∗∗ 0.00585∗∗∗ -0.00778
(12.43) (9.51) (7.09) (-1.02)
α -0.306∗∗∗ -0.0374∗∗∗
(-10.81) (-4.42)
NUTS-3 fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes
R2 0.288 0.563 0.582 0.752
Adj. R2 0.286 0.343 0.581 0.626
F 114.8 363.9 424.3 462.3
N 1160 1160 1160 1160
t statistics in parentheses, built with Newey-West SE
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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F.2.4. Industrial vs. household systems
Table F.8.: First stage NLS estimation of logistic PV diffusion (industrial vs. house-
hold systems).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FPV≤30 kWp,t−k−1 FPV≤100 kWp,t−k−1 FPV>100 kWp,t−k−1 FPV>1 MWp,t−k−1
a -0.0977∗∗∗ -0.0993∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ 0.873∗∗∗
(-9.04) (-9.47) (4.44) (9.58)
asun 0.930∗∗∗ 0.943∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗
(9.36) (9.70) (-4.32) (-9.90)
a2sun 0.564
∗∗∗ 0.706∗∗∗
(4.26) (8.66)
ashare si-do houses 0.139
∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(5.27) (5.33)
aurban -0.00238 0.000877
(-0.46) (0.18)
aeast -0.00497∗∗∗ -0.00503∗∗∗ 0.00118 0.00479
(-8.92) (-8.65) (1.29) (1.33)
b 2.988∗∗∗ 3.233∗∗∗ 1.986∗ 2.011∗
(6.24) (5.03) (2.51) (2.26)
c 4.324∗∗∗ 4.300∗∗∗ 4.943∗∗∗ 4.691∗∗∗
(46.09) (43.68) (6.05) (7.45)
NUTS-3 fixed effects No No No No
Time fixed effects No No No No
R2 0.753 0.750 0.220 0.254
Adj. R2 0.751 0.749 0.215 0.247
N 1157 1157 1131 744
t statistics in parentheses, robust SE
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table F.9.: Second stage estimation of increase in PV diffusion on increase in share
of green votes (industrial vs. household systems).
Household installations Industrial installations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆FPV≤30 kWp,t ∆FPV≤100 kWp,t ∆FPV>100 kWp,t ∆FPV>1 MWp,t
FˆPV≤30kWp,t−k−1 1.527
∗∗∗
(14.32)
FˆPV≤100 kWp,t−k−1 1.625
∗∗∗
(14.42)
FˆPV>100 kWp,t 5.893
∗∗∗
(4.85)
FˆPV>1 MWp,t 1.691
(1.59)
ln(GDPcap,t) 0.0119∗∗ 0.0129∗∗ 0.000115 0.000538
(2.85) (2.82) (0.48) (1.56)
share si-do houst -0.000656 -0.000604
(-1.50) (-1.28)
R2 0.763 0.765 0.395 0.320
Adj. R2 0.641 0.645 0.0877 -0.0287
F 265.2 262.7 71.98 46.57
FInstrument=0 205.2 207.9 23.53 2.523
p-valueInstrument=0 2.07e-41 7.03e-42 0.00000150 0.113
N 1157 1157 1134 747
t statistics in parentheses, built with Newey-West SE
NUTS-3 and time fixed effects included
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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F.2.5. The diffusion of eolic systems
Table F.10.: Descriptive statistics, eolic.
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
FEolic,t−1 .036 .072 0 .87
FEolicCapac.,t−1 .032 .078 0 1.3
∆FEolic,t−1 .012 .028 0 .47
∆FEolicCapac.,t−1 .015 .044 0 1.1
FEolic,t−k−1 .024 .055 0 .72
FEolicCapac.,t−k−1 .017 .045 0 .8
pEolic,t 8.6 .26 8.3 8.8
∆pEolic,t/pPV,t−k ∗ wind 30 147 -335 420
vt .079 .036 .02 .29
∆vt .012 .015 -.03 .081
ln(GDPcap,t) 10 .33 9.4 11
N 1239
Table F.11.: First stage NLS estimation of logistic eolic diffusion.
(1) (2)
FEolic,t−k−1 FEolicCapac.,t−k−1
a -0.147∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗
(-3.38) (-3.27)
awind 0.0674
∗∗∗ 0.0547∗∗∗
(3.49) (3.49)
aeast 0.00662 0.00681
(1.11) (1.14)
b 1.431 1.902∗∗∗
(1.90) (3.62)
c 2.555∗∗∗ 3.015∗∗∗
(4.83) (7.99)
NUTS-3 fixed effects No No
Time fixed effects No No
R2 0.440 0.379
Adj. R2 0.437 0.376
N 1171 1171
t statistics in parentheses, robust SE
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table F.12.: Second stage estimation of increase in eolic diffusion on increase in
share of green votes.
(1) (2)
∆FEolic,t−1 ∆FEolicCapac.,t−1
FˆEolic,t−k−1 -0.315∗∗∗
(-3.45)
FˆEolicCapac.,t−k−1 -0.0389
(-0.38)
ln(GDPcap,t) 0.0555∗ 0.0697
(2.02) (1.42)
R2 0.0618 0.0101
Adj. R2 -0.415 -0.493
F 5.913 2.076
FInstrument=0 11.94 0.148
p-valueInstrument=0 0.000581 0.701
N 1161 1161
t statistics in parentheses, built with Newey-West SE
NUTS-3 and time fixed effects included
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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F.2.6. SOEP
Table F.13.: Descriptive statistics, SOEP.
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
∆Greent .024 .15 0 1
PVt−1 .065 .25 0 1
∆PVt−1,t−2,t−3 .024 .15 0 1
ln RHHINCt 7.8 .59 3.7 11
∆ ln RHHINCt .014 .28 -3.4 3
∆PVt−1 .01 .1 0 1
Green2t−1 .056 .23 0 1
∆Greent−1,t−2,t−3 .049 .22 0 1
Internett−1 .43 .5 0 1
PCt−1 .59 .49 0 1
N 68930
Removed PV systems
Why should we exclude those who claim that they have removed a PV system?
Figure F.1 compares the fraction of respondents who claim that they removed PV
in the SOEP data set and those in the full sample of PV systems by transmis-
sion system operator. The figure illustrates that, according to the SOEP data set,
disproportionately many PV systems were removed.
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Figure F.1.: Rate of cumulative removed divided by cumulative installed PV systems
by year.
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Details on controls
All SOEP estimations include the following controls.
A dummy for vocational education. The dummy is set to one if the respondent states
that she completed one of the following (zero otherwise): Lehre (Apprenticeship),
Berufsfachschule, Gesundheitswesen (Vocational School), Schule Gesundheitswesen
(bis 99) (Health Care School), Fachschule, Meister (Technical School), Beamtenaus-
bildung (Civil Service Training), Sonstiger Abschluss (Other Training).
A dummy for college education. The dummy is set to one if the respondent states
that she completed one of the following (zero otherwise): Fachhochschule (Technical
College), Universitaet, TH (University, Technical College), Hochschule im Ausland
(College Not In Germany), Ingenieur-, Fachschule (Ost) (Engineering, Techncial
School (East)), Hochschule (Ost) (University (East)).
A dummy for labor status. The dummy is set to one if the respondent states that
she has a job (zero otherwise), in SOEP wording: Working (Working).
183
F. Appendix to Chapter 7 – From Green Users to Green Voters
Unbalanced panel
Section 7.4.6 in Chapter 7 shows the results for the balanced SOEP data, i.e., indi-
viduals for whom one observation between 2007 and 2012 is missing are excluded.
Why are the results of the balanced panel (see Table 7.23, 7.24, 7.25, 7.26 and 7.27
in Section 7.4.6 of Chapter 7 ) the most reliable? Using an unbalanced panel biases
our results since a missing observation in t prohibits us from including a change at
t + 1. Since we lag ∆PVt−1,t−2,t−3 we cannot even find a change at t + 2. Only
in the balanced panel, ∆PVt−1,t−2,t−3 measures the intended effect. If respondents
have to possess a PV system in consecutive years to be classified as PV adopters,
non-adopters should, conversely, have to possess no PV system in consecutive years.
The control group – those who did not install PV – should also be observed in all
periods of study.
Still, if we analyze the unbalanced panel but focus on home owners who did not
remove their PV system, we find an odds ratio significantly greater than one for the
level of PV adoption, see Table F.14 column (2), and the change in PV adoption,
see Table F.15 column (2). The descriptive statistics for the unbalanced panel are
shown in Table F.16.
Table F.14.: Odds ratio of PV level on change in green attitude for unbalanced panel.
All Home owners Non-home owners
(1) (2) (3)
∆Greent ∆Greent ∆Greent
PVt−1 1.448∗∗∗ 1.678∗∗∗ 0.646
(3.43) (4.39) (-1.29)
ln RHHINCt 1.185∗∗ 1.256∗∗ 1.256∗∗
(2.97) (2.71) (2.62)
Time∗NUTS-1 dummies Yes Yes Yes
College and vocational degree dummyt Yes Yes Yes
Labor status dummyt Yes Yes Yes
Observations 64757 35375 28928
DFM 67 66 65
Final log-likelihood L -7363.5 -4025.0 -3291.4
Exponentiated coefficients; Robust t statistics in parentheses clustered on households
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table F.15.: Odds ratio of PV change on change in green attitude for unbalanced
panel.
All Home owners Non-home owners
(1) (2) (3)
∆Greent ∆Greent ∆Greent
∆PVt−1,t−2,t−3 1.316 1.475∗ 0.554
(1.47) (2.01) (-1.01)
∆ ln RHHINCt 0.903 0.690∗∗ 1.249+
(-0.95) (-2.72) (1.65)
Time∗NUTS-1 dummies Yes Yes Yes
College and vocational degree dummyt Yes Yes Yes
Labor status dummyt Yes Yes Yes
Observations 56979 31451 25072
DFM 67 66 63
Final log-likelihood L -6614.6 -3631.5 -2942.2
Exponentiated coefficients; Robust t statistics in parentheses clustered on households
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table F.16.: Descriptive statistics, SOEP unbalanced panel.
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
∆Greent .024 .15 0 1
PVt−1 .062 .24 0 1
∆PVt−1,t−2,t−3 .022 .15 0 1
ln RHHINCt 7.8 .59 0 12
∆ ln RHHINCt .014 .3 -3.4 3.9
∆PVt−1 .011 .1 0 1
Green2t−1 .054 .23 0 1
∆Greent−1,t−2,t−3 .046 .21 0 1
Internett−1 .4 .49 0 1
PCt−1 .54 .5 0 1
N 117610
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Instrumental variables regression – Home owners
Table F.17.: Two stage least squares estimation of PV level on change in green
attitude (for home owners).
First stage Second stage
(1) (2)
PVt−1 ∆Greent
PˆVt−1 0.271∗∗∗
(3.35)
Internett−1 0.0194∗
(2.42)
PCt−1 0.0293∗∗
(3.17)
ln RHHINCt 0.0371∗∗∗ -0.00774
(4.16) (-1.44)
Time∗NUTS-1 dummies Yes Yes
College and vocational degree dummyt Yes Yes
Labor status dummyt Yes Yes
R2 0.0531 -0.218
Adj. R2 0.0506 -0.221
F 5.083 2.697
Hansen J statistic 0 1.375
Hansen p-value 0.241
Observations 25706 25706
DFM 69 68
Final log-likelihood L -5811.2 8399.7
Robust t statistics in parentheses clustered on households
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Instrumental variables regression – All
Table F.18.: Two stage least squares estimation of PV level on change in green
attitude (for home and non-home owners).
First stage Second stage
(1) (2)
PVt−1 ∆Greent
PˆVt−1 0.544∗∗∗
(3.29)
Internett−1 0.0107∗
(2.12)
PCt−1 0.0125∗
(2.31)
ln RHHINCt 0.0488∗∗∗ -0.0259∗∗
(9.37) (-2.71)
Time∗NUTS-1 dummies Yes Yes
College and vocational degree dummyt Yes Yes
Labor status dummyt Yes Yes
R2 0.0494 -0.668
Adj. R2 0.0480 -0.671
F 6.159 3.357
Hansen J statistic 0 0.246
Hansen p-value 0.620
Observations 45538 45538
DFM 69 68
Final log-likelihood L -1177.1 7354.1
Robust t statistics in parentheses clustered on households
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table F.19.: Estimates of PV level on change in green attitude (for home and non-
home owners).
Probit Bi-Probit
(1) (2)
∆Greent ∆Greent
PVt−1 0.159∗∗ 0.435
(2.64) (1.45)
ln RHHINCt 0.0485+ 0.0342
(1.65) (1.06)
First stage
Internett−1 0.0904∗
(2.13)
PCt−1 0.167∗∗
(3.19)
ln RHHINCt 0.431∗∗∗
(10.03)
Time∗NUTS-1 dummies Yes Yes
College and vocational degree dummyt Yes Yes
Labor status dummyt Yes Yes
ρ -0.139
χ2ρ=0 (p-value) 0.898 (0.343)
χ2Instruments=0 (p-value) 18.66 (0.0000889)
Observations 45455 45538
DFM 67 137
Final log-likelihood L -5143.7 -15503.0
Robust t statistics in parentheses clustered on households
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
187
F. Appendix to Chapter 7 – From Green Users to Green Voters
Instrumental variables regression – Non-home owners
Table F.20.: Estimates of PV level on change in green attitude (for non-home own-
ers).
Probit
(1)
∆Greent
PVt−1 -0.270
(-1.41)
ln RHHINCt 0.0763+
(1.74)
Time∗NUTS-1 dummies Yes
College and vocational degree dummyt Yes
Labor status dummyt Yes
ρ
χ2ρ=0 (p-value)
χ2Instruments=0 (p-value)
Observations 19268
DFM 61
Final log-likelihood L -2242.2
Robust t statistics in parentheses clustered on households
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table F.21.: Two stage least squares estimation of PV level on change in green
attitude (for non-home owners).
First stage Second stage
(1) (2)
PVt−1 ∆Greent
PˆVt−1 -1.596
(-1.51)
Internett−1 -0.00281
(-0.65)
PCt−1 -0.00424
(-0.98)
ln RHHINCt 0.0157∗∗∗ 0.0275+
(3.40) (1.76)
Time∗NUTS-1 dummies Yes Yes
College and vocational degree dummyt Yes Yes
Labor status dummyt Yes Yes
R2 0.0176 -1.720
Adj. R2 0.0142 -1.729
F 1.278 2.123
Hansen J statistic 0 0.0114
Hansen p-value 0.915
Observations 19832 19832
DFM 69 68
Final log-likelihood L 11677.6 -1840.3
Robust t statistics in parentheses clustered on households
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
188
F. Appendix to Chapter 7 – From Green Users to Green Voters
Instrumental variables regression – home owners, unbalanced panel
Using the unbalanced panel does not affect the results in which we use the level of
Internet and PC adoption to instrument the level of PV adoption. See Table F.22 for
the bi-probit estimates and Table F.23 for the two-stage least squares estimates.
Table F.22.: Estimates of PV level on change in green attitude (for home owners,
unbalanced panel).
Probit Bi-Probit
(1) (2)
∆Greent ∆Greent
PVt−1 0.230∗∗∗ 0.456∗
(4.30) (2.04)
ln RHHINCt 0.110∗∗ 0.0986∗∗
(3.05) (2.60)
First stage
Internett−1 0.120∗∗
(2.81)
PCt−1 0.231∗∗∗
(4.38)
ln RHHINCt 0.255∗∗∗
(5.91)
Time∗NUTS-1 dummies Yes Yes
College and vocational degree dummyt Yes Yes
Labor status dummyt Yes Yes
ρ -0.119
χ2ρ=0 (p-value) 1.119 (0.290)
χ2Instruments=0 (p-value) 36.11 (1.44e-08)
Observations 35375 35782
DFM 66 137
Final log-likelihood L -4021.4 -15238.2
Robust t statistics in parentheses clustered on households
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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F. Appendix to Chapter 7 – From Green Users to Green Voters
Table F.23.: Two stage least squares estimation of PV level on change in green
attitude (for home owners, unbalanced panel).
First stage Second stage
(1) (2)
PVt−1 ∆Greent
PˆVt−1 0.264∗∗∗
(3.77)
Internett−1 0.0187∗∗
(2.69)
PCt−1 0.0278∗∗∗
(3.62)
ln RHHINCt 0.0419∗∗∗ -0.00676
(5.68) (-1.41)
Time∗NUTS-1 dummies Yes Yes
College and vocational degree dummyt Yes Yes
Labor status dummyt Yes Yes
R2 0.0504 -0.201
Adj. R2 0.0486 -0.203
F 5.904 3.548
Hansen J statistic 0 1.916
Hansen p-value 0.166
Observations 35782 35782
DFM 69 68
Final log-likelihood L -7764.5 11745.1
Robust t statistics in parentheses clustered on households
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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F. Appendix to Chapter 7 – From Green Users to Green Voters
Reverse causality unbalanced panel
The estimates on reverse causality remain unaffected from using the unbalanced
panel. See Table F.24 for the level of PV adoption on becoming greener and Ta-
ble F.25 for the change of PV adoption on becoming greener.
Table F.24.: Odds ratio of green attitude level on PV change for unbalanced panel.
All Home owners Non-home owners
(1) (2) (3)
∆PVt−1 ∆PVt−1 ∆PVt−1
Green2t−1 0.848 0.606+ 1.420
(-0.89) (-1.85) (1.37)
ln RHHINCt 1.819∗∗∗ 1.795∗∗∗ 1.408∗
(5.95) (4.37) (2.15)
Time∗NUTS-1 dummies Yes Yes Yes
College and vocational degree dummyt Yes Yes Yes
Labor status dummyt Yes Yes Yes
Observations 63477 33662 25636
DFM 61 52 51
Final log-likelihood L -4028.7 -2686.8 -1256.8
Exponentiated coefficients; Robust t statistics in parentheses clustered on households
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table F.25.: Odds ratio of change in green attitude on PV change for unbalanced
panel.
All Home owners Non-home owners
(1) (2) (3)
∆PVt−1 ∆PVt−1 ∆PVt−1
∆Greent−1,t−2,t−3 0.756 0.475∗ 1.305
(-1.31) (-2.23) (0.91)
∆ ln RHHINCt 0.988 1.054 0.945
(-0.06) (0.19) (-0.18)
Time∗NUTS-1 dummies Yes Yes Yes
College and vocational degree dummyt Yes Yes Yes
Labor status dummyt Yes Yes Yes
Observations 55002 29609 21322
DFM 58 51 47
Final log-likelihood L -3331.7 -2271.0 -973.1
Exponentiated coefficients; Robust t statistics in parentheses clustered on households
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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